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Precis of Nenad Miscevic, Thought Experiments (Springer, 2022) Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-09-18 Nenad Miscevic
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Conditional Obligation, Permissibility, and the All or Nothing Problem Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-09-11 Xueshi Wang
In Horton’s All or Nothing Problem, the agent has three options: a permissible act that saves no one, a wrongful act that saves only one child, or a supererogatory act that saves two children. Some may argue that if the agent is not going to save two children, she should save none rather than just one. However, this conclusion is counterintuitive. Although there are many proposed solutions to this
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Comment on Logins – On the Connection between Normative Explanatory Reasons and Normative Reasoning Reasons Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-09-07 Eva Schmidt
The comment starts with a brief exposition of the Eroteric View put forth by Artūrs Logins. I then provide one friendly comment on the exact form of the normative question which is central to the view, and suggest that in addition to the question, ‘Why ought S to φ ?’, Logins should take the question, ‘Why is S permitted to φ?’ as definitive of normative reasons. In a more critical comment, I reflect
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The Cognitive and Ontological Dimensions of Naturalness – Editor’s Introduction Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-09-07 Sebastian Scholz, Gottfried Vosgerau
Editor’s Introduction to the Special Issue ‘The Cognitive Ontological Dimensions of Naturalness’, including brief introductions of the individual contributions.
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A View from the Periphery Commentary on Philip Kitcher’s What’s the Use of Philosophy Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-08-28 Rahel Jaeggi
Comment on Philip Kitchers “What is the Use of Philosophy”, arguing that while Kitcher is right to insist on the practical relevance of philosophy one should be careful to distinguish this view from an instrumental understanding of philosophy. Maybe philosophy is of no use but still has an impact.
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Induction With and Without Natural Properties: a New Approach to the New Riddle of Induction Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-08-22 Paul D. Thorn, Gerhard Schurz
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Reply to Commentators Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-08-21 Philip Kitcher
Anyone who raises questions about a well-entrenched practice can expect at least some of the practitioners to offer rebuttals. I am grateful to those who view my critique of current analytic philosophy as flawed for taking time to endeavor to correct me. They will surely not be surprised to find me recalcitrant. But I hope they will conclude, as I do, that the present airing of disagreements is profitable
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Should Polygamous Marriage Be Legal? Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-08-19 Wanpat Youngmevittaya
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A New Argument for Ethical Evidentialism Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-08-09 Brian Zamulinski
This paper contains a new argument for evidentialism as an ethical rather than an epistemic doctrine. The argument relies on new developments in consequentialist thinking. The insights of the proponents of the moral encroachment thesis are used to show that we need higher standards of evidence, and to develop the concept of ethically sufficient evidence. It is demonstrated that prospectivism (subjective
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Compatibilism and the Concept of a Law-Breaking Event Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-08-09 Adrian Kuźniar
This paper provides and justifies a broader definition of a ‘law-breaking event’ than that adopted by D. Lewis who identifies this concept with the notion of an event that falsifies the laws of nature in his sense of ‘falsification’. It is pointed out that the broader definition is the key to answering C. Ginet’s objection against local miracle compatibilism. It also allows a neutral reconstruction
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Why Reasons Are Explanations Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-08-05 Stephen Finlay
In his book Normative Reasons (Logins A in Normative reasons: between reasoning and explanation. Cambridge University Press, 2022), Artürs Logins accepts that a normative reason to do A is always an answer to a ‘Why A?’ question, but rejects the unifying explanationist theory which identifies reasons always as explanations. On his Erotetic Theory, ‘Why A?’ questions sometimes seek an explanation (in
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Committal Question: A Reply to Hodgson Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-08-03 Faraz Ghalbi
In this paper, I will counter Hodgson’s critique of Hanks’ assertion that neutral predication is incoherent, which is premised on the belief that asking is a neutral act. My defense of Hanks will be two-pronged. Firstly, I will provide textual proof that Hanks is, or should be, of the opinion that asking is not neutral, but rather a committal act. Secondly, I will illustrate how Hanks’ model can accommodate
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Are Reasons Answers to Questions? Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-27 Davide Fassio
In Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation (2022), Arturs Logins provides a novel reductivist account of normative reasons, what he calls the Erotetic View of Reasons. In this paper, I provide three challenges to this view. The first two concern the extensional adequacy of the Erotetic View. The view may fail to count as normative reasons all and only considerations that are such. In particular
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Rational Optimism Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-25 Matthew F. Wilson, Tyler J. VanderWeele
Optimistic beliefs have been criticized by philosophers as being irrational or epistemically deficient. This paper argues for the possibility of a rational optimism. We propose a novel four-fold taxonomy of optimistic beliefs and argue that people may hold optimistic beliefs rationally for at least two of the four types (resourced optimism and agentive optimism). These forms of rational optimism are
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Conceptual Spaces: A Solution to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction? Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-23 Sebastian Scholz
Nelson Goodman observed that we use only certain ‘good’ (viz. projectible) predicates during reasoning, with no obvious demarcation criterion in sight to distinguish them from the bad and gruesome ones. This apparent arbitrariness undermines the justifiability of our reasoning practices. Inspired by Quine’s 1969 paper on Natural Kinds, Peter Gärdenfors proposes a cognitive criterion based on his theory
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Ultra-Thin Objects across Domains: A Generalized Approach to Reference and Existence Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-22 Tolgahan Toy
This paper explores a unified approach to linguistic reference and the nature of objects, addressing both abstract and concrete entities. We propose a method of redefining ultra-thin objects through a modified abstraction principle, which involves two distinct computations: subsemantic computation processes direct physical input, while semantic computation derives the semantic values of a sentence
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Taking Issue with Le Poidevin’s New Agnosticism Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-18 Carl-Johan Palmqvist
Le Poidevin’s ‘new agnosticism’ concerns partaking in religious life while being uncertain whether religious discourse is fictional or not. Le Poidevin has offered two distinct versions of the new agnosticism, ‘semantic agnosticism’ and ‘meta-linguistic agnosticism’. I suggest that the first, ‘semantic agnosticism’, should be rejected, mainly because it involves a highly questionable view of truth
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The Domain of Morality Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-19 Massimo Reichlin
Taking stock of standard philosophical analyses of the concept, it is proposed that the domain of morality be defined by reference to seven characteristics: normativity, informality, importance, universality, categoricalness, overridingness, and a reference to beneficence and justice as the basic contents of its rules. These features establish a rather sharp distinction between moral and conventional
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The Heaviest Metal Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-13 Michel-Antoine Xhignesse
It has recently been argued that metal’s ‘heaviness’ is conceptually inarticulable. I argue, on the contrary, that ‘heaviness’ is a matter of inaccessibility—the ‘something more’ that makes metal ‘heavy’ is actually something less: less auditory processing fluency. Like profound literature, metal resists, but also invites and rewards, interpretation. I argue that understanding ‘heaviness’ in terms
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Varieties of Natural Concepts Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-11 James A. Hampton
The concepts to be considered in this chapter are those that occur in everyday common human thought and language – the “natural history” of concepts in use. While many may appear to be constituted by similarity relations, which make them suitable for modelling in conceptual spaces for example, other concepts in everyday use may be differently constituted. These concepts include abstract concepts, essentialist
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The Epistemic Condition for Character Responsibility Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-08 Marcella Linn
If responsibility for character requires (among other things) having knowledge of the quality of one’s character, and this knowledge requires having at least some good aspects of character, we seem to come to startling conclusions. First, as Neil Levy argues, the worse one is morally speaking, the less one is responsible for being morally bad. Second, the truly bad are excused for their bad characters
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The Moral Agent: A Critical Rationalist Perspective Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-06-24 Alireza Mansouri
Despite the moral underpinnings of Karl Popper’s philosophy, he has not presented a well-established moral theory for critical rationalism (CR). This paper addresses the ontological status of moral agents as part of a research program for developing a moral theory for CR. It argues that moral agents are selves who have achieved the cognitive capacity of personhood through an evolutionary scenario and
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How One Cannot Participatively Imagine What One Could Cognitively Imagine Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-06-18 Alberto Voltolini, Carola Barbero
In this paper, we want to maintain that the puzzle of imaginative resistance is basically a pragmatic issue due to the failure of participative imagination, as involving a pre-semantic level relating to a wide context (the overall situation of discourse). Since the linguistic meanings of the relevant fiction-involving sentences violate some of our basic norms, what such sentences (fictionally) say
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Naturalness in the Making: Classifying, Operationalizing, and Naturalizing Naturalness in Plant Morphology Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-06-14 Catherine Kendig
What role does the concept of naturalness play in the development of scientific knowledge and understanding? Whether naturalness is taken to be an ontological dimension of the world or a cognitive dimension of our human perspective within it, assumptions of naturalness seem to frame both concepts and practices that inform the partitioning of parts and the kinding of kinds. Within the natural sciences
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Introspection, Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-06-06 Robert J. Howell
Alter’s The Matter of Consciousness is not only the most systematic defense of the knowledge argument, it is so crystal clear, so compelling, that it should be required reading not only for those interested in consciousness, but for those interested in clear philosophical writing. In some circles The Knowledge Argument (KA) gets a bad rap. Philosophers in those circles should read this book. Though
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The Gap in the Knowledge Argument Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-06-04 Barbara Montero
Alter (The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism, GB: Oxford University Pres, 2023) argues for something surprising: despite being widely rejected by philosophers, including Frank Jackson himself, Jackson’s knowledge argument succeeds. Alter’s defense of Jackson’s argument is not only surprising; it’s also exciting: the knowledge argument, if it’s sound, underscores
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Uniformity in the Dynamics of Fiction-making Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-31 Iago Mello Batistela
In this paper I defend the claim that the act of writing a work of fiction consists in the performance of a sui generis speech act, and propose a dynamic treatment for acts of fiction-making. Recently, speech act theories of fiction have become targets of the uniformity argument. According to it, in order to account for the myriad of speech acts present in works of fiction, speech act theories of fiction
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Précis of What’s the use of Philosophy? Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-31 Philip Kitcher
This précis provides a summary of the book, What’s the Use of Philosophy?
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Reclamation and Authorization: Cepollaro and Lopez de Sa on in-group Restriction Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-28 Pasi Valtonen
It is generally thought that the reclamation of slurs is restricted to the in-group. Bianca Cepollaro and Dan Lopez de Sa challenge this assumption by presenting cases in which slurs are successfully reclaimed by members of out-groups. I agree with the idea that the out-groups often participate in reclamation. In this paper, I present a view which accommodates the fact that sometimes out-groups successfully
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On the Uses of Philosophy Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-28 William G. Lycan
This paper agrees with the premises of Philip Kitcher’s argument, but rejects the inference to his conclusion about what we philosophers ought to be doing instead of philosophizing in the traditional way. It argues that two topics Kitcher himself mentions, consciousness and moral realism, can be and are usefully pursued and are both of some interest and value to the general intelligent public.
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Justifying Self-Partiality Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-22 Agnès Baehni
The role that the first-person perspective is allowed to play in moral reasoning is a major source of contemporary debate between partialists and impartialists. The discussion usually revolves around the question of partiality’s justification when it is intended to benefit our loved ones. Surprisingly, the issue of partiality to oneself is rarely addressed directly and its link with egoism is left
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Institutional Racism and Social Norms: On the Debate Between Rawls and Mills Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-22 Keunchang Oh
In this paper, I engage with the debate between John Rawls and Charles Mills. In the first part, relevant works by Rawls and Mills are mainly examined. To this end, I first begin by examining Rawls’s ideal theory of justice and its relevance to the issue of racism. I then consider Mills’s non-ideal critique of Rawls and supplement it with the help of the notion of social norms. Whereas Rawls’s view
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The Charge of Rule Worship Against Rule-Consequentialism Restated Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-18 Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion
According to rule-consequentialism’s moral criterion, a given action is morally right if and only if it complies with an ideal code of rules, regardless of the consequences of that action. Rules are to be assessed by their consequences, not actions. This being so, one of the many accusations that have been made against rule-consequentialism is that it can turn suboptimal decisions into morally right
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Lucky Idiots and Incompetent Villains: Luck and Responsibility in Meaningful Lives Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-15 Chad Mason Stevenson
What is the relationship between meaning in life and luck? One popular view within the literature is that resultant luck vitiates meaning; that if the relevant state-of-affairs is primarily the result of luck, chance, or happenstance, rather than the person’s actions, then no meaning is conferred. Call this the anti-luck constraint. In this article it is argued that we should reject the anti-luck constraint
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Fischer on the Time of Death’s Badness Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-15 Erik Carlson, Karl Ekendahl, Jens Johansson
In a recent article in this journal, John Martin Fischer defends the view that death harms its victim after she dies. More specifically, he develops a “truthmaking” account in order to solve what he calls the Problem of Predication for this view. In this reply, we argue that Fischer’s proposed solution to this problem is unsuccessful.
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Natural Concepts and the Economics of Cognition and Communication Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-08 Peter Gärdenfors
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The Inconsistent Reduction: An Internal Methodological Critique of Revisionist Just War Theory Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-03 Regina Sibylle Surber
This article argues that the reduction of the morality of killing in war to the morality of killing in self-defense by ‘reductive-individualist’ revisionist just war theories is inconsistent, because when those theories apply the moral notion of self-defense to the morality of killing in war, they do not preserve the two conceptions of the “individual” inherent in this notion. The article demonstrates
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Can Democratic Equality Justify Capitalism? Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-03 Cade Franken
Jeppe von Platz has recently argued that welfare-state capitalism can be justified by a theory of democratic equality, challenging John Rawls’s critique of capitalism. Von Platz develops his argument by introducing a social democratic interpretation of democratic equality as an alternative to Rawls’s justice as fairness. Unlike justice as fairness, in which there is only one possible principle of reciprocity
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Nenad Miščević Stays True to Himself! Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-25 Yiftach Fehige
This is a contribution to a symposium about a book on thought experiments by Nenad Miščević. I argue that it is the first monograph dedicated to a defense of the mental models account of thought experiments. I exemplify the strengths of this account by applying Miščević’s analytical tools to the task of reading the Biblical Book of Job as a theological thought experiment.
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The Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and Semantic Primitivism Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-17 Michał Wieczorkowski
According to the factualist interpretation, the skeptical solution to the skeptic’s problem hinges on rejecting inflationary accounts of semantic facts, advocating instead for the adoption of minimal factualism. However, according to Alexander Miller, this account is unsound. Miller argues that minimal factualism represents a form of semantic primitivism, a position expressly rejected by Kripke’s Wittgenstein
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The Puzzle of Dion and Theon Solved Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-15 H. E. Baber
Dion is a human person, Lefty is his left foot, and Theon is Lefty-Complement, a proper part of Dion. Lefty is annihilated and Dion survives left-footless. After Lefty’s annihilation Theon, if he survives, occupies the same region as Dion. I suggest that this scenario be understood as a fusion case in which Dion and Theon, initially overlapping but distinct, are identical after Lefty’s annihilation
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Précis of The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-15 Torin Alter
In The Matter of Consciousness (TMOC), I defend Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986, 1995) knowledge argument, which poses a significant challenge to physicalism. I also argue that the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism.
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Situational Crime Prevention, Advice Giving, and Victim-Blaming Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-09 Sebastian Jon Holmen
Situational crime prevention (SCP) measures attempt to prevent crime by reducing the opportunities for crime to occur. One of the ways in which some SCP measures reduce such opportunities is by providing victims with advice about how to avoid being victimised, for instance through public awareness campaigns or safety apps. Some scholars claim that this approach to preventing crime often or always promotes
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Nonattributive and Nonreferential Uses of Definite Descriptions Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-02 Maria Matuszkiewicz
This paper revisits Donnellan’s distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions and argues that it is not exhaustive. Donnellan characterizes the distinction in terms of two criteria: the speaker’s intentions and the type of content the speaker aims to express. I argue that contrary to the common view, these two criteria are independent and that the distinctive features
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The Consequence Argument and the Possibility of the Laws of Nature Being Violated Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-27 Pedro Merlussi
In a recent paper, Brian Cutter objected to the consequence argument due to its dependence on the principle that miracle workers are metaphysically impossible. A miracle worker is someone who has the ability to act in a way such that the laws of nature would be violated. While there is something to the thought that agents like us do not have this ability, Cutter claims that there is no compelling reason
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Evolutionary Debunking and the Folk/Theoretical Distinction Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-14 M. Scarfone
In metaethics, evolutionary debunking arguments combine empirical and epistemological premises to purportedly show that our moral judgments are unjustified. One objection to these arguments has been to distinguish between those judgments that evolutionary influence might undermine versus those that it does not. This response is powerful but not well understood. In this paper I flesh out the response
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The Hyperintensional Variant of Kaplan’s Paradox Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-09 Giorgio Lenta
David Kaplan famously argued that mainstream semantics for modal logic, which identifies propositions with sets of possible worlds, is affected by a cardinality paradox. Takashi Yagisawa showed that a variant of the same paradox arises when standard possible worlds semantics is extended with impossible worlds to deliver a hyperintensional account of propositions. After introducing the problem, we discuss
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Williamson’s Epistemicism and Properties Accounts of Predicates Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-26 Paul Teller
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Philosophy as a Science and as a Humanity Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-23 Michael Strevens
This commentary on Philip Kitcher’s book What’s the Use of Philosophy? addresses two questions. First, must philosophers be methodologically self-conscious to do good work? Second, is there value in the questions pursued in the traditional areas of analytic philosophy?
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The Analysis and Reexamination of Functionalism from the Perspective of Artificial Intelligence Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-01 Strahinja Đorđević, Goran Ružić
This paper examines the role of machine functionalism, as one of the most popular positions within the philosophy of mind, in the context of the development of artificial intelligence. Our analysis starts from the idea that machine functionalism is a theory that is largely consistent with the principles behind the strong AI thesis. However, we will see that there is a convincing counter-argument against
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How to Read How to Do Things with Words: On Sbisà’s Proof by Contradiction Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-23 Jeremy Wanderer, Leo Townsend
Midway through How to Do Things With Words, J.L. Austin’s announces a “fresh start” in his efforts to characterize the ways in which speech is action, and introduces a new conceptual framework from the one he has been using up to that point. Against a common reading that portrays this move as simply abandoning the framework so far developed, Marina Sbisà contends that the text takes the argumentative
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Normative Error Theory and No Self-Defeat: A Reply to Case Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-19 Mustafa Khuramy, Erik Schulz
Many philosophers have claimed that normative error theorists are committed to the claim ‘Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it’, which to some appears paradoxical. Case (2019) has claimed that the normative error theorist cannot avoid this paradox. In this paper, we argue that there is no paradox in the first place, that is once we clear up the ambiguity of the word ‘reason’, both
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What Counts as Cheating? Deducibility, Imagination, and the Mary Case Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-18 Amy Kind
In The Matter of Consciousness, in the course of his extended discussion and defense of Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, Torin Alter dismisses some objections on the grounds that they are cases of cheating. Though some opponents of the knowledge argument offer various scenarios in which Mary might come to know what seeing red is like while still in the room, Alter argues that the proposed
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Replies to Vendrell Ferran, Piercey, Schechtman, and Collins Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-17 Jukka Mikkonen
i) Íngrid Vendrell Ferran’s defence of the ‘experiential view’ and her related conception of ‘radical neo-cogntivism’, ii) Robert Piercey’s view of the epistemic value of plots and emplotment, iii) Marya Schechtman’s revisionist ideas of self-narration, and, finally, iv) David Collins’s suggestion of the value of an imaginative engagement with the author of an artwork.
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Selves, Persons, and the Neo-Lucretian Symmetry Problem Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-16 Patrick Stokes
The heavily discussed (neo-)Lucretian symmetry argument holds that as we are indifferent to nonexistence before birth, we should also be indifferent to nonexistence after death. An important response to this argument insists that prenatal nonexistence differs from posthumous nonexistence because we could not have been born earlier and been the same ‘thick’ psychological self. As a consequence, we can’t
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Heterophenomenology: A Limited Critique Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-15 Abhishek Yadav
Dennett (Synthese, 53(2), 159–180, 1982, 1991, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9–10), 19–30, 2003, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6, 247–270, 2007) proposes and defends a method called heterophenomenology. Heterophenomenology is a method to study consciousness from a third-person objective point of view as opposed to a first-person subjective point of view or (auto)-phenomenology. The
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The Dilemma of Authority Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-13 Allyn Fives
What I refer to here as the dilemma of authority arises when one ought to defer to authority; one ought to act as the more weighty reason demands; one can do either; one cannot do both. For those who reject the possibility of legitimate authority, the dilemma does not arise. Among those who accept legitimate authority, some, including Joseph Raz, presume the conflict can be resolved without remainder
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Miscevic and the Stages Defence Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-12 Sören Häggqvist
This contribution examines Miscevic’s defence against restrictionist X-phi, based on his view that thought experiments exhibit a large number of typical stages. On Miscevic’s view, the epistemic threats identified by proponents of the negative program in X-phi may be countered or ameliorated in various ways at various stages. I argue that the defence he offers is insufficient to counter the arguments
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Does Parfit Establish Non-Reductionists Should Accept the Extreme Claim? Philosophia (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2023-12-22 Douglas Ehring
The Non-Reductionist holds that personal identity is a matter in whole or in part of “further facts,” facts over and above those about psychological and physical continuity and connectedness. If Non-Reductionism is true, then it is possible for there to be “nonsymmetrical fission cases” in which there is nonsymmetry with respect to further facts such that the fissioner is identical with one of the