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Why Computer Simulation Cannot Be an End of Thought Experimentation Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-04-09 N. K. Shinod
Computer simulation (CS) and thought experiments (TE) seem to produce knowledge about the world without intervening in the world. This has called for a comparison between the two methods. However, Chandrasekharan et al. (2013) argue that the nature of contemporary science is too complex for using TEs. They suggest CS as the tool for contemporary sciences and conclude that it will replace TEs. In this
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Empiricism Must, but Cannot, Presuppose Real Causation Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-04-08 Hans Radder
In this article, I put forward a basic philosophical claim: empirical scientific knowledge, that is, knowledge generated in experimental and observational practices, presupposes real causation. My discussion exploits two core notions from the philosophical analysis of scientific experimentation and observation: the aim of realizing object-apparatus correlations and the required control of the relevant
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Explicationist Epistemology and the Explanatory Role of Knowledge Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-04-08 Erik J. Olsson
It has been argued that much of contemporary epistemology can be unified under Carnap’s methodology of explication, which originated in the neighboring field of philosophy of science. However, it is unclear to what extent epistemological theories that emphasize the explanatory role of knowledge fit into this picture, Kornblith’s natural kind epistemology and Williamson’s knowledge first approach being
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Mario Bunge (1919–2020): Conjoining Philosophy of Science and Scientific Philosophy Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-03-21 Martin Mahner
The leitmotif of Mario Bunge’s work was that the philosophy of science should be informed by a comprehensive scientific philosophy, and vice versa; with both firmly rooted in realism and materialism. Now Bunge left such a big oeuvre, comprising more than 70 books and hundreds of articles, that it is impossible to review it in its entirety. In addition to biographical remarks, this obituary will therefore
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Cooperative Division of Cognitive Labour: The Social Epistemology of Photosynthesis Research Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-03-19 Kärin Nickelsen
How do scientists generate knowledge in groups, and how have they done so in the past? How do epistemically motivated social interactions influence or even drive this process? These questions speak to core interests of both history and philosophy of science. Idealised models and formal arguments have been suggested to illuminate the social epistemology of science, but their conclusions are not directly
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Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory without Homeostatic Mechanisms: Two Recent Attempts and their Costs Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-03-17 Yukinori Onishi, Davide Serpico
The homeostatic property cluster theory (HPC) is widely influential for its ability to account for many natural-kind terms in the life sciences. However, the notion of homeostatic mechanism has never been fully explicated. In 2009, Carl Craver interpreted the notion in the sense articulated in discussions on mechanistic explanation and pointed out that the HPC account equipped with such notion invites
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Scientific Modeling Versus Engineering Modeling: Similarities and Dissimilarities Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-03-02 Aboutorab Yaghmaie
This article aims to answer what I call the “constitution question of engineering modeling”: in virtue of what does an engineering model model its target system? To do so, I will offer a category-theoretic, structuralist account of design, using the olog framework. Drawing on this account, I will conclude that engineering and scientific models are not only cognitively but also representationally indistinguishable
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Undecidability of the Spectral Gap: An Epistemological Look Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-03-02 Emiliano Ippoliti, Sergio Caprara
The results of Cubitt et al. on the spectral gap problem add a new chapter to the issue of undecidability in physics, as they show that it is impossible to decide whether the Hamiltonian of a quantum many-body system is gapped or gapless. This implies, amongst other things, that a reductionist viewpoint would be untenable. In this paper, we examine their proof and a few philosophical implications,
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Disagreement About Scientific Ontology Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-02-13 Bruno Borge
In this paper, I analyze some disagreements about scientific ontology as cases of disagreement between epistemic peers. I maintain that the particularities of these cases are better understood if epistemic peerhood is relativized to a perspective-like index of epistemic goals and values. Taking the debate on the metaphysics of laws of nature as a case study, I explore the limits and possibilities of
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On the Explanatory Power of Dispositional Realism Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-02-11 Nélida Gentile, Susana Lucero
The article focuses on the unifying and explanatory power of the selective realism defended by Anjan Chakravartty. Our main aim is twofold. First, we critically analyse the purported synthesis between entity realism and structural realism offered by the author. We give reasons to think that this unification is an inconvenient marriage. In the second step, we deal with certain controversial aspects
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Thematic Reclassifications and Emerging Sciences Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-02-07 Raphaël Sandoz
Over time, various thematic classifications have been put forward to organize science into a coherent system of specialized areas of research. From an analysis of the historical evolution of the criteria used to distinguish the sciences from one another, I propose in this paper a quadripartite typology for the different thematic classification systems propounded by scholars throughout the centuries
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Dispositional Realism, Conflicting Models and Contrastive Explanation Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-02-05 Adriana Spehrs
Chakravartty puts forward a view of scientific knowledge that conceives of properties attributed to objects by scientific models as dispositions. Those dispositions refer to the capacity of an object to behave differently in different circumstances. This pluralism of behaviour is intended to show that perspectivalism does not exclude the possibility of non-perspectival knowledge. To support this claim
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Pluralizing Darwin: Making Counter-Factual History of Science Significant Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-02-05 Thierry Hoquet
In the wake of recent attempts at alternate history (Bowler 2013), this paper suggests several avenues for a pluralistic approach to Charles Darwin and his role in the history of evolutionary theory. We examine in what sense Darwin could be described as a major driver of theoretical change in the history of biology. First, this paper examines how Darwin influenced the future of biological science:
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N. R. Hanson and von Uexküll: A Biosemiotic and Evolutionary Account of Theories Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-02-05 C. David Suárez Pascal
This paper proposes a biosemiotic conception of theories, as non-intentional organic theories, which is based on an analysis and comparison of philosopher Norwood Russell Hanson’s account of theories and zoologist Jakob von Uexküll’s theory of organisms. It is argued that Hanson’s proposals about scientific theories and their relation to observation are semiotic in nature and that there exists a correspondence
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Monist and Pluralist Approaches on Underdetermination: A Case Study in Evolutionary Microbiology Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-09-28 Thomas Bonnin
Philosophers have usually highlighted how the weakness and paucity of historical evidence underdetermine the choice between rival historical explanations. Focusing underdetermination on the link between theory and evidence comes, I argue, with three assumptions: (a) competing hypotheses are easy to generate, (b) investigators agree on the constitution and interpretation of the evidence and (c) a plurality
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Correction to: The Multicriterial Approach to the Problem of Demarcation Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-09-01 Damian Fernandez-Beanato
The Editors of JGPS regret that the corrections to this article have made two formulations misleading for the reader.
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Proof, Explanation, and Justification in Mathematical Practice Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-08-28 Moti Mizrahi
In this paper, I propose that applying the methods of data science to “the problem of whether mathematical explanations occur within mathematics itself” (Mancosu 2018) might be a fruitful way to shed new light on the problem. By carefully selecting indicator words for explanation and justification, and then systematically searching for these indicators in databases of scholarly works in mathematics
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Colour, Wavelength and Turbidity in the Light of Goethe’s Colour Studies Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-08-10 Gopi Krishna Vijaya
The polarity of light and dark in the treatment of the Newtonian spectrum and the inverse spectrum is studied further and the validity of heterogeneity of light and darkness in relation to Goethe’s views is examined. In order to clarify the reality of the “darkness rays”, the experimentum crucis is re-evaluated. It is shown that the commonly accepted analysis contains assumptions in the choice of the
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How to Justify the Symmetrization Postulate in Quantum Mechanics Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-08-05 Tomasz Bigaj
The aim of this paper is to reconstruct and correct one argument (known in the literature as the exchange degeneracy argument) in support of the symmetrization postulate in quantum mechanics. I identify the central premise of the argument as a thesis specifying a particular ontic (or epistemic) property of quantum superpositions. The precise form of this thesis depends on some underlying assumptions
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The Case Against Factorism: On the Labels of $$\otimes$$-Factor Hilbert-Spaces of Similar Particles in Quantum Mechanics Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-08-05 F. A. Muller, Gijs Leegwater
We discuss the case against Factorism, which is the standard assumption in quantum mechanics that the labels of the $$\otimes$$ -factor Hilbert-spaces in direct-product Hilbert-spaces of composite physical systems of similar particles refer to particles, either directly or descriptively. We distinguish different versions of Factorism and argue for their truth or falsehood. In particular, by introducing
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Regularities, Degrees of Necessity, and Dispositionalism Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-07-24 Xavi Lanao
Traditionally, philosophers have cashed out the distinction between law-like and accidental regularities sharply: a regularity is either law-like, and thereby necessary, or accidental. However, Mitchell (2000) and Lange (2008) have drawn attention to the fact that some law-like regularities come in different degrees of necessity. For instance, the regularity expressed by “all electrons are negatively
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Leibniz, Kant, and Referring in the Quantum Domain Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-07-11 Cord Friebe
The paper addresses the referring problem in quantum mechanics, by spelling out the alternatives with complete or individual concepts (Leibniz; in modern terms: definite descriptive proper names), with directly referential labels (standard formalism of quantum mechanics), and with intuition (Kant). The connection between the way of referring and some metaphysical theses about objects will be explained
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Identical Quantum Particles as Distinguishable Objects Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-06-24 Dennis Dieks, Andrea Lubberdink
According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. These classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by unique combinations of physical properties. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the received view is that particles of the same kind (“identical particles”) are physically indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This doctrine rests on the
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In Defence of Rationalist Accounts of the Continental Drift Debate: A Response to Pellegrini Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-06-15 Erik Weber, Dunja Šešelja
This paper is a reaction to ‘Styles of Thought on the Continental Drift Debate’ by Pablo Pellegrini, published in this journal. The author argues that rationalist accounts of the continental drift debate fail because they overlook important issues. In this discussion we distinguish various forms of rationalism. Then we present a sophisticated rationalist account of the continental drift debate and
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Presentist History for Pluralist Science Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-06-02 Hasok Chang
Building on my previous writings on presentism, pluralism, and “complementary science”, I develop an activist view of historiography. I begin by recognizing the inevitability of presentism. Our own purposes and perspectives do and should guide the production of our accounts of the past; like funerals, history-writing is for the living. There are different kinds of presentist history, depending on the
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On the Assessed Strength of Agents’ Bias Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-05-30 Jürgen Landes, Barbara Osimani
Recent work in social epistemology has shown that, in certain situations, less communication leads to better outcomes for epistemic groups. In this paper, we show that, ceteris paribus, a Bayesian agent may believe less strongly that a single agent is biased than that an entire group of independent agents is biased. We explain this initially surprising result and show that it is in fact a consequence
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On Chemical Natural Kinds Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-05-20 Eric R. Scerri
A critique of LaPorte's views on chemical kinds, like jade and ruby, is presented. More positively, a new slant is provided on the question of whether elements are natural kinds. This is carried out by appeal to the dual nature of elements, a topic that has been debated in the philosophy of chemistry but not in the natural kinds literature. It is claimed that the abstract notion of elements, as opposed
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The Multicriterial Approach to the Problem of Demarcation Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-04-29 Damian Fernandez-Beanato
The problem of demarcating science from nonscience remains unsolved. This article executes an analytical process of elimination of different demarcation proposals put forward since the professionalization of the philosophy of science, explaining why each of those proposals is unsatisfactory or incomplete. Then, it elaborates on how to execute an alternative multicriterial scientific demarcation project
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Typicality and Minutis Rectis Laws: From Physics to Sociology Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-04-24 Gerhard Wagner
This paper contributes to the clarification of the concept of “typicality” discussed in contemporary philosophy of physics by conceiving the nomological status of a typical behaviour such as that expressed in the Second Law of Thermodynamics as a “minutis rectis law”. A brief sketch of the discovery of “typicality” shows that there were ideas of typical behaviour not only in physics but also in sociology
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Formal Models of Scientific Inquiry in a Social Context: An Introduction Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-04-09 Dunja Šešelja, Christian Straßer, AnneMarie Borg
Formal models of scientific inquiry, aimed at capturing socio-epistemic aspects underlying the process of scientific research, have become an important method in formal social epistemology and philosophy of science. In this introduction to the special issue we provide a historical overview of the development of formal models of this kind and analyze their methodological contributions to discussions
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Appearance and Persistence as the Unity of Diachronic and Synchronic Concepts of Emergence Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-04-03 Vladimír Havlík
Recent philosophical discourse on emergence has developed with particular concern for the distinction between weak and strong emergence (e.g., Bedau 1997 ; Chalmers 2002 ) and with the primary focus on detailed analysis of the concept of supervenience (e.g., Kim 1984 ; 1999 ; McLaughlin 1997 ). However, in the last decade and as a new departure, attention has been devoted to the distinction between
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Population Thinking in Epistemic Evolution: Bridging Cultural Evolution and the Philosophy of Science Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-03-11 Antonio Fadda
Researchers in cultural evolutionary theory (CET) have recently proposed the foundation of a new field of research in cultural evolution named ‘epistemic evolution’. Drawing on evolutionary epistemology’s early studies, this programme aims to study science as an evolutionary cultural process. The paper discusses the way CET’s study of science can contribute to the philosophical debate and, vice versa
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From Gauss to Riemann Through Jacobi: Interactions Between the Epistemologies of Geometry and Mechanics? Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-03-01 Maria de Paz, José Ferreirós
The aim of this paper is to argue that there existed relevant interactions between mechanics and geometry during the first half of the nineteenth century, following a path that goes from Gauss to Riemann through Jacobi. By presenting a rich historical context we hope to throw light on the philosophical change of epistemological categories applied by these authors to the fundamental principles of both
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Aristotle and Quantum Mechanics: Potentiality and Actuality, Spontaneous Events and Final Causes Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-02-19 Boris Kožnjak
Aristotelian ideas have in the past been applied with mixed fortunes to quantum mechanics. One of the most persistent criticisms is that Aristotle’s notions of potentiality and actuality are burdened with a teleological character long ago abandoned in the natural sciences. Recently this criticism has been met with a model of the actualization of quantum potentialities in light of Aristotle’s doctrine
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On the Tension Between Physics and Mathematics Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-02-04 Miklós Rédei
Because of the complex interdependence of physics and mathematics their relation is not free of tensions. The paper looks at how the tension has been perceived and articulated by some physicists, mathematicians and mathematical physicists. Some sources of the tension are identified and it is claimed that the tension is both natural and fruitful for both physics and mathematics. An attempt is made to
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Effective Complexity: In Which Sense is It Informative? Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-01-03 Esteban Céspedes, Miguel Fuentes
This work responds to a criticism of effective complexity made by James McAllister, according to which such a notion is not an appropriate measure for information content. Roughly, effective complexity is focused on the regularities of the data rather than on the whole data, as opposed to algorithmic complexity. McAllister’s argument shows that, because the set of relevant regularities for a given
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What Are the Pragmatics of Explanation? Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-01-03 John W. Carroll
An enticing view about explanation consists of two theses. First, there is the Relevance Thesis, the thesis that the truth of explanation sentences depends on a contextually selected relevance relation. The idea is that whether an utterance is true depends on what factors the context counts as relevant. Second, there is the Contrastivity Thesis, the thesis that the truth of explanation sentences depends
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A Conciliatory Answer to the Paradox of the Ravens Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-12-27 William Peden
In the Paradox of the Ravens, a set of otherwise intuitive claims about evidence seems to be inconsistent. Most attempts at answering the paradox involve rejecting a member of the set, which seems to require a conflict either with commonsense intuitions or with some of our best confirmation theories. In contrast, I argue that the appearance of an inconsistency is misleading: ‘confirms’ and cognate
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Cognitive Niche Construction and Extragenetic Information: A Sense of Purposefulness in Evolution Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-12-16 Lorenzo Magnani
My book Abductive Cognition. The Epistemological and Eco-Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning (2009) basically refers to all kinds of human hypothetical cognition, also of creative kind. During the research related to the preparation of that book I soon had the opportunity to examine the studies regarding the human process of continuous delegation and distribution of cognitive functions to
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Inquiring into Space-Time, the Human Mind, and Religion: The Life and Work of Adolf Grünbaum (1923–2018) Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-12-01 Martin Carrier, Gereon Wolters
Grunbaum's three chief fields of research were space-time philosophy, the methodological credentials of psychoanalysis, and reasons given in favor of the existence of God. Grunbaum defended the so-called conventionality thesis of physical geometry. He partially followed Hans Reichenbach in this respect but developed a new ontological argument for the conventionality claim in addition. In addressing
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An Argument for the Principle of Indifference and Against the Wide Interval View Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-11-18 John E. Wilcox
The principle of indifference has fallen from grace in contemporary philosophy, yet some papers have recently sought to vindicate its plausibility. This paper follows suit. In it, I articulate a version of the principle and provide what appears to be a novel argument in favour of it. The argument relies on a thought experiment where, intuitively, an agent’s confidence in any particular outcome being
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Evolutionary Explanations of Simple Communication: Signalling Games and Their Models Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-10-29 Travis LaCroix
This paper applies the theoretical criteria laid out by D’Arms et al. ( 1998 ) to various aspects of evolutionary models of signalling. The question that D’Arms et al. seek to answer can be formulated as follows: Are the models that we use to explain the phenomena in question conceptually adequate? The conceptual adequacy question relates the formal aspects of the model to those aspects of the natural
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Intended and Unintended Mathematics: The Case of the Lagrange Multipliers Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-10-24 Daniele Molinini
We can distinguish between two different ways in which mathematics is applied in science: when mathematics is introduced and developed in the context of a particular scientific application; when mathematics is used in the context of a particular scientific application but it has been developed independently from that application. Nevertheless, there might also exist intermediate cases in which mathematics
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Principles of Information Processing and Natural Learning in Biological Systems Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-10-23 Predrag Slijepcevic
The key assumption behind evolutionary epistemology is that animals are active learners or ‘knowers’. In the present study, I updated the concept of natural learning, developed by Henry Plotkin and John Odling-Smee, by expanding it from the animal-only territory to the biosphere-as-a-whole territory. In the new interpretation of natural learning the concept of biological information, guided by Peter
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Converging Concepts of Evolutionary Epistemology and Cognitive Biology Within a Framework of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-10-19 Isabella Sarto-Jackson
Evolutionary epistemology (EE) has experienced a continuous rise over the last decades. Important new theoretical considerations and novel empirical findings have been integrated into the existing framework (Gontier and Bradie 2018). In this paper, I would like to suggest three lines of research that I believe will significantly contribute to further advance EE: (1) ontogenetic considerations, (2)
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Particles Do Not Conspire Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-10-10 Arianne Shahvisi
The aim of this paper is to debunk the assertion that miraculous “conspiracies” between fundamental particles are required to bring about the projectibility of special science generalisations. Albert and Loewer have proposed a theory of lawhood which supplements the Best System of fundamental laws with a statistical postulate over the initial conditions of the universe, thereby rendering special science
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Knowledge Objects of Synthetic Biology: From Phase Transitions to the Biological Switch Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-10-08 Thorsten Kohl, Johannes Falk
Following Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s epistemological concept we show how a generic element of synthetic biology, the “biological switch”, can be integrated into an experimental system. Here synthetic biology is assumed to be a technoscience. Hence, the biological switch becomes a technoscientific research object. Consequently, the experimental system has to be analyzed in a technoscientific experimental
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Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-09-24 Seungbae Park
The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (J Gen Philos Sci 49(3):451–459, 2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park in J Gen Philos Sci 48(4):569–579, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén in Stud Hist Philos Sci 56(72):82, 2016). I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against
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Cultural Blankets: Epistemological Pluralism in the Evolutionary Epistemology of Mechanisms Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-09-05 Pierre Poirier, Luc Faucher, Jean-Nicolas Bourdon
In a recently published paper, we argued that theories of cultural evolution can gain explanatory power by being more pluralistic. In his reply to it, Dennett agreed that more pluralism is needed. Our paper’s main point was to urge cultural evolutionists to get their hands dirty by describing the fine details of cultural products and by striving to offer detailed and, when explanatory, varied algorithms
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Explicating Objectual Understanding: Taking Degrees Seriously Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-09-01 Christoph Baumberger
The paper argues that an account of understanding should take the form of a Carnapian explication and acknowledge that understanding comes in degrees. An explication of objectual understanding is defended, which helps to make sense of the cognitive achievements and goals of science. The explication combines a necessary condition with three evaluative dimensions: an epistemic agent understands a subject
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Non-factive Understanding: A Statement and Defense Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-09-01 Yannick Doyle, Spencer Egan, Noah Graham, Kareem Khalifa
In epistemology and philosophy of science, there has been substantial debate about truth’s relation to understanding. “Non-factivists” hold that radical departures from the truth are not always barriers to understanding; “quasi-factivists” demur. The most discussed example concerns scientists’ use of idealizations in certain derivations of the ideal gas law from statistical mechanics. Yet, these discussions
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From Explanation to Understanding: Normativity Lost? Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-09-01 Henk W. de Regt
In recent years, scientific understanding has become a focus of attention in philosophy of science. Since understanding is typically associated with the pragmatic and psychological dimensions of explanation, shifting the focus from explanation to understanding may induce a shift from accounts that embody normative ideals to accounts that provide accurate descriptions of scientific practice. Not surprisingly
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Understanding for Hire Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-09-01 Daniel A. Wilkenfeld, Christa M. Johnson
In this paper, we will explore one way in which understanding can—and, we will argue, should—be valuable. We will do this by drawing on what has been said (primarily in Pritchard et al.: The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) about the different ways knowledge can be valuable. Our main contribution will be to identify one heretofore undiscussed
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How to Formulate Scientific Realism and Antirealism Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-08-21 Seungbae Park
The wider the gap between rivaling positions, the more there can be debates between rivaling interlocutors. The gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the Prussian conception of rationality is wider than the gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the English conception of rationality. Therefore, scientific
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How Theories of Induction Can Streamline Measurements of Scientific Performance Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-08-07 Slobodan Perović, Vlasta Sikimić
We argue that inductive analysis (based on formal learning theory and the use of suitable machine learning reconstructions) and operational (citation metrics-based) assessment of the scientific process can be justifiably and fruitfully brought together, whereby the citation metrics used in the operational analysis can effectively track the inductive dynamics and measure the research efficiency. We
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Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-17 Zahra Zargar, Ebrahim Azadegan, Lotfollah Nabavi
It is widely supposed that methodological naturalism, understood as a thesis about the methodology of science, is metaphysically neutral, and that this in turn guarantees the value-neutrality of science. In this paper we argue that methodological naturalism is underpinned by certain ontological and epistemological assumptions including evidentialism and the causal closure of the physical, adoption
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Copernican Reasoning About Intelligent Extraterrestrials: A Reply to Simpson Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-17 Samuel Ruhmkorff, Tingao Jiang
Copernican reasoning involves considering ourselves, in the absence of other information, to be randomly selected members of a reference class. Consider the reference class intelligentobservers. If there are extraterrestrial intelligences (ETIs), taking ourselves to be randomly selected intelligent observers leads to the conclusion that it is likely the Earth has a larger population size than the typical
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Towards a Monist Theory of Explanation Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-16 Carsten Held
A monist theory of explanation is one that seeks a common definition for all speech acts answering why-questions. One recent example is the counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE), which assumes that an ideal explanation can be characterized by the familiar Hempelian criteria for a scientific explanation plus a certain counterfactual that is supported by the laws mentioned in the explanans. I show
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A Causal Approach to Analogy Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-07-16 Wolfgang Pietsch
Analogical reasoning addresses the question how evidence from various phenomena can be amalgamated and made relevant for theory development and prediction. In the first part of my contribution, I review some influential accounts of analogical reasoning, both historical and contemporary, focusing in particular on Keynes, Carnap, Hesse, and more recently Bartha. In the second part, I sketch a general
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Rules, Intentions and Social Behavior: A Reassessment of Peter Winch Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2019-06-28 Jordi Fairhurst
The aim of the present article is twofold. Firstly, it aims to study the problems arising from the notion of rule proposed by Peter Winch in The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (1958) to account for all meaningful behavior. On the one hand, it will analyze the problems in the argument posed by Winch in order to state that all meaningful behavior is governed by rules. On the
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