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Intrinsic Properties and the Problem of “Other Things” Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Ryan Wasserman
Intrinsic properties are those which cannot be had or lacked in virtue of other things. Being a square is intrinsic, in this sense, whereas being next to a square is not. But what, exactly, counts as an “other thing” in this context? As it turns out, this is a surprisingly difficult question. I provide a critical assessment of three existing proposals (in terms of identity, mereology, and ontology)
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Four false dichotomies in the study of teleology Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-08-09 Daniel W. McShea, Gunnar Babcock
The study of teleology is challenging in many ways, but there is a particular challenge that makes matters worse, distorting the conceptual space that has set the terms of debate. And that is the tendency to think about teleology in terms of certain long‐established dichotomies. In this paper, we examine four such dichotomies prevalent in the literature on teleology, the notions that: 1) Teleological
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Organisms, agency and Aristotle Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-08-09 James G. Lennox
There is a tension at the heart of Aristotle's understanding of organic activities, created by his appeals to the productive activities of craftsmen and his use of normative language to characterize the goals of such activities. In this paper I discuss two ways of interpreting Aristotle's teleology aimed at resolving this tension, and discuss a closely analogous tension at the heart of a number of
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Rejecting norms of standing for private blame Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-07-29 Marta Johansson Werkmäster, Jakob Werkmäster
We argue that we should be sceptical towards the claim that there is such a thing as the standing to blame someone privately, understood in terms of holding the attitude of blame. Key features of the idea about standing to blame do not apply to private blame. For example, we argue that private blame is not the exercise of some normative power, and it is not even pro tanto wrong for a hypocrite to privately
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The property of goal‐directedness: Lessons from the dispositions debate Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-07-13 Matthew Tugby
The system‐property or ‘cybernetic’ theory of goals and goal‐directedness became popular in the twentieth century. It is a theory that has reductionist and behaviourist roots. There are reasons to think that the system‐property theory needs to be formulated in terms of counterfactuals. However, it proves to be difficult to formulate a counterfactual analysis of goal‐directedness that is counterexample‐free
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The limits of compromise Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-07-02 Fabian Wendt
This paper defends the view that the limits of compromise are identical with the moral principles that set limits to human action more generally. Moral principles that prohibit lying, stealing, or killing, for example, sometimes make it morally impermissible to accept a compromise proposal, for the simple reason that the proposal involves an act of lying, killing, or stealing. The same holds for any
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Prime matter emergentism: Unity without reduction Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-07-02 Stephen Boulter
I am persuaded that the anti‐reductionist stance of the Mistake‐Making Theoretical Framework is fundamentally sound and will prove heuristically fruitful. But the very success of this framework generates a challenge. Many biologically informed metaphysicians have drawn striking conclusions from the fact that biology cannot be reduced to physics and chemistry. One such conclusion is John Dupré's “disunity
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What is narrativity? Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-25 Nazim Keven
In recent years, narrative accounts of the self have gained increasing attention. It is widely accepted that humans are storytelling creatures, that stories shape our self‐conception, and that we fail to be agents without a narrative framework. While there is less agreement on what constitutes a narrative, it is generally understood to be more than a chronological listing of life events; it is also
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Life is strongly emergent Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-25 Michele Paolini Paoletti
In this article, I argue that life is a strongly emergent phenomenon. For the project of drawing a real distinction between living and non‐living beings cannot but appeal to strongly emergent powers. First, I introduce some features whose possession is typically taken to be sufficient for possessing life, i.e., Life‐Sufficient Features (or LS‐Features). I also clarify what I mean by “strongly emergent
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Relational properties: Definition, reduction, and states of affairs Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-20 Bo R. Meinertsen
This paper defines relational properties and argues for their reducibility in a, broadly speaking, Armstrongian framework of state of affairs ontology and truthmaking. While Armstrong's own characterisation and reduction of them arguably is the best one available in the literature of this framework, it suffers from two main problems. As will be shown, it neither defines relational properties very clearly
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Organisational teleology 2.0: Grounding biological purposiveness in regulatory control Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-05-24 Leonardo Bich
This paper critically revises the organisational account of teleology, which argues that living systems are first and foremost oriented towards a goal: maintaining their own conditions of existence. It points out some limitations of this account, mainly in the capability to account for the richness and complexity of biological systems and their purposeful behaviours. It identifies the reason of these
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Dualism about undercutting defeat Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-05-24 Marco Tiozzo
Most philosophers agree that the distinction between rebutting and undercutting defeaters is sound. Recently, however, there has been much debate over the nature of and relationship between rebutting and undercutting defeaters. Among the things that have been argued about is whether undercutting defeat, in contrast to rebutting defeat, require higher‐order commitment, i.e., a belief regarding the link
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The perceptual model: Emotions as possessed reasons Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-05-03 Hamid Vahid
Emotions play vital roles in our psychology and our lives. They also often form the basis of our evaluative beliefs. On some views, emotions, like perceptions, justify the beliefs to which they give rise. It has, however, been claimed that, unlike perceptions, emotions are merely proxies for the genuine reasons that are constituted by their cognitive bases. In this paper, I argue that this objection
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Recalcitrant emotions: The problems of perceptual theories Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-24 Giulio Sacco
The term ‘recalcitrant emotions’ refers to those cases where we feel an emotion that apparently contradicts our better judgements. For instance, one may be afraid of flying while claiming not to believe that it is dangerous. This phenomenon is commonly conceived as an objection to cognitivism, according to which emotions are based on the subject's beliefs, insofar as it would force us to ascribe to
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Knowing with Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-24 Heather Rabenberg
In this paper, I argue that there are irreducibly social epistemic values alongside more traditional epistemic values such as knowledge and true belief. In particular, I argue that what I call “epistemic convergence” is one such value, and that it can help us explain the badness of social epistemic pathologies, such as testimonial injustice and epistemic bubbles.
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Relaxed realism, robust realism, and the truthmaker challenge Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-30 Paiman Karimi
Relaxed realist theories are becoming more common in metanormative theory. They want the advantages of robust forms of realism but without their metaphysical underpinnings. However, it is not always clear how we should understand relaxed realist theories in general. In this paper I clarify and defend relaxed realism. First, I characterise and distinguish relaxed realist theories from robust realist
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Mathematical structuralism and bundle theory Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-09 Bahram Assadian
According to the realist rendering of mathematical structuralism, mathematical structures are ontologically prior to individual mathematical objects such as numbers and sets. Mathematical objects are merely positions in structures: their nature entirely consists in having the properties arising from the structure to which they belong. In this paper, I offer a bundle-theoretic account of this structuralist
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Knowability paradox, decidability solution? Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-09 William Bondi Knowles
Fitch's knowability paradox shows that for each unknown truth there is also an unknowable truth, a result which has been thought both odd in itself and at odds with views which impose epistemic constraints on truth and/or meaningfulness. Here a solution is considered which has received little attention in the debate but which carries prima facie plausibility. The decidability solution is to accept
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Gettier and the a priori Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-11-27 Philipp Berghofer
In 1967, Alvin Goldman prominently claimed that the traditional JTB analysis is adequate for non-empirical knowledge. Since then, this claim has remained widely unchallenged. In this paper, I show that this claim is false. I provide two examples in which a true belief is a priori justified but epistemically defective such that it does not constitute knowledge. Finally, I submit a novel analysis of
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Introduction—A return to form Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-11-04 Petter Sandstad
Starting roughly thirty years ago, essences and essentialism has seen a gradual rise in interest and support, not only as measured in the number of publications, but also in terms of applicability to distinct philosophical issues. This special issue showcases this wide applicability. Michail Peramatzis opens with a paper on Aristotle. On Aristotle's hylomorphism, a substance such as Socrates is made
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Dynamic all the way down Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-10-12 Donatella Donati, Simone Gozzano
In this paper we provide an analysis of dynamic dispositionalism. It is usually claimed that dispositions are dynamic properties. However, there is no exhaustive analysis of dynamism in the dispositional literature. We will argue that the dynamic character of dispositions can be analyzed in terms of three features: (i) temporal extension, (ii) necessary change and (iii) future orientedness. Roughly
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Structure, essence and existence in chemistry Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-25 Robin Findlay Hendry
Philosophers have often debated the truth of microstructural essentialism about chemical substances: whether or not the structure of a chemical substance at the molecular scale is what makes it the substance it is. Oddly they have tended to pursue this debate without identifying what a structure is, and with some confusion and about what a chemical substance is. In this paper I draw on chemistry to
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Kant and the king: Lying promises, conventional implicature, and hypocrisy Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-21 Roy Sorensen, Ian Proops
Immanuel Kant promised, ‘as Your Majesty's loyal subject’, to abstain from all public lectures about religion. All past commentators agree this phrase permitted Kant to return to the topic after the King died. But it is not part of the ‘at-issue content’. Consequently, ‘as Your Majesty's loyal subject’ is no more an escape clause than the corresponding phrase in ‘I guarantee, as your devoted fan, that
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From individual to general experience Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-22 Anja Berninger
There has been some debate recently about whether we can come to know what an experience is like that we have not been through ourselves. Mostly, this debate focuses on general phenomenal knowledge. It is asked, for instance, whether we can come to know what it is like to be a refugee generally speaking (as opposed to being some specific refugee). In this paper, I want to add to this debate by trying
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The limits of the just-too-different argument Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-16 Ragnar Francén, Victor Moberger
According to moral non-naturalism, the kind of genuine or robust normativity that is characteristic of moral requirements cannot be accounted for within a wholly naturalistic worldview, but requires us to posit a domain of non-natural properties and facts. The main argument for this core non-naturalist claim appeals to what David Enoch calls the ‘just-too-different intuition’. According to Enoch, robust
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Delineating beauty: On form and the boundaries of the aesthetic Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-03 Panos Paris
Philosophical aesthetics has recently been expanding its purview—with exciting work on everyday aesthetics, somaesthetics, gustatory aesthetics, and the aesthetics of imperceptibilia like mathematics and human character—reclaiming territory that was lost during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the discipline begun concentrating almost exclusively on the philosophy of art and restricted
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The significance of skepticism Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-17 Taylor Madigan
There is a recurrent sort of skeptical character in philosophical debates who believes that some social practice must be abolished because it involves a false presupposition about how things ‘really’ are. I examine this style of skeptical argument, using the moral responsibility skeptic as my main illustration. I excavate two unstated and un-argued for premises that it requires (which I call Undistorted
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Deflating the hard problem of consciousness by multiplying explanatory gaps Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-03 Işık Sarıhan
Recent philosophy has seen a resurgence of the realist view of sensible qualities such as colour. The view holds that experienced qualities are properties of the objects in the physical environment, not mentally instantiated properties like qualia or merely intentional, illusory ones. Some suggest that this move rids us of the explanatory gap between physical properties and the qualitative features
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Are there essential forms in the social domain? Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-06-14 Ludger Jansen
Traditionally, nature has often been thought to be structured by essential forms providing the generic features of natural things and thus the foundations for scientific explanations. In contrast, human history and the social domain have been thought to be the realm of ever-changing appearances, where contingency prevails. The paper argues that the existence of essential forms is compatible with the
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Alethic desires, framing effects, and deflationism: Reply to Asay Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-29 Jeremy Wyatt
Jamin Asay has recently argued that deflationists about the concept of truth cannot satisfactorily account for our alethic desires, i.e., those of our desires that pertain to the truth of our beliefs. In this brief reply, I show how deflationists can draw on well-established psychological findings on framing effects to explain how the concept of truth behaves within the scope of our alethic desires
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Contingency, arbitrariness, and the basis of moral equality Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-26 Giacomo Floris
Hardly anyone denies that (nearly) all human beings have equal moral status and therefore should be considered and treated as equals. Yet, if humans possess the property that confers moral status upon them to an unequal degree, how come they should be considered and treated as equals? It has been argued that this is because the variations in the degree to which the status-conferring property is held
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Computing in the nick of time Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-19 J. Brendan Ritchie, Colin Klein
The medium-independence of computational descriptions has shaped common conceptions of computational explanation. So long as our goal is to explain how a system successfully carries out its computations, then we only need to describe the abstract series of operations that achieve the desired input–output mapping, however they may be implemented. It is argued that this abstract conception of computational
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What analytic metaphysics can do for scientific metaphysics Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-16 Chanwoo Lee
The apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism
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Memory belief is weak Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-14 Changsheng Lai
Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on
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A Socratic essentialist defense of non-verbal definitional disputes Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-28 Kathrin Koslicki, Olivier Massin
In this paper, we argue that, in order to account for the apparently substantive nature of definitional disputes, a commitment to what we call ‘Socratic essentialism’ is needed. We defend Socratic essentialism against a prominent neo-Carnapian challenge according to which apparently substantive definitional disputes always in some way trace back to disagreements over how expressions belonging to a
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Ruth Barcan Marcus and Minimal Essentialism Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-28 Jessica Leech
Since the publication of Kit Fine's “Essence and Modality”, there has been lively debate over how best to think of essence in relation to necessity. The present aim is to draw attention to a definition of essence in terms of modality that has not been given sufficient attention. This neglect is perhaps unsurprising, since it is not a proposal made in response to Fine's 1994 paper and ensuing discussion
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Luck egalitarianism and non-overlapping generations Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-25 Elizabeth Finneron-Burns
This paper argues that there are good reasons to limit the scope of luck egalitarianism to co-existing people. First, I outline reasons to be sceptical about how “luck” works intergenerationally and therefore the very grounding of luck egalitarianism between non-overlapping generations. Second, I argue that what Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen calls the “core luck egalitarian claim” allows significant intergenerational
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Aristotle on unity in Metaphysics Z.12 and H.6 Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-13 Michail Peramatzis
Aristotle's inquiry into the definitional question “what is substance?” in the central books of the Metaphysics is constrained by the unity requirement. Roughly, a particular hylomorphic compound substance, such as this human, ought to be a unified whole and not just a heap of material parts and form. A similar claim applies to the substance-kind, human, which Metaphysics ΖΗΘ characterises as a hylomorphic
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On the alleged explanatory impotence/conceptual vacuity of substance dualism Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-08 James Moreland
In the last decade, there has been a notable upsurge in property (PD) and generic substance dualism (SD). By SD I mean the view that there is a spiritual substantial soul that is different from but variously related to its body. SD includes Cartesian, certain forms of late Medieval hylomorphic (e.g., Aquinas'), and Haskerian emergent SD. Nevertheless, some form of physicalism remains the majority view
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Does the Kantian state dominate?: Freedom and majoritarian rule Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-28 Mike Gregory
Recently, scholars have criticized what they call the “Kantian-Republican” thesis of freedom as non-domination. The main complaint is that domination is unavoidable. This concern can be separated into the problem of state domination, which suggests that the state's intervening powers necessarily dominate its citizens, and the problem of majority domination, which suggests that the People necessarily
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Is swearing morally innocent? Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-22 Bouke de Vries
Some philosophers believe that swearing is morally innocent insofar as it is non-abusive and vulgarities are being used, such as when people exclaim “s**t!” or “f**k!” This article shows this view to be mistaken. I start by arguing that taking offense at non-abusive vulgar swearing is not irrational, before arguing that, even if it were, such swearing would still not always be justified. The fact that
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Value relations sans evaluative grounds Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-21 Andrés G. Garcia
I argue that there can be value relations without individual values to support them. The fact that an item is better than another item does not have to be explained by reference to the values of the individual items. Instead, value relations can be grounded directly and exhaustively in descriptive facts about their relata. I show that my suggestion fits well with plausible perspectives on the nature
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How to be an antirealist about metaphysical explanation Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-21 Naomi Thompson
Antirealism about metaphysical explanation is relatively underexplored. This paper maps out the territory for the antirealist, explaining what it would take to be an antirealist given various different conceptions of metaphysical explanation, and of the relationship between metaphysical explanation and grounding.
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A substantial problem for priority monism Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-21 Martin Glazier
Priority monism is the doctrine that there is exactly one substance: the whole concrete cosmos. This paper develops an objection to priority monism. The objection is that although every substance is necessarily a substance, for the priority monist the cosmos is not necessarily a substance. It follows that the cosmos is not a substance and so priority monism is false. The priority monist's pluralist
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Causal theories of the moving spotlight Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-15 Nihel H. Jhou
This paper brings together the Sarvāstivāda (a major school of Abhidharma Buddhism) and Miller's (2019) moving spotlight theory to see how presentness is explained in terms of causation. The paper argues that a causal theory of presentness like Miller's encounters a dilemma: causation is either synchronic or diachronic, but neither is safe in the presence of the challenges. On the one hand, if causation
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Trust the process? Hyloenergeism and biological processualism Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-02-14 Jeremy W. Skrzypek
In this paper, I propose a theory of living organisms that captures the insights of both traditional Aristotelian hylomorphism and John Dupré's “biological processualism”. Like traditional Aristotelian hylomorphism, the proposed theory understands material objects to be comprised of both matter and form. Unlike contemporary structural varieties of hylomorphism, however, it does not understand the form
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Is Colour incompatibility analytic? Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-01-04 William Bondi Knowles
It is widely believed that some a priori necessary truths are not analytic in the sense of transformable by substitution of synonyms into logical truths. One much-cited example comes from the supposed incompatibility between colour predicates. The idea is that sentences like “Nothing is both blue all over (or uniformly or at a point) and also red” are not transformable into a logical truth in the same
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Other minds, other people, and human opacity Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-11-27 Peter M. S. Hacker
This paper explains the absence of the problem of other minds in ancient philosophy and links its rise in early modern philosophy with the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and the consequent veil of ideas. The futile struggles of early modern philosophers with the problems is delineated. So too are the incoherent theories of modern neuroscientists and psychologists. The sources of
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Rule-consequentialism, procreative freedom, and future generations Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-11-20 Julia Mosquera
In this paper I analyse how procreative freedom poses a challenge for rule-consequentialism. First, I reconstruct the rule-consequentialist case for procreative freedom. Second, I argue that population scenarios resulting from very low fertility pose a problem for rule-consequentialism since such scenarios cannot secure population growth or even avoid human extinction in the long run. Third, I argue
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Introduction Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-11-17 Charlotte Newey, Luke Elson
Our lives are all better for having Brad in them, so it has been our pleasure to put together this Special Issue of Ratio. Rules to Live By: The Work of Brad Hooker features papers first presented at the Spring 2021 Ratio Conference, which was held in honour of Brad and his work. The themes herein reflect Brad's enormous contribution to moral philosophy, with half the papers focused on his version
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Correctly responding to reasons while being means-end incoherent Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-11-02 Leonhard Schneider
This paper argues that Reason Responsiveness (RR) accounts of rationality, proposed for example by Benjamin Kiesewetter and Error Lord, fail to explain structural irrationality (i.e., the irrationality involved in holding incoherent attitudes). Proponents of RR hold that rationality consists in correctly responding to available reasons. Structural irrationality, they argue, is just a “by-product” of
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Meaning and beauty Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-10-21 Lucas Scripter
What place do experiences of beauty have in a meaningful life? A marginal one, at best, it would seem, if one looks at the current literature in analytic philosophy. Treatments of beauty within so-called “analytic existentialism” tend to suffer from four limitations: beauty is neglected, reduced to artistic production, saddled to theology, or taken as a mere application of a broader theoretical framework
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Fairness and close personal relationships Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-09-30 Charlotte A. Newey
This paper argues that close personal relationships play an important role in our judgments about what is fair. I start with an explanation of leading theories of fairness, highlighting the potential for further work on the grounds of fairness. Next, I offer an account of close personal relationships as having the ability to generate legitimate and reasonable expectations of one or other party to a
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Fairness as comparative desert Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-09-27 S. Deon Wu
One prominent theory of fairness is John Broome's. This article identifies several problems with Broome's theory but defends Broome's claim that fairness requires the proportionate satisfaction of claims. This article also shows how Broome's conception of fairness is compatible with fairness as comparative desert.
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Deep personal relationships and well-being: A response to Hooker Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-08-17 Roger Crisp
This paper is a response to Brad Hooker's “Does having deep personal relationships constitute an element of well-being?” (2021). The paper begins with a discussion of the implications of disagreement about such issues. After raising some general questions for Hooker's account, the paper turns to the key elements in a deep personal relationship, according to Hooker: multi-faceted understanding, and
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Holding points of view does not amount to knowledge Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-08-09 Rogelio Miranda Vilchis
I argue that knowing and having points of view are fundamentally different epistemic states if we assume that having justified true beliefs is necessary for knowledge. Knowers necessarily possess justified true beliefs, but persons holding points of view may, for example, lack justification, have false beliefs, or both. I examine these differences and expose other crucial differentiating patterns between
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Hooker's rule-consequentialism, disasters, demandingness, and arbitrary distinctions Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-08-09 Fiona Woollard
According to Brad Hooker's rule-consequentialism, as well as ordinary moral prohibitions against lying, stealing, killing, and harming others, the optimific code will include an over-riding “prevent disaster clause”. This paper explores two issues related to the disaster clause. The first issue is whether the disaster clause is vague—and whether this is a problem for rule-consequentialism. I argue
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From Brad to worse: Rule-consequentialism and undesirable futures Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-08-05 Tim Mulgan
This paper asks how rule-consequentialism might adapt to very adverse futures, and whether moderate liberal consequentialism can survive into broken futures and/or futures where humanity faces imminent extinction. The paper first recaps the recent history of rule-consequentialist procreative ethics. It outlines rule-consequentialism, extends it to cover future people, and applies it to broken futures
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Hooker's rule-consequentialism and Scanlon's contractualism—A re-evaluation Ratio (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-08-03 Jussi Suikkanen
Brad Hooker's rule-consequentialism and T. M. Scanlon's contractualism have been some of the most debated ethical theories in normative ethics during the last twenty years or so. This article suggests that these theories can be compared at two levels. Firstly, what are the deep, structural differences between the rule-consequentialist and contractualist frameworks in which Hooker and Scanlon formulate