-
Christian Klamler’s ”A distance measure for choice functions” [Social Choice and Welfare 30 (2008) 419–425]: a correction Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-03-14
Abstract An extensive choice over X is a function assigning to any subset S of X a possibly empty subset of S. Klamler (Soc Choice Welf 30:419–425, 2008) shows that the operation of symmetric difference induces a metric on the family of extensive choices over X, and this metric is characterized by five axioms A1–A5. We provide counterexamples to Klamler’s result, suggest a slight modification of axioms
-
A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-03-14
Abstract This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents’ payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choice functions which may respond to agents’ preference intensities as well as preference rankings. We show that a social choice function is ex ante Pareto efficient and Bayesian
-
Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-03-13 Joseph Siani, Bertrand Tchantcho, Bill Proces Tsague
Power measures are used to quantify the influence of members of a democratic institution. We consider voting games with abstention or (3,2) games, which are decision-making processes in which voting options include yes, no and abstention. The power indices that we study are based on the notions of minimal and shift minimal winning tripartitions. We define and characterize the Deegan–Packel and shift
-
Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-03-09 Marina Núñez, Francisco Robles
-
Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians? Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-03-08
Abstract In this paper, we challenge the claim that a conservative central bank strengthens the likelihood of a conservative government. In contrast, if an election is based on the comparative advantages of the candidates, an inflation-averse central banker can deter the chances of a conservative candidate because once inflation is removed, its comparative advantage in the fight against inflation disappears
-
Collective or individual rationality in the Nash bargaining solution: efficiency-free characterizations Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-03-04 Kensei Nakamura
-
Approval-based voting with mixed goods Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-02-27
Abstract We consider a voting scenario in which the resource to be voted upon may consist of both indivisible and divisible goods. This setting generalizes both the well-studied model of multiwinner voting and the recently introduced model of cake sharing. Under approval votes, we propose two variants of the extended justified representation (EJR) notion from multiwinner voting, a stronger one called
-
Quadratic funding with incomplete information Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-02-24 Luis Mota Freitas, Wilfredo L. Maldonado
-
Redistributive politics under ambiguity Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-02-13 Javier D. Donna
-
Dorm augmented college assignments Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-02-13 Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan
In college assignments, a common practice is that students receive their dorm allocation after the realization of college placements. This causes wasted resources and unfair allocation. To fix this, we consider a college assignment problem where students simultaneously receive their college and dorm assignments. We first introduce the so-called “Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance” (DDA) and show that
-
Relative measures of economic insecurity Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-02-03 Walter Bossert, Conchita D’Ambrosio
We characterize a new class of individual measures of economic insecurity in a setting where there is a single relevant variable that can be interpreted as income or consumption. Insecurity is intended to capture the difficulties faced by an economic agent when confronted with adverse events. We work with an intertemporal model and base our measures on the changes in the variable when moving from one
-
Consistent social ranking solutions Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-01-23 Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita
-
The interdependence of social deliberation and judgment aggregation Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-01-20 Hendrik Siebe
-
Truthful cake sharing Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-01-16 Xiaohui Bei, Xinhang Lu, Warut Suksompong
-
The Quintilian School in the history of Social Choice: an early tentative step from plurality rule to pairwise comparisons Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-01-07
Abstract We present two texts from Roman Empire times that add two early appearances to the stream of the history of Social Choice Theory. One is from the School of Rhetoric of Quintilian (35–96), a contemporary of Pliny the Younger, who developed an early criticism of Plurality rule and, in search of a better method, sketched a choice by pairwise comparisons. The other is from Aulus Gellius (160–180)
-
Robustness to manipulations in school choice Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2024-01-07 Alexander Nesterov, Olga Rospuskova, Sofia Rubtcova
-
Animals and social welfare Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-12-22
Abstract I propose a framework to evaluate the social gains from policies regarding animals. The model considers both the welfare of animals and humans. The gains in animal welfare are estimated by considering the violations of the animals’ fundamental freedoms weighted for each species. I apply this framework to twenty policy proposals targeting wild, domestic, farmed, and laboratory animals. Although
-
Labor market efficiency: output as the measure of welfare Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-12-08 Behrang Kamali Shahdadi
We study the matching of workers to firms in which workers choose an observable and contractable effort after the match. If there are complementarities between a worker’s ability and a firm’s technology, positive assortative matching (PAM) is the only matching in any equilibrium and is the unique efficient matching. We investigate the effect of a policy that changes the matching of firms to workers
-
To be fair: claims have amounts and strengths Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-12-09 Stefan Wintein
John Broome (Proc Aristot Soc 91:87–101, 1990) has developed an influential theory of fairness, which has generated a thriving debate about the nature of fairness. In its initial conception, Broomean fairness is limited to a comparative notion. More recent commentators such as Hooker (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:329–52, 2005), Saunders (Res Publica 16:41–55, 2010), Lazenby (Utilitas 26:331–345, 2014)
-
Cross invariance, the Shapley value, and the Shapley–Shubik power index Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-11-25 Chun-Ting Chen, Wei-Torng Juang, Ching-Jen Sun
In this paper we propose a simple axiom which, along with the axioms of additivity (transfer) and dummy player, characterizes the Shapley value (the Shapley–Shubik power index) on the domain of TU (simple) games. The new axiom, cross invariance, demands payoff invariance on symmetric players across “quasi-symmetric games,” that is, games where excluding null players, all players are symmetric. Additionally
-
Inequality measurement with coarse data Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-11-16 Xiangyu Qu
-
Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-11-02 Sarvesh Bandhu, Abhinaba Lahiri, Anup Pramanik
-
A dynamic model of endogenous development: the role of pioneers Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-11-01 Alexander Usvitskiy
-
Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-11-02 Agustín G. Bonifacio
In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents. We introduce and characterize the family of iterative reallocation rules and show that each rule in this class is withdrawal-proof and endowments-merging-proof, at least one is endowments-splitting-proof
-
Cost intervention in delinquent networks Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-11-01 Yifan Xiong, Youze Lang, Ziyan Li
-
Ordinal utility differences Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-10-27 Jean Baccelli
It is widely held that under ordinal utility, utility differences are ill-defined. Allegedly, for these to be well-defined (without turning to choice under risk or the like), one should adopt as a new kind of primitive quaternary relations, instead of the traditional binary relations underlying ordinal utility functions. Correlatively, it is also widely held that the key structural properties of quaternary
-
The expressive power of voting rules Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-10-10 Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, João V. Ferreira
-
Technological advance, social fragmentation and welfare Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-10-04 Steven J. Bosworth, Dennis J. Snower
-
The “invisible hand” of vote markets Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-09-19 Dimitrios Xefteris, Nicholas Ziros
This paper studies electoral competition between two non-ideological parties when voters are free to trade votes for money. We find that allowing for vote trading has significant policy consequences, even if trade does not actually take place in equilibrium. In particular, the parties’ equilibrium platforms are found to converge (hence, there is no reason for vote trading) to the ideal policy of the
-
Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-09-13 Stefano Barbieri, Marco Serena
-
The largest Condorcet domain on 8 alternatives Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-09-05 Charles Leedham-Green, Klas Markström, Søren Riis
In this note, we report on a Condorcet domain of record-breaking size for n = 8 alternatives. We show that there exists a Condorcet domain of size 224 and that this is the largest possible size for 8 alternatives. Our search also shows that this domain is unique up to isomorphism. In this note we investigate properties of the new domain and relate them to various open problems and conjectures.
-
Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-08-30 Aditya Vikram
We study a model in which a single object is to be allocated among a set of agents whose valuations are interdependent. We define signal-ranking mechanisms and show that if the signal-ranking allocation rule satisfies a combinatorial condition and the valuation functions are additively separable, there exist budget-balanced and ex-post incentive compatible signal-ranking mechanisms. For a restricted
-
Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-08-21 Tamás Solymosi
We characterize the assignment games which admit a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS) in terms of efficiently verifiable structural properties of the nonnegative matrix that induces the game. We prove that an assignment game is PMAS-admissible if and only if the positive elements of the underlying nonnegative matrix form orthogonal submatrices of three special types. In game theoretic terms
-
Approval-based shortlisting Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-08-11 Martin Lackner, Jan Maly
-
Escape poverty trap with trust? An experimental study Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-08-06 Kenneth S. Chan, Vivian Lei, Filip Vesely
-
Ties Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-08-04 Federico Revelli, Tsung-Sheng Tsai, Cheng-Tai Wu
We tackle the question of the role of pivotality in voter turnout decisions by testing for the first time whether the occurrence of a tied election generates information spillovers onto nearby localities’ subsequent elections. First, we develop a model where voters update their beliefs regarding the probability of their vote being decisive upon observing earlier elections’ outcomes. Next, by exploiting
-
Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-07-28 Gustav Alexandrie
Due to the imperfect ability of individuals to discriminate between sufficiently similar alternatives, individual indifferences may fail to be transitive. I prove two impossibility theorems for social choice under indifference intransitivity, using axioms that are strictly weaker than Strong Pareto and that have been endorsed (sometimes jointly) in prior work on social choice under indifference intransitivity
-
Tailored recommendations on a matching platform Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-07-25 Gunhaeng Lee
-
On measuring axiom violations due to each tax instrument applied in a real-world personal income tax Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-07-19 Simone Pellegrino, Achille Vernizzi
In their seminal paper, Kakwani and Lambert (Eur J Polit Econ 14:369–380, 1998) state three Axioms an equitable tax system should respect. By proposing a measurement system based on re-ranking indexes of taxes, tax rates and post-tax incomes, they show how to evaluate the negative influences that Axiom violations exert on the redistributive effect of a tax. By considering each element of a real-world
-
Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-07-15 Walter Bossert, Susumu Cato, Kohei Kamaga
We examine the impact of Suzumura’s (Economica 43:381–390, 1976) consistency property when applied in the context of collective choice rules that are independent of irrelevant alternatives, neutral, and monotonic. An earlier contribution by Blau and Deb (Econometrica 45:871–879, 1977) establishes the existence of a vetoer if the collective relation is required to be complete and acyclical. The purpose
-
The behavioral economics of dynamically inconsistent behavior: a critical assessment Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-07-14 Sebastian Krügel, Matthias Uhl
Preferences often change—even in short time intervals—due to either the mere passage of time (present-biased preferences) or changes in visceral or environmental conditions (state-dependent preferences). On the basis of empirical findings concerning state-dependent preferences, we critically discuss the “Aristotelian” view of unitary decision makers in economics. We illustrate that the conceptualization
-
Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-07-08 Kazuya Kikuchi
This paper studies the allocation of voting weights in a committee representing groups of different sizes. We introduce a partial ordering of weight allocations based on stochastic comparison of social welfare. We show that when the number of groups is sufficiently large, this ordering asymptotically coincides with the total ordering induced by the cosine proportionality between the weights and the
-
A general framework for participatory budgeting with additional constraints Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-07-07 Simon Rey, Ulle Endriss, Ronald de Haan
-
On efficiency in disagreement economies Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-07-07 Christian Heyerdahl-Larsen, Johan Walden
-
Cesàro average utilitarianism in relativistic spacetime Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 Marcus Pivato
-
On the safety of group manipulation Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-06-28 Hans Peters, Yuliya Veselova
Groups of voters have more possibilities to influence the voting result than separate individuals. However, there is a problem with coordinating their actions. This paper considers manipulation by groups of voters who have the same preferences. If a voting result is more preferable for voters of a particular group provided that all its members use the same strategy (report the same insincere preference)
-
Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-06-22 Jing Yu, Martin G. Kocher
-
Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-06-07 Jin Xi, Haitian Xie
This study examines the mechanism design problem for public goods provision in a large economy with n independent agents. We propose a class of dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanisms, which we call the adjusted mean-thresholding (AMT) mechanisms. We show that when the cost of provision grows slower than the \(\sqrt{n}\)-rate, the AMT mechanisms are both
-
How does exposure to COVID-19 influence health and income inequality aversion? Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-05-19 Miqdad Asaria, Joan Costa-Font, Frank Cowell
-
Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-05-18 Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Flip Klijn, Marc Vorsatz
-
Citizen preferences and the architecture of government Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-05-12 Jean-Marc Bourgeon, Marie-Laure Breuillé
-
Manipulation of moves in sequential contests Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-05-10 Konstantinos Protopappas
-
Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-05-06 Mostapha Diss, Clinton Gubong Gassi, Issofa Moyouwou
We study the relationships between two well-known social choice concepts, namely the principle of social acceptability introduced by Mahajne and Volij (Soc Choice Welf 51(2):223–233, 2018), and the majoritarian compromise rule introduced by Sertel (Lectures notes in microeconomics, Bogazici University, 1986) and studied in detail by Sertel and Yılmaz (Soc Choice Welf 16(4):615–627, 1999). The two concepts
-
Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-05-05 Geoffrey A. Chua, Gaoji Hu, Fang Liu
-
Intergenerational equity and sustainability: a large population approach Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-04-24 Urmee Khan, Maxwell B. Stinchcombe
Patient and Pareto responsive (pPr) societal preferences were introduced and studied in Khan and Stinchcombe (2018). This paper develops a tractable subclass of the pPr preferences that satisfy a strong equity criterion formulated to match intuitions and results for large but finite models. In population models where the number and happiness of future people is stochastic, the only optimal policies
-
Centrality measures in networks Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-04-24 Francis Bloch, Matthew O. Jackson, Pietro Tebaldi
-
Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-04-17 Miho Hong, Semin Kim
-
Proportional representation in matching markets: selecting multiple matchings under dichotomous preferences Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-04-05 Niclas Boehmer, Markus Brill, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
-
Forward induction and market entry with an endogenous outside option Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-03-31 Antonio J. Morales, Javier Rodero-Cosano
-
Moral awareness polarizes people’s fairness judgments Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.874) Pub Date : 2023-03-25 Michael Kurschilgen