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Evolutionary Debunking and the Folk/Theoretical Distinction Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-03-14 M. Scarfone
In metaethics, evolutionary debunking arguments combine empirical and epistemological premises to purportedly show that our moral judgments are unjustified. One objection to these arguments has been to distinguish between those judgments that evolutionary influence might undermine versus those that it does not. This response is powerful but not well understood. In this paper I flesh out the response
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The Hyperintensional Variant of Kaplan’s Paradox Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-03-09 Giorgio Lenta
David Kaplan famously argued that mainstream semantics for modal logic, which identifies propositions with sets of possible worlds, is affected by a cardinality paradox. Takashi Yagisawa showed that a variant of the same paradox arises when standard possible worlds semantics is extended with impossible worlds to deliver a hyperintensional account of propositions. After introducing the problem, we discuss
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Williamson’s Epistemicism and Properties Accounts of Predicates Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-02-26 Paul Teller
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Philosophy as a Science and as a Humanity? Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-02-23 Michael Strevens
This commentary on Philip Kitcher’s book What’s the Use of Philosophy? addresses two questions. First, must philosophers be methodologically self-conscious to do good work? Second, is there value in the questions pursued in the traditional areas of analytic philosophy?
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The Analysis and Reexamination of Functionalism from the Perspective of Artificial Intelligence Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-02-01 Strahinja Đorđević, Goran Ružić
This paper examines the role of machine functionalism, as one of the most popular positions within the philosophy of mind, in the context of the development of artificial intelligence. Our analysis starts from the idea that machine functionalism is a theory that is largely consistent with the principles behind the strong AI thesis. However, we will see that there is a convincing counter-argument against
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How to Read How to Do Things with Words: On Sbisà’s Proof by Contradiction Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-01-23 Jeremy Wanderer, Leo Townsend
Midway through How to Do Things With Words, J.L. Austin’s announces a “fresh start” in his efforts to characterize the ways in which speech is action, and introduces a new conceptual framework from the one he has been using up to that point. Against a common reading that portrays this move as simply abandoning the framework so far developed, Marina Sbisà contends that the text takes the argumentative
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Normative Error Theory and No Self-Defeat: A Reply to Case Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-01-19 Mustafa Khuramy, Erik Schulz
Many philosophers have claimed that normative error theorists are committed to the claim ‘Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it’, which to some appears paradoxical. Case (2019) has claimed that the normative error theorist cannot avoid this paradox. In this paper, we argue that there is no paradox in the first place, that is once we clear up the ambiguity of the word ‘reason’, both
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What Counts as Cheating? Deducibility, Imagination, and the Mary Case Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-01-18 Amy Kind
In The Matter of Consciousness, in the course of his extended discussion and defense of Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, Torin Alter dismisses some objections on the grounds that they are cases of cheating. Though some opponents of the knowledge argument offer various scenarios in which Mary might come to know what seeing red is like while still in the room, Alter argues that the proposed
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Replies to Vendrell Ferran, Piercey, Schechtman, and Collins Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-01-17 Jukka Mikkonen
i) Íngrid Vendrell Ferran’s defence of the ‘experiential view’ and her related conception of ‘radical neo-cogntivism’, ii) Robert Piercey’s view of the epistemic value of plots and emplotment, iii) Marya Schechtman’s revisionist ideas of self-narration, and, finally, iv) David Collins’s suggestion of the value of an imaginative engagement with the author of an artwork.
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Selves, Persons, and the Neo-Lucretian Symmetry Problem Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-01-16 Patrick Stokes
The heavily discussed (neo-)Lucretian symmetry argument holds that as we are indifferent to nonexistence before birth, we should also be indifferent to nonexistence after death. An important response to this argument insists that prenatal nonexistence differs from posthumous nonexistence because we could not have been born earlier and been the same ‘thick’ psychological self. As a consequence, we can’t
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Heterophenomenology: A Limited Critique Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-01-15
Abstract Dennett (Synthese, 53(2), 159–180, 1982, 1991, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9–10), 19–30, 2003, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6, 247–270, 2007) proposes and defends a method called heterophenomenology. Heterophenomenology is a method to study consciousness from a third-person objective point of view as opposed to a first-person subjective point of view or (auto)-phenomenology
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The Dilemma of Authority Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-01-13 Allyn Fives
What I refer to here as the dilemma of authority arises when one ought to defer to authority; one ought to act as the more weighty reason demands; one can do either; one cannot do both. For those who reject the possibility of legitimate authority, the dilemma does not arise. Among those who accept legitimate authority, some, including Joseph Raz, presume the conflict can be resolved without remainder
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Miscevic and the Stages Defence Philosophia Pub Date : 2024-01-12 Sören Häggqvist
This contribution examines Miscevic’s defence against restrictionist X-phi, based on his view that thought experiments exhibit a large number of typical stages. On Miscevic’s view, the epistemic threats identified by proponents of the negative program in X-phi may be countered or ameliorated in various ways at various stages. I argue that the defence he offers is insufficient to counter the arguments
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Does Parfit Establish Non-Reductionists Should Accept the Extreme Claim? Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-12-22 Douglas Ehring
The Non-Reductionist holds that personal identity is a matter in whole or in part of “further facts,” facts over and above those about psychological and physical continuity and connectedness. If Non-Reductionism is true, then it is possible for there to be “nonsymmetrical fission cases” in which there is nonsymmetry with respect to further facts such that the fissioner is identical with one of the
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Recklessness, Agent-Relative Prerogatives, and Latent Obligations: Does Belief-Relativity Trump Fact-Relativity with Respect to Our Rights? Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-12-13 Larry Alexander
Are our rights—to our bodily integrity, to our possessions, to the goods and services promised us, and so on—matters of fact, or are our rights functions of others’ beliefs about how their acts will affect our rights? The conventional view states that subjective oughts—based on what we believe—determine culpability, whereas objective oughts—based on the facts—determine permissibility. After all, the
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Vaccines and the Case for the Enhancement of Human Judgment Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-12-11 Ken Daley
Many have argued that human enhancement, in particular bioenhancement via genetic engineering, brain-interventions or preimplantation embryo selection, is problematic even if it can be safely implemented. Various arguments have been put forward focusing on issues such as the undermining of autonomy, uneven distribution and unfairness, and the alteration of one’s identity, amongst others. Nevertheless
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Understanding as Usability and Context-Sensitivity to Interests Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-12-07 Andreas Søndergaard
Is understanding subject to a factivity constraint? That is, must the agent’s representation of some subject matter be accurate in order for her to understand that subject matter? ‘No’, I argue in this paper. As an alternative, I formulate a novel manipulationist account of understanding. Rather than correctly representing, understanding, on this account, is a matter of being able to manipulate a representation
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Be Careful What You Grant Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-12-07 Lydia McGrew
I examine the concept of granting for the sake of the argument in the context of explanatory reasoning. I discuss a situation where S wishes to argue for H1 as a true explanation of evidence E and also decides to grant, for the sake of the argument, that H2 is an explanation of E. S must then argue that H1 and H2 jointly explain E. When H1 and H2 compete for the force of E, it is usually a bad idea
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What Logical Evidence Could not be Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-12-07 Matteo Baggio
By playing a crucial role in settling open issues in the philosophical debate about logical consequence, logical evidence has become the holy grail of inquirers investigating the domain of logic. However, despite its indispensable role in this endeavor, logical evidence has retained an aura of mystery. Indeed, there seems to be a great disharmony in conceiving the correct nature and scope of logical
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Russellian Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and Revelation Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-11-27 Christopher Devlin Brown
This paper responds to an argument from Botin which claims that Russellian physicalism is committed to the view that either (i) our phenomenal concepts do not reveal anything essential about phenomenal properties (following Goff, Botin calls this the ‘opaque’ account of phenomenal concepts), or that (ii) phenomenal concepts are capable of revealing at least some of the essence of phenomenal properties—making
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Does Representationalism Offer a Reply to the Knowledge Argument? Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-11-29 Frank Jackson
I agree with Torin Alter that physicalists should be a priori physicalists. I argue against his rejection of the representationalist response to the knowledge argument.
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Towards a Pluralistic Account of Thought Experiments Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-11-28 Mélanie Frappier
In light of our knowledge about neurodiversity, I argue that the cognitive science framework Miščević uses in Thought Experiments must be broaden to create a pluralistic account of thought experimentation, one able to account for the many ways thought experiments are replicated using not only visual models, but also arguments, conceptual analyses, and images as some of the many instruments used in
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The Rationality and Flexibility of Motor Representations in Skilled Performance Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-11-23 Gabriele Ferretti, Silvano Zipoli Caiani
Philosophers and cognitive scientists have been debating about the nature of practical knowledge in skilled action. A big challenge is that of establishing whether and how practical knowledge (knowledge-how) is influenced by, or related to propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). This becomes even more challenging when trying to understand how propositional and motor representations may cooperate
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Holistic Competence and its Partial Manifestations Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-11-13 Tony Tsz Fung Lau
Virtue epistemology (VE) suggests that S knows just in case S’s true belief is creditable to S’s competence. While Lackey’s (2007, 2009) objection from testimonial knowledge had raised concerns that VE is too strong, some virtue epistemologists (Sosa 2007, Pritchard 2012) adopted a weaker condition requiring only partial credit on agent’s part. This paper, however, argues that in addition to the creditable
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Metaphysical Causal Pluralism: What Are New Mechanists Pluralistic About? Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-11-11 Michał Oleksowicz
Although the literature on the issue of pluralism within the philosophy of science is very extensive, this paper focuses on the metaphysical causal pluralism that emerges from the new mechanistic discussion on causality. The main aim is to situate the new mechanistic views on causation within the account of varieties of causal pluralism framed by Psillos (2009). Paying attention to his taxonomy of
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Prisoner’s Dilemma and Newcomb’s Problem: Two Problems or One? Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-11-03 Emil Badici
David Lewis argued that Newcomb’s Problem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma are “one and the same problem” or, to be more precise, that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is nothing else than “two Newcomb problems side by side” (Lewis Philosophy and Public Affairs 8:235–240, 1979: 235). It has been objected that his argument fails to take into account certain epistemic asymmetries which undermine the one-problem thesis
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The Significance and Complexity of Conscience Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-10-11 C.A.J. Coady
The concept of conscience continues to play a central role in our ethical reasoning as well as in public and philosophical debate over medical ethics, religious freedom, and conscientious objection in many fields, including war. Despite this continued relevance the nature of conscience itself has remained a relatively neglected topic in recent philosophical literature. In this paper I discuss some
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Moral Responsibility, the Author, and the Ethical Criticism of Art Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-10-04 Zhen Li
In this paper, I argue that since artworks cannot take moral responsibility, it is impossible to establish any sort of ethical criticism towards them for their own sake. Ethical criticism of art is inevitably directed at the artist(s), who can take moral responsibility for creating or performing the art in certain ways. Therefore, we should distinguish between two types of criticism towards art: (1)
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Understanding as Transformative Activity: Radicalizing Neo-Cognitivism for Literary Narratives Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-09-28 Ingrid Vendrell Ferran
Mikkonen’s new book and his emphasis on understanding should be regarded as an important contribution to the contemporary debate on the cognitive value of literary narratives. As I shall argue, his notion of understanding can also help explain how literature is existentially valuable. In so doing, his account can support a radicalized contemporary neo-cognitivism according to which literature can affect
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The Quarantine Model and its Limits Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-09-26 Andrea Lavazza, Sergei Levin, Mirko Farina
There are several well-established theories of criminal punishment and of its justification. The quarantine model (advocated by Pereboom and Caruso) has recently emerged as one of the most prominent theories in the field, by denying the very idea of criminal justice. This theory claims that no one ought to be criminally punished because fundamentally people do not deserve any kind of punishment. On
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Précis of Philosophy, Literature and Understanding: On Reading and Cognition Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-09-22 Jukka Mikkonen
This précis gives an overview of my book Philosophy, Literature, and Understanding: On Reading and Cognition which is the subject of a book symposium in Philosophia. The overview covers the book’s four chapters that explore i) the nature of literary imagination, ii) the epistemic value of narratives, iii) the concepts of cognition, knowledge and understanding with regard to fiction, and iv) evidence
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Self-Narrative, Literary Narrative, and Self-Understanding Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-09-20 Marya Schechtman
In the innovative and engaging Philosophy, Literature and Understanding, Jukka Mikkonen investigates a range of developments in multiple disciplines that have complicated traditional debates between cognitivists and non-cognitivists about literature. To avoid the extremes this debate has fallen into, Mikkonen develops a middle course that grounds the cognitive value of literature in its contributions
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Confusing Narratives Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-09-19 Robert Piercey
Jukka Mikkonen argues that the cognitive benefits of narrative should be explained in terms of understanding rather than knowledge. An apparent consequence of Mikkonen’s view is that ‘plot-based’ conceptions of narrative are less interesting than has long been supposed. I argue that, although the concept of understanding does indeed outperform the concept of knowledge in this area, it would be a mistake
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Integrated Information is not Causation: Why Integrated Information Theory’s Causal Structures do not Beat Causal Reductionism Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-09-16 Javier Sánchez-Cañizares
In a recent work (Grasso et al., 2021), practitioners of the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) claim to have overcome the weaknesses of causal reductionism in producing a coherent account of causation, as causal reductionism would blatantly conflate causation with prediction and could not answer the question of ‘what caused what.’ In this paper, I reject such a dismissal of causal reductionism since
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Humility’s Independence Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-09-12 Derick Hughes
Philosophers often claim that humility is a dependent virtue: a virtue that depends on another virtue for its value. I consider three views about this relation: Specific Dependence, Unspecific Dependence, and Fittingness. I argue that, since humility cannot uniquely depend on another virtue, and since this uniqueness is desirable, we should reject Specific and Unspecific Dependence. I defend a Fittingness
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The Grounds of Excuses Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-09-02 Marie van Loon
According to a popular view, excuses undermine blameworthiness. At the same time, philosophers commonly accept that blameworthiness is composed of two necessary conditions: a moral objectionability condition and a responsibility condition. For excuses to do their job, they must undermine at least one of these conditions. In this paper, I conclude that excuses do neither. By inference to the best explanation
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“In Defence of Jus Ad Bellum Criteria” Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-09-01 James Pattison
In this contribution, I defend the standard list of jus ad bellum principles. In The Ethics of War and the Force of Law: A Modern Just War Theory, Uwe Steinhoff endorses only three principles of jus ad bellum (right intention, just cause, and proportionality) and claims that the others are redundant. I argue that, although fundamentally all jus ad bellum principles can be reduced to proportionality
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Between Kwasi Wiredu’s Humanistic Ethics and Motsamai Molefe’s Supernaturalist Ethics Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-08-19 Ada Agada
Wiredu has argued that traditional Akan (African) ethics is humanistic in orientation and that human welfare, rather than God’s will, is the basis of morality. In response, Motsamai Molefe asserts that Wiredu’s conclusion overlooks the supernaturalist dimension of traditional African ontology which presents God as the apex being in the universe and the ultimate ground of reality. According to Molefe
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In Defence of Necessity Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-08-17 Suzanne Uniacke
This paper disputes Uwe Steinhoff’s view that a jus ad bellum requirement of necessity can be merged with a condition of proportionality. It argues that the proposed merger detracts from a conceptual and moral understanding of the structure and rationale of both the necessity and the proportionality considerations applicable in a range of moral contexts, including those of war and so-called lesser
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Legitimate Authority Again Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-08-11 Joseph E. Capizzi
In The Ethics of War and the Force of Law, Uwe Steinhoff argues “[t]he legitimate authority criterion should be abandoned.” (33) His position explicitly rejects the views of those defending legitimate authority as both indispensable and prior to the other criteria of the just war theory. In a subtle rejoined to these views, Steinhoff contends these accounts misrepresent the tradition and can provide
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Beyond Authority: Hinge Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-08-09 Luca Zanetti
According to constitutivism, we can justify the authority of aims and norms on the ground that they are inescapable. Constitutivist views divide between ambitious and modest ones. According to ambitious constitutivism, the inescapability of aims grounds their unconditional authority, whereas according to modest constitutivism, the inescapability of aims only grounds their conditional authority. Either
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War, Reciprocity and the Moral Equality of Combatants Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-08-08 Seumas Miller
In this article I address differences between myself and Uwe Steinhoff in relation to the moral principle of reciprocity and its implications for the doctrine of the moral equality of combatants. Whereas I agree with Steinhoff that there is a principle of reciprocity in play in war, contra Steinhoff, I suggest that this principle and, indeed, moral principles of reciprocity more generally, are particularist
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Getting on to the Same Page: War, Moral Fundamentalism, and Convention Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-08-07 Gerald Lang
Uwe Steinhoff’s The Ethics of War and the Force of Law contains an extended critique of ‘moral fundamentalism’, or the project of uncovering an individualist ‘deep morality’ of war governed by the same moral principles and rules that govern ordinary moral life, as well as a more positive account of war that depicts it as a social practice. Much of Steinhoff’s account is indebted to a series of claims
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Reply to Critics Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-08-02 Uwe Steinhoff
This article provides a response to the contributors of this symposium. Notably, I respond to the following objections: that my list of just war criteria is too long on an “ideal” level and too short for practical purposes; that in particular my rejection of legitimate authority is misguided; that I am wrong in claiming that in just war theory the conditions of proportionality and necessity, which
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Sextus and the Nature of Suspension Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-07-29 Robb Dunphy
This article is an investigation of the nature of suspension of judgement as it is conceived by Sextus Empiricus. I carry out this investigation by examining what I take to be Sextus’ most pertinent remarks on the topic and by considering them in the context of contemporary philosophical work on the nature of suspension. Against the more frequently encountered idea that Sextus is operating with a privative
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Alienation, Resonance, and Experience in Theories of Well-Being Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-07-28 Andrew Alwood
Each person has a special relation to his or her own well-being. This rough thought, which can be sharpened in different ways, is supposed to substantially count against objectivist theories on which one can intrinsically benefit from, or be harmed by, factors that are independent of one’s desires, beliefs, and other attitudes. It is often claimed, contra objectivism, that one cannot be alienated from
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Exposed: On Shame and Nakedness Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-07-21 Fredrik Westerlund
This article develops a new phenomenological account of the shame people typically tend to feel when seen naked by others. Although shame at nakedness is a paradigmatic and widespread form of shame, it has been under-explored in the literature on shame. The central thesis of the article is that shame at nakedness is rooted in our desire for social affirmation and constituted by our capacity for social
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The Viciousness of Envy Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-07-15 Timothy Perrine
Across time and cultures, envy is widely regarded as a vice. This paper provides a theory of viciousness that explains why envy is a vice. First, it sketches an account of the trait of envy, utilizing some of the social psychology literature on social comparisons. Second, it considers some theories of vices—including Neo-Aristotelian, Kant’s, and Driver’s consequentialism—and briefly argues that they
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Identification with Change: Narrative Identity, Enhancements and Transformative Experience Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-07-04 Erik Krag
New medical technologies promise to allow us to transform our core characteristics. Some see these technologies as filled with promise. Others see them as filled with existential risk. David DeGrazia argues that personal identity concerns raised by opponents to enhancement technology fail to impugn attempts by autonomous agents to bring about enhancements with which they autonomously identify. In advancing
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A Refutation of Spectrum Arguments for Nontransitive Betterness Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-07-04 Erik Carlson
This short paper states a new objection against “spectrum arguments” for nontransitive betterness. It is shown that defenders of such arguments must reject one of two very plausible principles.
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Why Dispositionalism Needs Interpretivism: A Reply to Poslajko Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-06-30 Devin Sanchez Curry
I have proposed wedding the theories of belief known as dispositionalism and interpretivism. Krzysztof Poslajko objects that dispositionalism does just fine on its own and, moreover, is better off without interpretivism’s metaphysical baggage. I argue that Poslajko is wrong: in order to secure a principled criterion for individuating beliefs, dispositionalism must either collapse into psychofunctionalism
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The Conditional Analysis of the Agentive Modals: a Reply to Mandelkern et al. Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-06-22 Simon Kittle
A proper understanding of agentive modals promises to clarify issues to do with free will, know how, and other philosophically interesting topics. In this paper I identify one constraint on, and one structural feature of, trying-based versions of the conditional analysis of the agentive modals. I suggest that the constraint and structural feature together provide a novel account of why the famous Lehrer-Chisholm
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Distributive Justice and Gameplay Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-06-14 Mark Silcox
In Anarchy, State and Utopia Robert Nozick criticizes a broad range of theories of distributive justice using a thought experiment that involves the financial incentives for playing basketball. In this paper, I defend the so-called “patterning” conceptions of justice that are the targets of Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” argument, via the development of an extended analogy between the distribution of
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Can Lives Be Seen as Meaningful Within the Cosmic Context? Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-06-12 Iddo Landau
Many philosophers have suggested that lives emerge as meaningless when considered within the context of the vastness of the cosmos and of time. Landau (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89(4), 727–734, 2011, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17(3), 457–468, 2014, 2017) has argued that considering a life within the context of the vastness of the cosmos and of time need not lead to this pessimistic
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Normative Defeaters and the Alleged Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-06-05 Giacomo Melis
One emerging issue in contemporary epistemology concerns the relation between animal knowledge, which can be had by agents unable to take a view on the epistemic status of their attitudes, and reflective knowledge, which is only available to agents capable of taking such a view. Philosophers who are open to animal knowledge often presume that while many of the beliefs of human adults are formed unreflectively
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What Does it Mean to be an Ontological Naïve Realist? Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-05-19 Ícaro M. I. Machado
Although meritorious, Naïve Realism faces theoretical issues stemming from the lack of clarity in the concepts forming its propositions and the relevant (but not usually acknowledged) diversity of its theses. In this paper, my goal is to provide a groundwork that mitigates these theoretical complications. One such distinction concerns its subject matter, in particular, whether it deals with the nature
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Can Social Reflective Equilibrium Delineate Cornell Realist Epistemology? Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-05-16 Sushruth Ravish, Vikram Singh Sirola
Cornell realism (CR), a prominent meta-ethical position that has emerged since the last decades of the twentieth century, proposes a non-reductionist naturalistic account of moral properties and facts. This paper argues that the best version of CR’s chosen methodology for arriving at justified moral beliefs must be seen as a variant of reflective equilibrium. In comparison to the traditional versions
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Confusion in the Bishop’s Church Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-05-15 Jan Heylen
Kearns (2021) reconstructs Berkeley’s (1713) Master Argument as a formally valid argument against the Materialist Thesis, with the key premise the Distinct Conceivability Thesis, namely the thesis that truths about sensible objects having or lacking thinkable qualities are (distinctly) conceivable and as its conclusion that all sensible objects are conceived. It will be shown that Distinct Conceivability
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Is it Good to Conceive of One’s Life Narratively? Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-05-15 Sally Latham, Mark Pinder
Grace Hibshman has developed a new explanation for why narrative self-conceptions might contribute to one’s flourishing: conceiving of one’s life narratively, she argues, can facilitate an improved self-understanding. In this short paper, we argue that, pace Hibshman, life narratives tend to misrepresent and mislead. So while they may give the impression of an improved self-understanding, that impression
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In Defense of the Crown Act Philosophia Pub Date : 2023-05-08 Amir Jaima
The CROWN Act is a recent piece of legislation adopted in 19 states and a handful of counties that prohibits race-based hair discrimination, which is the denial of employment and educational opportunities from individuals with kinky or curly hair textures or associated hairstyles. I contend, however, that in spite of the political and popular momentum, politician and activists need stronger and more