-
Usury enforcement as an alternative to capital taxation in pre-modern states Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-22 Joshua Hendrickson
-
Altruism and self-interest in constitutional reform: the case of the British abolition of slavery and the slave trade Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-22 John Meadowcroft
-
Does more democracy encourage individualism?: evidence from women’s suffrage in the US Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-19 Yeonha Jung
-
Appealing, threatening or nudging? Assessing various communication strategies to promote tax compliance Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-11 Andris Saulitis, Philipp Chapkovski
-
Equilibrium responses to price controls: a supply-chain approach Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-06 Casey B. Mulligan
-
The medieval church as an economic firm? Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-08-31 David d’Avray
A school of economic historians argues that the medieval church was an economic firm: not metaphorically, but literally. Their work has been virtually ignored by professional medieval historians, but it has been published by Oxford University Press and the University of Chicago Press, so it does deserve attention. Conversely, it would be healthy for economists and public choice scholars to get reactions
-
Government incentives and firm location choices Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-08-25 Donghyuk Kim, Byoungmin Yu
-
State antiquity and economic progress: cause or consequence? Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-08-12 M. Scott King, Claudia Williamson Kramer
Legacy of statehood is seen as a positive influence on economic growth and development. The state antiquity literature argues that the more experience a country has with state institutions, the more beneficial the current state’s impact on development can be. While not discounting the advantages that a well-functioning state can provide for economic progress, we draw attention to an alternate mechanism:
-
Persuasion and gender: experimental evidence from two political campaigns Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-08-05 Vincenzo Galasso, Tommaso Nannicini
-
The political economy of environmental legislation: evidence from the British Parliament Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-08-03 Morakinyo O. Adetutu
-
When Goliath sells to David: explaining price gouging perceptions through power Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-07-29 Johanna Jauernig, Matthias Uhl, Ingo Pies
External shocks (e.g., due to a pandemic) may lead to price jumps in the short term. Rather than being read as a signal of increased scarcity, the resulting “price gouging” is often ascribed to sellers’ selfish exploitation of the crisis. In our experimental study, we investigate the drivers of fairness perceptions regarding voluntary transactions in situations of increased scarcity and explore how
-
-
Mayoral partisanship and municipal fiscal health Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-07-13 Benedict S. Jimenez, Laiyang Ke, Minji Hong
-
Demonstrated risk preferences and COVID-19 regulations in the United States Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-07-12 Peter Anderson
-
Popular autocrats: why do voters support Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary? A quantitative analysis Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-07-08 Áron Hajnal
-
Jurisdiction size and perceived corruption Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-07-08 Abel François, Nicolas Lagios, Pierre-Guillaume Méon
-
Environmental regulation, regulatory spillovers and rent-seeking Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-07-07 Juan Pablo González
-
Movement split: how the structure of revolutionary coalitions shapes revolutionary outcomes Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-27 Benjamin Abrams
This article investigates the relationship between the coalitional structure of revolutionary movements and revolutionary outcomes. Noting the chimerical nature of revolutionary coalitions, it introduces readers to the concept of ‘movement split’: the moment in a revolutionary process when, once a regime is overthrown, the revolutionary coalition fractures into ‘radicals’, who seek further, social
-
Revolution and Institutional Change: an introduction to the special issue Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-25 Mehrdad Vahabi
This special issue reflects one of the first systematic inquiries into the effects of revolutions on institutional change, a topic previously explored only tangentially across diverse social science domains. It fosters interdisciplinary discourse on revolutionary outcomes among economists, political scientists, sociologists, and economic historians informed by the public choice research program. The
-
Ruled by robots: preference for algorithmic decision makers and perceptions of their choices Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-20 Marina Chugunova, Wolfgang J. Luhan
-
A tournament theory of congressional committee leadership Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-17 Christian Fong, Joshua McCrain
-
Complex externalities: introduction to the special issue Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-13 Pablo Paniagua, Veeshan Rayamajhee, Ilia Murtazashvili
This paper introduces the special issue on complex externalities and public choice. The collection of essays extends analytical bridges between public choice, property rights economics, and new institutional economics. The essays question many of our prevailing assumptions behind the standard conceptualization of externalities. They also offer pragmatic and theoretical alternatives and apply these
-
The political economy of the original “Thucydides’ Trap”: a conflict economics perspective on the Peloponnesian war Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-13 George Tridimas
-
Democratization and knowledge in social sciences Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-10 Amir Tayebi, Sheida Teimouri
-
Rosters and connected apportionments Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-07 Manshu Khanna, Haydar Evren
-
Housing values and jurisdictional fragmentation Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-05-26 John William Hatfield, Katrina Kosec, Luke P. Rodgers
-
The institutional structure of pollution: large-scale externalities and the common law Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-05-25 Larry Eubanks, Glenn L. Furton
This paper revisits a long-standing discussion surrounding the efficacy of the common law versus government intervention in addressing large-scale environmental externalities. Drawing on a conceptual framework developed by James M. Buchanan, we challenge the prevailing economic orthodoxy which holds that so-called “large-number” externalities inherently necessitate government policy intervention. Instead
-
Corruption, bribery, and market reform Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-05-24 Hamid Beladi, Sugata Marjit, Vivekananda Mukherjee
-
Investment incentives attract foreign direct investment: evidence from the great recession Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-05-23 Aycan Katitas, Sonal Pandya
-
-
Revolutions and corruption Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-05-17 Joshua D. Ammons, Shishir Shakya
-
A tale of government spending efficiency and trust in the state Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-05-18 António Afonso, João Tovar Jalles, Ana Venâncio
This paper empirically links the efficiency and performance assessment of the general government, proxied by efficiency scores, to the trust in government. Government spending efficiency scores are first computed via data envelopment analysis (DEA). Then, relying on panel data and instrumental variable approaches, we estimate the effect of public sector efficiency on citizens trust on national governments
-
Affirmative action in large population tullock contests Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-05-13 Ratul Lahkar, Rezina Sultana
-
Exogenous shocks and electoral outcomes Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-05-04 Kaustav Das, Atisha Ghosh, Pushkar Maitra
-
The electoral effect of pork barrel politics: evidence from England Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-30 Johannes Lattmann
-
Empirical and computational approaches to collective choice: introduction to a special issue Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-20 Simon Medcalfe, Shane Sanders
-
A unified approach to measuring unequal representation Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-20 Junichiro Wada, Yuta Kamahara
-
The political economy of climate action in Indian Country Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-20 Tessa Provins
-
Intergovernmental alignment and the electoral value of mayors: reverse coattails in an unexpected technocracy Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-20 Alexandru Savu
-
Two (lay) dogmas on externalities Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-20 Vaughn Bryan Baltzly
I argue that much current thinking on externalities—at least among “lay political economists” (but even, on occasion, among professional economists)—is saddled with two analytical errors. The first is what I call coextensivism: the conflation of public goods and externalities. The second error is what I call externality profligacy: the conflation of economic and “social” externalities. The principal
-
Revolutions and rational choice: A critical discussion Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-20 Pierre Courtois, Rabia Nessah, Tarik Tazdaït
Since the early studies of Olson (The logic of collective action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971/1965) and Tullock (Public Choice 11:89–99, 1971), who first defined the paradox of revolution, there has been a great deal of relevant work based on rational choice theory. While the main point of this research is to investigate solutions to this apparent paradox, its overall contribution is
-
How to choose a compatible committee? Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-17 Ritu Dutta, Rajnish Kumar, Surajit Borkotokey
Electing a committee of size k from m candidates (\(k < m\)) is an interesting problem under multi-winner voting situations. In this paper, we propose a new committee selection rule based on cooperative game theoretic tools, where voters can approve both individuals and groups of candidates simultaneously. This flexibility of approving groups of candidates allows the voters to assess the candidates’
-
Enhancing voluntary contributions in a public goods economy via a minimum individual contribution level Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-12 Michela Chessa, Patrick Loiseau
-
Behavioral responses of mandatory masking within social interactions Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-09 Eric Cardella, Briggs Depew, Ryan B. Williams
-
Attentiveness in elections with impressionable voters Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-04-01 Costel Andonie, Daniel Diermeier
We propose a model of attentiveness in elections with impressionable voters under three electoral rules: plurality, approval voting, and negative plurality. Voters’ conduct is determined by their attentiveness and impressions of candidates. We show that attentiveness is as important as voters’ preferences for the outcome of the election. Specifically, we show that candidates benefit from increased
-
Balancing democracy: majoritarianism versus expression of preference intensity Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-14 Asaf D. M. Nitzan, Shmuel I. Nitzan
This paper evaluates three prominent voting systems: the Majority Rule (MR), Borda Rule (BR), and Plurality Rule (PR). Our analysis centers on the susceptibilities of each system to potential transgressions of two foundational principles: the respect for majority preference (majoritarianism) and the acknowledgment of the intensity of individual preferences. We operationalize the concept of 'cost' as
-
Axiomatization of plurality refinements Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-07 Ali I. Ozkes, M. Remzi Sanver
Plurality rule uniquely satisfies anonymity, monotonicity, neutrality, and tops-onlyness. However, it is not always able to produce resolute outcomes. We study singleton-valued refinements of plurality rule that satisfy all but one of these four axioms. Monotonicity is preserved by all refinements of plurality, whereas no refinement satisfies the remaining three except for a very limited case. We explore
-
‘Keep friends close, but enemies closer’: connections and political careers Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-07 Andrea Cintolesi
-
Conflict under the shadow of elections Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-07 Antonis Adam, Maxime Menuet, Petros G. Sekeris
-
Regional favoritism in access to credit Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-01 Francis Osei-Tutu, Laurent Weill
-
Revolutionary leaders and the punishment of critics Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-26 Christian J. Sander
-
Prevention externalities: private and public responses to the 1878 yellow fever epidemic Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-24 Byron Carson
-
Assessing the effect of international terrorism on civil liberties using a potential outcomes framework Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Antonis Adam, Evi Tsavou
-
The political economy of criminal governance Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-21 David Skarbek
How can people who do not rely on effective government institutions establish property rights, enforce agreements, and facilitate social and economic exchange? Scholars of public choice have long studied anarchic settings to understand foundational questions of political economy, such as the viability and robustness of self-enforcing exchange, the emergence of coercive power, and the Madisonian challenge
-
Regulatory independence may limit electoral holdup but entrench capture Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-04 Arthur Schram, Aljaž Ule
-
Against the tide: how changes in political alignment affect grant allocation to municipalities in Hungary Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-03 Tamás Vasvári, Dóra Longauer
-
Anti-mafia policies and public goods in Italy Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-26 Stefania Fontana, Giorgio d’Agostino
-
The political economy of American Indian policy: introduction to a special issue Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-16 Terry L. Anderson, Ilia Murtazashvili, Dominic P. Parker
Historically and currently, federal policies governing American Indian country do not typically resemble policies that economists think would stimulate economic and cultural prosperity. This special issue employs Public Choice and New Institutional Economics to analyze the origins and consequences of these policies. This approach, which emphasizes rent seeking, government failure, and formal and informal
-
Natural disasters and voter gratitude: What is the role of prevention policies? Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-14 Carla Morvan, Sonia Paty
-
Size isn’t everything: COVID-19 and the role of government Public Choice (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-13 Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard