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Avowing the Avowal View Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-07 Elizabeth Schechter
This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that ¬p and yet is sincere in asserting that p. I argue that...
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Serious Actualism and Nonexistence Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-03 Christopher James Masterman
Serious actualism is the view that it is metaphysically impossible for an entity to have a property, or stand in a relation, and not exist. Fine (1985) and Pollock (1985) influentially argue that t...
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Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-03 Alec Hinshelwood
We know our own intentional actions in a distinctively first-personal way. Many accounts of knowledge of intentionally doing something, A, assume that grounds for the knowledge would have to establ...
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Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-03 Adam Bradley
Are we acquainted with the self in experience? It may seem so. After all, we tend to be confident in our own existence. A natural explanation for this confidence is that the self somehow shows up i...
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Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize? Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-21 Michael Zhao
Call ‘radical moral theorizing’ the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral judgments, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency,...
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The Grounds of a Critique of Pure Reason Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-20 Joe Stratmann
For the realist metaphysician, certain notions in metaphysics are objectively theory-guiding. But what makes them so? Echoing others, Dasgupta (2018) suggests that the realist metaphysician faces t...
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Ambiguity Tests, Polysemy, and Copredication Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-19 David Liebesman, Ofra Magidor
A family of familiar linguistic tests purport to help identify when a term is ambiguous. These tests are philosophically important: a familiar philosophical strategy is to claim that some phenomeno...
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The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-19 Benj Hellie
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)
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Amphibians and the Particular-Universal Distinction Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 Chiao-Li Ou
I defend a new conception of the particular-universal distinction based on considerations about what David Lewis calls ‘amphibians’. I argue, first, that given the possibility of amphibians, two re...
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Bad Beliefs: Why they Happen to Good People Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 David Coady
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)
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Engineering Human Beauty with More Caution Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 Xinkan Zhao
Ravasio (2023) recently presents an interesting discussion of strategies to deal with lookism. He categorizes strategies into revisionary and redistributive ones and argues for a case against the f...
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Sharing Pain: A Hybrid Expressivist Account Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 Jada Wiggleton-Little
When one communicates that they are in pain, it is often assumed that the speaker is providing an assertion or report. Call this the cognitivist stance of pain utterances. Nevertheless, many senten...
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The Reasons to Follow Conventional Practices Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 C. M. Melenovsky
This article challenges a reductive analysis of social practices by distinguishing five kinds of reason for following the rules of conventional practices. Depending on one’s preferred intellectual ...
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Perspective and spatial experience Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-04 Alex Kerr
Distant things look smaller, in a sense. Why? I argue that the reason is not that our experiences have a certain subject matter, or are about certain mind-independent things and features. Instead, ...
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Delusions and the Predictive Mind Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-03 Federico Bongiorno, Philip R. Corlett
A growing number of studies in both the scientific and the philosophical literature have drawn on a Bayesian predictive processing framework to account for the formation of delusions. The key here ...
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The Parmenidean Ascent Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Kenneth L. Pearce
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)
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The Horizonal Structure of Visual Experience Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-12-07 Jonathan Mitchell
How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite being limited, in any given perceptual moment, to perceiving the sides facing us from a specific spatial perspec...
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Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-12-03 Tammo Lossau
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)
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Attention And Attentiveness: A Defence of The Argument for Adverbialism Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-12-03 Christopher Mole
In recent philosophical work on attention, several authors have employed versions of an argument purporting to show that attention is not identical to any cognitive process. Others have criticised ...
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The Architectonic of Reason: Purposiveness and Systematic Unity in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-30 I.S. Blecher
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)
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Multidimensional Adjectives Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-28 Justin D’Ambrosio, Brian Hedden
Multidimensional adjectives are ubiquitous in natural language. An adjective F is multidimensional just in case whether F applies to an object or pair of objects depends on how those objects stand ...
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Coherence as Joint Satisfiability Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-29 Samuel Fullhart, Camilo Martinez
According to many philosophers, rationality is, at least in part, a matter of one’s attitudes cohering with one another. Theorists who endorse this idea have devoted much attention to formulating v...
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A Defence of Ontological Innocence: Response to Barker Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-23 Jonas Werner
In a recent paper in this journal, Jonathan Barker argues against the claim that grounded entities are ontologically innocent. In this paper I defend the ontological innocence of grounded entities ...
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Reasons First Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-23 Errol Lord
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)
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Why Is Proof the Only Way to Acquire Mathematical Knowledge? Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-10-15 Marc Lange
This paper proposes an account of why proof is the only way to acquire knowledge of some mathematical proposition’s truth. Admittedly, non-deductive arguments for mathematical propositions can be s...
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Plato’s Sun-Like Good: Dialectic in the Republic Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-12 Rick Benitez
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 101, No. 4, 2023)
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Perception and Disjunctive Belief: A New Problem for Ambitious Predictive Processing Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-07 Assaf Weksler
ABSTRACT Perception can’t have disjunctive content. Whereas you can think that a box is blue or red, you can’t see a box as being blue or red. Based on this fact, I develop a new problem for the ambitious predictive processing theory, on which the brain is a machine for minimizing prediction error, which approximately implements Bayesian inference. I describe a simple case of updating a disjunctive
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The Meaning of Terrorism Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-21 Anne Schwenkenbecher
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)
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On Scepticism About Ought Simpliciter Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-16 James L. D. Brown
ABSTRACT Scepticism about ought simpliciter is the view that there is no such thing as what one ought simpliciter to do. Instead, practical deliberation is governed by a plurality of normative standpoints, each authoritative from their own perspective but none authoritative simpliciter. This paper aims to resist such scepticism. After setting out the challenge in general terms, I argue that scepticism
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Russellian Monism and Ignorance of Non-structural Properties Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-16 Justin Mendelow
Russellian monists argue that non-structural properties, or a combination of structural and non-structural properties, necessitate phenomenal properties. Different Russellian monists offer varying accounts of the structural/non-structural distinction, leading to divergent forms of Russellian monism. In this paper, I criticise Derk Pereboom’s characterisation of the structural/non-structural distinction
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Metaphysical Emergence Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-08-16 Elanor Taylor
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 101, No. 3, 2023)
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A Case Against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-23 Allison Aitken
ABSTRACT There’s a common line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary, Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh–eighth century) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lacking any unifying principle, the phenomenal unity of conscious
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Sexualisation Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-12 Robert Morgan
ABSTRACT One person treats another as a sexual being by responding to their actual or perceived sexual properties. I develop an account of sexualisation to examine this phenomenon, especially as it relates to wrongful treatment such as sexual harassment. On the account proposed here, one person sexualises another when they foreground that person’s sexual properties. Some property of a person is foregrounded
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Paradoxes and Inconsistent Mathematics Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-09 Christian Alafaci
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)
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Well-Being Measurements and the Linearity Assumption: A Response to Wodak Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-03 Cristian Larroulet Philippi
ABSTRACT Wodak (2019) persuasively argues that we are not justified in believing that well-being measurements are linear. From this, he infers grave consequences for both political philosophy thought experiments and empirical psychological research. Here I argue that these consequences do not follow. Wodak’s challenges to the status of well-being measurements do not affect thought experiments, and
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Determinism, Death, and Meaning Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-06-19 James Baillie
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)
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On Believing: Being Right in a World of Possibilities Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-06-04 Aaron Z. Zimmerman
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)
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Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-06-04 Bryan C. Reece
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)
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Singular Experience Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-21 Ali Rezaei
ABSTRACT Almost every case of visual experience is as of a unified state of affairs and as of one or more specific particulars. I argue that a view on which the content of visual experience is a singular proposition, does a better job at explaining these two features of visual experience than three popular theories: the Complex Property Theory, Generalism, and Fregean Particularism. The defended view
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Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-16 J. Dmitri Gallow
ABSTRACT Standard principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second place, they face difficulties in cases where you’ve lost track of the time. I provide a principle of chance deference which handles those problem cases. This principle has a surprising consequence for Adam Elga’s Sleeping Beauty
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Skill and Mastery: Philosophical Stories from the Zhuangzi Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-16 Julianne Chung
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 101, No. 4, 2023)
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Even More Supererogatory Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-10 Holly M. Smith
ABSTRACT Losing an arm to rescue a child from a burning building is supererogatory. But is losing an arm to save two children more supererogatory than losing two arms to save a single child? What factors make one act more supererogatory than another? I provide an innovative account of how to compare which of two acts is more supererogatory, and show the superiority of this account to its chief rival
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Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-05-10 Eugene Mills
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)
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Disagreement for Dialetheists Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-03-31 Graham Bex-Priestley, Yonatan Shemmer
ABSTRACT Dialetheists believe some sentences are both true and false. Objectors have argued that this makes it unclear how people can disagree with each other because, given the dialetheist’s commitments, if I make a claim and you tell me my claim is false, we might both be correct. Graham Priest (2006a) thinks that people disagree by rejecting or denying what is said rather than ascribing falsehood
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Inescapable Concepts Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-28 Thomas Hofweber
ABSTRACT It seems to be impossible to draw metaphysical conclusions about the world merely from our concepts or our language alone. After all, our concepts alone only concern how we aim to represent the world, not how the world in fact is. In this paper I argue that this is mistaken. We can sometimes draw substantial metaphysical conclusions simply from thinking about how we represent the world. But
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Self-Fulfilling Beliefs: A Defence Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-27 Paul Silva Jr.
Self-fulfilling beliefs are, in at least some cases, a kind of belief that is rational to form and hold in the absence of evidence. The rationality of such beliefs have significant implications for...
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Buddhist Epistemology and the Liar Paradox Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-14 Szymon Bogacz
ABSTRACT The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox
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Robert Nola (25 June 1940 – 23 October 2022) Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-01 Frederick Kroon
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)
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Experience Embodied: Early Modern Accounts of the Human Place in Nature Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-29 Robert B. Louden
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 101, No. 3, 2023)
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Plato’s Epistemology: Being and Seeming Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-24 Rupert L Sparling
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 101, No. 2, 2023)
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Benefits are Better than Harms: A Reply to Feit Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-22 Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, Olle Risberg
ABSTRACT We have argued that the counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) violates the plausible adequacy condition that an act that would harm an agent cannot leave her much better off than an alternative act that would benefit her. In a recent paper in this journal, however, Neil Feit objects that our argument presupposes questionable counterfactual backtracking. He also argues
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When to Psychologize Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-23 A.K. Flowerree
The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question which is that of, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested i...
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The Catch-22 of Forgetfulness: Responsibility for Mental Mistakes Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-17 Zachary C. Irving, Samuel Murray, Aaron Glasser, Kristina Krasich
ABSTRACT Attribution theorists assume that character information informs judgments of blame. But there is disagreement over why. One camp holds that character information is a fundamental determinant of blame. Another camp holds that character information merely provides evidence about the mental states and processes that determine responsibility. We argue for a two-channel view, where character simultaneously
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The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the ‘Mind-Body’ Problem Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-18 Christopher Shields
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 101, No. 2, 2023)
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Rationality in Mathematical Proofs Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-18 Yacin Hamami, Rebecca Lea Morris
Mathematical proofs are not sequences of arbitrary deductive steps—each deductive step is, to some extent, rational. This paper aims to identify and characterize the particular form of rationality ...
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Feeling Like It: A Theory of Inclination and Will Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-18 Sergio Tenenbaum
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 101, No. 4, 2023)
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When is Equality Basic? Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-17 Ian Carter, Olof Page
In this paper we steer a course between two views of the value of equality that are usually understood as diametrically opposed to one another: on the one hand, the view that equality has intrinsic...
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Women Are Not Adult Human Females Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-04 Rebecca Mason
ABSTRACT Some philosophers argue that women are adult human females. Call this the Adult Human Female thesis (AHF). The aim of this paper is to show that AHF is false.
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The Audibility Problem and Indirect Listening Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-11-29 Wouter A. Cohen
ABSTRACT There is a strong intuition that we can listen to works of music, yet musical ontologies on which works of music are abstract objects, perhaps most notably, type theories of music, seem to imply that this is impossible. This problem has received relatively little attention in the literature. I here explore and develop a solution suggested by Julian Dodd and argue that it has at least two problematic
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Extending the Predictive Mind Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-11-23 Andy Clark
ABSTRACT How do intelligent agents spawn and exploit integrated processing regimes spanning brain, body, and world? The answer may lie in the ability of the biological brain to select actions and policies in the light of counterfactual predictions—predictions about what kinds of futures will result if such-and-such actions are launched. Appeals to the minimization of ‘counterfactual prediction errors’