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Allocation without transfers: a welfare-maximizing mechanism under incomplete information Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-09-19 Ethem Akyol
This paper studies the allocation of multiple copies of indivisible objects to agents with multi-object demands in the absence of monetary transfers. We look for a welfare-maximizing ordinal mechanism in an incomplete information setting where agents’ preferences are privately known. Our main finding establishes the significant welfare gains of the so-called Ranking mechanism. When each agent’s type
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Flexible representative democracy Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Ben Abramowitz, Nicholas Mattei
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An axiomatic characterization of Split Cycle Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-09-06 Yifeng Ding, Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit
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The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-09-03 Achille Basile, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, Surekha Rao
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Natural interviewing equilibria in matching settings Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-08-30 Allan Borodin, Joanna Drummond, Kate Larson, Omer Lev
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Matching markets with farsighted couples Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-08-08 Ata Atay, Sylvain Funck, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
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Decentralized pure exchange processes on networks Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-08-05 Daniele Cassese, Paolo Pin
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Optimal labor income taxation: the role of the skill distribution Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-25 Dingquan Miao
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Preference heterogeneity over the aspects of individual well-being: towards the construction of an applied well-being index Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-19 Adi Arad, Steven Laufer, Zohar Or Sharvit, Yaniv Reingewertz, Michael Hartal
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Population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes for TU-games Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-16 Josep M. Izquierdo, Jesús Montes, Carlos Rafels
Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990) introduces population monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS) and proves that every assignment game with at least two sellers and two buyers, where each buyer-seller pair derives a positive gain from trade, lacks a PMAS. In particular glove games lacks PMAS. We propose a new cooperative TU-game concept, population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes (PLMAS),
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Padding and pruning: gerrymandering under turnout heterogeneity Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-09 Andrei Gomberg, Romans Pancs, Tridib Sharma
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Partitionable choice functions and stability Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-09 Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill, William Phan
We consider the two-sided many-to-one matching problem and introduce a class of preferences reflecting natural forms of complementarities. For example, academic departments hire seniors and then supporting juniors, teams recruit different roles and specialties, starting with the critical ones, and firms hire workers at various levels, starting with the executives. The key feature is that a firm can
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Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-09 Sreoshi Banerjee, Parikshit De, Manipushpak Mitra
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Probabilistic models of profiles for voting by evaluation Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-07-09 Antoine Rolland, Jean-Baptiste Aubin, Irène Gannaz, Samuela Leoni
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On the optimality of policy choices in the face of biased beliefs, retrospective voting and the down-up problem Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-06-24 Carlos Seixas, Diogo Lourenço
Previous literature has shown that voters’ biased beliefs regarding policy outcomes incentivize the selection of seemingly better, but socially worse, policies. It has also shown that voters’ tendency to gauge an incumbent’s competence by the present state of the economy (retrospective voting) could counteract biased beliefs. In this article, we argue that, when the advantageous consequences of a measure
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Sequential school choice with public and private schools Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-06-20 Tommy Andersson, Umut Dur, Sinan Ertemel, Onur Kesten
We investigate sequential two-stage admission systems with public and private schools. A sequential notion of truthfulness, called straightforwardness, is introduced. Contrary to one-stage systems, sequentiality leads to a trade-off between the existence of a straightforward equilibrium and non-wastefulness. We identify the unique set of rules for two-stage systems that guarantees the existence of
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Patent package structures and sharing rules for royalty revenue Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-06-20 Takaaki Abe, Emiko Fukuda, Shigeo Muto
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Partial-implementation invariance and claims problems Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-06-07 Bas Dietzenbacher, Yuki Tamura, William Thomson
In the context of claims problems, we formulate an axiom of invariance of a rule with respect to its “partial implementation”: having applied the rule to a problem in its domain of definition, we imagine some claimants picking up their awards and we consider the problem of distributing what remains of the endowment among the other claimants: in this problem, the claims of the first group of claimants
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Selection closedness and scoring correspondences Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-06-03 Semih Koray, Talat Senocak
Universal self-selectivity of a social choice function (SCF) F defined in Koray (Econometrica 68:981–995, 2000) implies that F is either dictatorial or anti-dictatorial. In an attempt to escape this impossibility, here we weaken self-selectivity of an SCF by introducing the notion of selection-closedness pertaining to families of SCFs. As in the self-selectivity setting, a society, which is to make
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Dynamically rational judgment aggregation Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-15 Franz Dietrich, Christian List
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Private provision of public goods under price uncertainty: a comment Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-09 Etienne Billette de Villemeur, Sebastián Cea-Echenique, Conrado Cuevas
We revise a result positing that there is a positive relationship between contributions and welfare in a public good provision game under price uncertainty (Gradstein et al. Soc Choice Welf 10(4):371–382, 1993). The authors state in Proposition 3 that welfare decreases when price uncertainty induces a reduction in private contributions. By contrast, we show that, under certain conditions, a reduction
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Fair group decisions via non-deterministic proportional consensus Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-04 Jobst Heitzig, Forest W. Simmons, Sara M. Constantino
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Euclidean preferences in the plane under $$\varvec{\ell _1},$$ $$\varvec{\ell _2}$$ and $$\varvec{\ell _\infty }$$ norms Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-03 Bruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard, Magdaléna Tydrichová
We present various results about Euclidean preferences in the plane under \(\ell _1,\) \(\ell _2\) and \(\ell _{\infty }\) norms. When there are four candidates, we show that the maximum size (in terms of the number of pairwise distinct preferences) of Euclidean preference profiles in \({\mathbb {R}}^2\) under norm \(\ell _1\) or \(\ell _{\infty }\) is 19. Whatever the number of candidates, we prove
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Group strategy-proof rules in multidimensional binary domains Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-05-02 Aditya Aradhye, Hans Peters
We consider a setting in which the alternatives are binary vectors and the preferences of the agents are determined by the Hamming distance from their most preferred alternatives. We consider only rules that are unanimous, anonymous, and component-neutral, and focus on strategy-proofness, weak group strategy-proofness, and strong group strategy-proofness. We show that component-wise majority rules
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Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-22 David McCune, Adam Graham-Squire
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A family of condorcet domains that are single-peaked on a circle Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-03 Arkadii Slinko
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Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-02 Hans Gersbach, Oriol Tejada
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Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-04-01 Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, René Romen
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Impartiality and relative utilitarianism Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-30 Edi Karni, John A. Weymark
A novel axiomatization of relative utilitarianism is provided using the single-profile setting used in Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem. Harsanyi’s axioms are supplemented with an impartiality axiom that requires social alternative lotteries p and q to be socially indifferent when (i) two individuals have conflicting preferences for them and everybody else is indifferent and (ii) the concerned
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Berge equilibrium, altruism and social welfare Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-28 Hans Haller
Welfare and other properties of Berge equilibria are investigated. In particular, we address the questions to what extent Berge equilibrium can select from multiple Nash equilibria; can serve as a substitute for Nash equilibria; can Pareto improve upon Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, some of the recent results on the relation between Berge equilibria and Kantian equilibria are summarized.
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Dynamic proportional rankings Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-20 Jonas Israel, Markus Brill
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Christian Klamler’s ”A distance measure for choice functions” [Social Choice and Welfare 30 (2008) 419–425]: a correction Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-14 Davide Carpentiere, Alfio Giarlotta, Stephen Watson
An extensive choice over X is a function assigning to any subset S of X a possibly empty subset of S. Klamler (Soc Choice Welf 30:419–425, 2008) shows that the operation of symmetric difference induces a metric on the family of extensive choices over X, and this metric is characterized by five axioms A1–A5. We provide counterexamples to Klamler’s result, suggest a slight modification of axioms A4 and
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A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-14 Kazuya Kikuchi, Yukio Koriyama
This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents’ payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choice functions which may respond to agents’ preference intensities as well as preference rankings. We show that a social choice function is ex ante Pareto efficient and Bayesian incentive
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Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-13 Joseph Siani, Bertrand Tchantcho, Bill Proces Tsague
Power measures are used to quantify the influence of members of a democratic institution. We consider voting games with abstention or (3,2) games, which are decision-making processes in which voting options include yes, no and abstention. The power indices that we study are based on the notions of minimal and shift minimal winning tripartitions. We define and characterize the Deegan–Packel and shift
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Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-09 Marina Núñez, Francisco Robles
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Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians? Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-08 Maxime Menuet, Hugo Oriola, Patrick Villieu
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Collective or individual rationality in the Nash bargaining solution: efficiency-free characterizations Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-04 Kensei Nakamura
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Approval-based voting with mixed goods Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-27 Xinhang Lu, Jannik Peters, Haris Aziz, Xiaohui Bei, Warut Suksompong
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Quadratic funding with incomplete information Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-24 Luis Mota Freitas, Wilfredo L. Maldonado
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Redistributive politics under ambiguity Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-13 Javier D. Donna
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Dorm augmented college assignments Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-13 Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan
In college assignments, a common practice is that students receive their dorm allocation after the realization of college placements. This causes wasted resources and unfair allocation. To fix this, we consider a college assignment problem where students simultaneously receive their college and dorm assignments. We first introduce the so-called “Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance” (DDA) and show that
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Relative measures of economic insecurity Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-03 Walter Bossert, Conchita D’Ambrosio
We characterize a new class of individual measures of economic insecurity in a setting where there is a single relevant variable that can be interpreted as income or consumption. Insecurity is intended to capture the difficulties faced by an economic agent when confronted with adverse events. We work with an intertemporal model and base our measures on the changes in the variable when moving from one
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Consistent social ranking solutions Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-23 Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita
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The interdependence of social deliberation and judgment aggregation Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-20 Hendrik Siebe
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Truthful cake sharing Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-16 Xiaohui Bei, Xinhang Lu, Warut Suksompong
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The Quintilian School in the history of Social Choice: an early tentative step from plurality rule to pairwise comparisons Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-07 Jorge Urdánoz, Josep M. Colomer
We present two texts from Roman Empire times that add two early appearances to the stream of the history of Social Choice Theory. One is from the School of Rhetoric of Quintilian (35–96), a contemporary of Pliny the Younger, who developed an early criticism of Plurality rule and, in search of a better method, sketched a choice by pairwise comparisons. The other is from Aulus Gellius (160–180), who
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Robustness to manipulations in school choice Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-07 Alexander Nesterov, Olga Rospuskova, Sofia Rubtcova
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To be fair: claims have amounts and strengths Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2023-12-09 Stefan Wintein
John Broome (Proc Aristot Soc 91:87–101, 1990) has developed an influential theory of fairness, which has generated a thriving debate about the nature of fairness. In its initial conception, Broomean fairness is limited to a comparative notion. More recent commentators such as Hooker (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:329–52, 2005), Saunders (Res Publica 16:41–55, 2010), Lazenby (Utilitas 26:331–345, 2014)
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Labor market efficiency: output as the measure of welfare Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2023-12-08 Behrang Kamali Shahdadi
We study the matching of workers to firms in which workers choose an observable and contractable effort after the match. If there are complementarities between a worker’s ability and a firm’s technology, positive assortative matching (PAM) is the only matching in any equilibrium and is the unique efficient matching. We investigate the effect of a policy that changes the matching of firms to workers
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Cross invariance, the Shapley value, and the Shapley–Shubik power index Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2023-11-25 Chun-Ting Chen, Wei-Torng Juang, Ching-Jen Sun
In this paper we propose a simple axiom which, along with the axioms of additivity (transfer) and dummy player, characterizes the Shapley value (the Shapley–Shubik power index) on the domain of TU (simple) games. The new axiom, cross invariance, demands payoff invariance on symmetric players across “quasi-symmetric games,” that is, games where excluding null players, all players are symmetric. Additionally
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Inequality measurement with coarse data Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2023-11-16 Xiangyu Qu
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Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2023-11-02 Sarvesh Bandhu, Abhinaba Lahiri, Anup Pramanik
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Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2023-11-02 Agustín G. Bonifacio
In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents. We introduce and characterize the family of iterative reallocation rules and show that each rule in this class is withdrawal-proof and endowments-merging-proof, at least one is endowments-splitting-proof
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A dynamic model of endogenous development: the role of pioneers Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2023-11-01 Alexander Usvitskiy
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Cost intervention in delinquent networks Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2023-11-01 Yifan Xiong, Youze Lang, Ziyan Li
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Ordinal utility differences Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2023-10-27 Jean Baccelli
It is widely held that under ordinal utility, utility differences are ill-defined. Allegedly, for these to be well-defined (without turning to choice under risk or the like), one should adopt as a new kind of primitive quaternary relations, instead of the traditional binary relations underlying ordinal utility functions. Correlatively, it is also widely held that the key structural properties of quaternary
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The expressive power of voting rules Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2023-10-10 Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, João V. Ferreira
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Technological advance, social fragmentation and welfare Soc. Choice Welfare (IF 0.5) Pub Date : 2023-10-04 Steven J. Bosworth, Dennis J. Snower