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The Hole Argument without the notion of isomorphism Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-15 Joanna Luc
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Indexicals and communicative affordances Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-14 Adrian Briciu
Various data from communication that does not occur face-to-face are taken to be problematic for Kaplan’s account of indexical expressions, as is the case with the so-called answering machine paradox. One fix, developed by Sidelle (1991) and Briciu (2018), is the remote utterance view: recording artifacts are means by which speakers perform utterances at a distance, just as by means of other artifacts
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An idealised account of mechanistic computation Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-14 Luke Kersten
The mechanistic account of computation offers one promising and influential theory of computational implementation. The aim of this paper is to shore up its conceptual foundations by responding to several recent challenges. After outlining and responding to a recent proposal from Kuokkanen (Synthese 200:247, 2022a), I suggest that computational description should be conceptualised as a form of idealisation
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Inquiry, reasoning and the normativity of logic Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-13
Abstract According to the traditional view in the philosophy of logic facts of logic bear normative authority regarding how one ought to reason. Usually this is to mean that the relation of logical consequence between statements has some special relevance for how one’s beliefs should cohere. However, as I will argue in this article, this is just one way in which logic is normative for reasoning. For
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HOTT and heavy: higher-order thought theory and the theory-heavy approach to animal consciousness Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-13 Jacob Berger, Myrto Mylopoulos
According to what Birch (2022) calls the theory-heavy approach to investigating nonhuman-animal consciousness, we select one of the well-developed theories of consciousness currently debated within contemporary cognitive science and investigate whether animals exhibit the neural structures or cognitive abilities posited by that theory as sufficient for consciousness. Birch argues, however, that this
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Exploring, expounding & ersatzing: a three-level account of deep learning models in cognitive neuroscience Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-13
Abstract Deep learning (DL) is a statistical technique for pattern classification through which AI researchers train artificial neural networks containing multiple layers that process massive amounts of data. I present a three-level account of explanation that can be reasonably expected from DL models in cognitive neuroscience and that illustrates the explanatory dynamics within a future-biased research
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The consequence argument and ordinary human agency Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-13 E. J. Coffman
Brian Cutter (Analysis 77: 278-287, 2017) argues that one of the most prominent versions of the consequence argument—viz., Peter van Inwagen’s (An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press, 1983) ‘Third Formal Argument’—does not support an incompatibility thesis that every paradigmatic compatibilist would reject. Justin Capes (Thought 8: 50-56, 2019) concedes Cutter’s conclusion concerning van Inwagen’s
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Bolzano’s Tortoise and a loophole for Achilles Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-08 Yannic Kappes
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Functionalism, interventionism, and higher-order causation Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-06
Abstract It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism’s problems with mental causation disappear if we abandon the intuitive but naïve production-based conception of causation in favor of one based on counterfactual dependence and difference-making. In recent years, this response has been thoroughly developed and defended by James Woodward, who contends that Kim’s causal exclusion argument, widely
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Reference in remembering: towards a simulationist account Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-05 James Openshaw, Kourken Michaelian
Recent theories of remembering and of reference (or singular thought) have de-emphasised the role causation was thought to play in mid- to late-twentieth century theorising. According to postcausal theories of remembering, such as simulationism, instances of the psychofunctional kind remembering are not, in principle, dependent on appropriate causal chains running from some event(s) remembered to the
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What is a mathematical structure of conscious experience? Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-05 Johannes Kleiner, Tim Ludwig
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Rigor and formalization Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-04
Abstract This paper critically examines and evaluates Yacin Hamami’s reconstruction of the standard view of mathematical rigor. We will argue that the reconstruction offered by Hamami is premised on a strong and controversial epistemological thesis and a strong and controversial thesis in the philosophy of mind. Secondly, we will argue that Hamami’s reconstruction of the standard view robs it of its
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Precedent and rest stop convergence in reflective equilibrium Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-04 Bert Baumgaertner, Charles Lassiter
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Irreplaceable truth Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-02 Jamin Asay
Conceptual engineers are always on the lookout for concepts that can be improved upon or replaced. Kevin Scharp has argued that the concept truth is inconsistent, and that this inconsistency thwarts its ability to serve in philosophical and scientific explanatory projects, such as developing linguistic theories of meaning. In this paper I present Scharp’s view about what makes a concept inconsistent
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Consumer-side reference through promiscuous memory traces Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-03-02 Michael Barkasi
What fixes the referents of episodic memories? While developed theories are lacking, it is generally assumed that the causal production of a memory, via memory traces, determines its referent. Recently, it has been pointed out that the “promiscuity” of memory traces poses a problem for this approach. Proposed solutions focus on finding some nonpromiscuous causal link. In this paper, I refine the problem
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A note on Williamson’s Gettier cases in epistemic logic Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-29 James Simpson
In a recent series of papers, Timothy Williamson argues that one can reach Edmund Gettier’s conclusion that the justified-true-belief (JTB) theory of knowledge is insufficient for knowledge by constructing Gettier cases in the framework of epistemic logic. In this paper, I argue, however, that Williamson’s Gettier cases in the framework of epistemic logic crucially turn on an assumption that the JTB
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What is gullibility? Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-28 Yingying Zhao, Zhiqiang Hu
Reductionism about testimony has become less popular as philosophers have uncovered our epistemic dependence on others. Meanwhile, both non-reductionism and the interpersonal view face a challenge from gullibility. Surprisingly, the concept of gullibility has not been sustainedly examined. The primary goal in this paper is to propose an analysis of gullibility. After some introductory remarks, we begin
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Environmental epistemology Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-26 Dallas Amico-Korby, Maralee Harrell, David Danks
We argue that there is a large class of questions—specifically questions about how to epistemically evaluate environments—that currently available epistemic theories are not well-suited for answering, precisely because these questions are not about the epistemic state of particular agents or groups. For example, if we critique Facebook for being conducive to the spread of misinformation, then we are
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Is there a defensible conception of reflective equilibrium? Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Claus Beisbart, Georg Brun
The goal of this paper is to re-assess reflective equilibrium (“RE”). We ask whether there is a conception of RE that can be defended against the various objections that have been raised against RE in the literature. To answer this question, we provide a systematic overview of the main objections, and for each objection, we investigate why it looks plausible, on what standard or expectation it is based
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Authenticity as self-discovery and interpretation of value Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Sara Pope
This paper offers an alternate solution to the puzzle of transformative experience raised by Paul (2014), through an appeal to Arthur Schopenhauer’s concept of the acquired character, which speaks to the intuition that authenticity entails a notion of the ‘self-as-guide’ (Rivera et al., 2019). On Paul’s solution to the puzzle, transformative decisions may be made authentically by adopting a meta-preference
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Lying by explaining: an experimental study Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Grzegorz Gaszczyk, Aleksandra Krogulska
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The teleological modal profile and subjunctive background of organic generation and growth Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-21 Preston Stovall
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The distinctly zetetic significance of disagreement Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-21 Quentin Pharr
Recent debates about disagreement’s significance have largely focused on its epistemic significance. However, given how much attention has already been paid to its epistemic significance, we might well wonder: what significance might disagreement have when we consider other related normative domains? And, in particular, what significance might it have when we consider the broader domain of inquiry
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An experimental study on the ontology of relations Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-21 Francesco Orilia, Michele Paolini Paoletti
There is an ongoing debate on the ontology of relations, which features four main competing approaches: directionalism, positionalism, anti-positionalism, and primitivism. This paper focuses on a particular version of positionalism, namely role positionalism, and proposes the results of an experimental philosophy research concerning aspects of it. We tested the intuitions of ordinary subjects regarding
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Practical perceptual representations: a contemporary defense of an old idea Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-19 Alison A. Springle, Alessandra Buccella
According to ‘orthodox’ representationalism, perceptual states possess constitutive veridicality (truth, accuracy, or satisfaction) conditions. Typically, philosophers who deny orthodox representationalism endorse some variety of anti-representationalism. But we argue that these haven’t always been, and needn’t continue to be, the only options. Philosophers including Descartes, Malebranche and Helmholtz
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Phenomenal character and the epistemic role of perception Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-17 Carlo Raineri
Naïve Realism claims that the Phenomenal Character of perception is constituted by the mind-independent objects one perceives. According to this view, the Phenomenal Character of perception is object-dependent: experiences of different objects have different Phenomenal Characters, even if those objects are qualitatively identical. Proponents of Naïve Realism often defend this conception by arguing
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Scientific explanation as a guide to ground Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-17 Markel Kortabarria, Joaquim Giannotti
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Lying and self-defeating prophecies Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-16 Wolfgang Freitag
The paper disputes the common view which holds that to lie is, essentially, to assert a disbelieved proposition. It shows by reference to self-defeating prophecies that one can lie by asserting a believed proposition, and by reference to self-fulfilling prophecies that one can be truthful by asserting a disbelieved proposition. It concludes that lying is, essentially, asserting a proposition believed
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Coordinated ifs and theories of conditionals Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-16
Abstract This paper concerns the semantics of coordinated if-clauses, as in (1)-(2). It is argued that the meanings of such sentences are explained straightforwardly on theories of conditionals that tie their non- monotonic behaviour to the if-clause itself (e.g. Schlenker 2004, but not theories that tie it to a (covert) modal operator (e.g. Kratzer 1981; 1991). Coordinated if-clauses are revealing
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Are life forms real? Aristotelian naturalism and biological science Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-16 Jennifer Ryan Lockhart, Micah Lott
Aristotelian naturalism (AN) holds that the norms governing the human will are special instances of a broader type of normativity that is also found in other living things: natural goodness and natural defect. Both critics and defenders of AN have tended to focus on the thorny issues that are specific to human beings. But some philosophers claim that AN faces other difficulties, arguing that its broader
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An accuracy characterisation of approximate coherence Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-15 Giacomo Molinari
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Two Forms of Functional Reductionism in Physics Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-15
Abstract Functional reductionism characterises inter-theoretic reduction as the recovery of the upper-level behaviour described by the reduced theory in terms of the lower-level reducing theory. For instance, finding a statistical mechanical realiser that plays the functional role of thermodynamic entropy allows to establish a reductive link between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. This view
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Interdisciplinarity in the 17th century? A co-occurrence analysis of early modern German dissertation titles Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-15 Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter
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The omniscient speaker puzzle Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-14 Aleksander Domosławski
The epistemicist theory aims to explain ignorance due to vagueness by semantic plasticity: the shiftiness of intensions across close possible worlds resulting from shiftiness in usage. This explanation is challenged by the Omniscient Speaker Puzzle (Sennet in Philos Stud 161(2):273–285, 2012). Suppose that an omniscient speaker, Barney, who knows all the facts about usage and how these facts determine
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A deflationary approach to legal ontology Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-13 Miguel Garcia-Godinez
Contra recent, inflationary views, the paper submits a deflationary approach to legal ontology. It argues, in particular, that to answer ontological questions about legal entities, we only need conceptual analysis and empirical investigation. In developing this proposal, it follows Amie Thomasson’s ‘easy ontology’ and her strategy for answering whether ordinary objects exist. The purpose of this is
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Bad social norms rather than bad believers: examining the role of social norms in bad beliefs Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-12 Basil Müller
People with bad beliefs — roughly beliefs that conflict with those of the relevant experts and are maintained regardless of counter-evidence — are often cast as bad believers. Such beliefs are seen to be the result of, e.g., motivated or biased cognition and believers are judged to be epistemically irrational and blameworthy in holding them. Here I develop a novel framework to explain why people form
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The implicit decision theory of non-philosophers Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Preston Greene, Andrew Latham, Kristie Miller, Michael Nielsen
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Objectivity, shared values, and trust Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Hanna Metzen
This paper deals with the nature of trust in science. Understanding what appropriate trust in science is and why it can reasonably break down is important for improving scientists’ trustworthiness. There are two different ways in which philosophers of science think about trust in science: as based on objectivity or as based on shared values. Some authors argue that objectivity actually grounds mere
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How the evaluability bias shapes transformative decisions Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Yoonseo Zoh, L. A. Paul, M. J. Crockett
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A case for animal reference: beyond functional reference and meaning attribution Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-06 Giulia Palazzolo
Reference is a basic feature of human language. A much debated question in the scholarship on animal communication and language evolution is whether traces of the human capacity for reference can be found in animals too. Do animals refer to things with their signals in the manner that humans do? Or is reference something that is unique to human communication? Answers to these questions have shifted
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Reflective equilibrium in logic Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-05 Ben Martin
Among the areas of knowledge that the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) has been applied to is that of logical validity. According to RE in logic, we come to be justified in believing a (deductive) logical theory in virtue of establishing some state of equilibrium between our initial judgements over the validity of specific (natural language) arguments and the logical principles which constitute
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How (not) to integrate scientific and moral realism Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-03 Leon-Philip Schäfer
In this essay, I seek to clarify and defend a unified account of realism, i.e. a conception of realism that does not only apply to philosophy of science, but also acknowledges how realism is understood in other philosophical disciplines—particularly, how moral realism is treated in metaethics. I will argue that integrating scientific and moral realism is less straightforward than is commonly assumed
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Diseases as social problems Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-02 Cristian Saborido, Jesús Zamora-Bonilla
In this paper we articulate a characterization of the concept of disease as a social problem. We argue that, from a social ontology point of view, diseases are problems that are identified and addressed within the framework of concrete social institutions and practices (those that shape medicine). This approach allows us to overcome the classical distinction between naturalist and normativist approaches
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Computational systems as higher-order mechanisms Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-02 Jorge Ignacio Fuentes
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A defense of Isaacson’s thesis, or how to make sense of the boundaries of finite mathematics Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-02-01 Pablo Dopico
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Infinitism: rival or common ground in answering the epistemic regress? Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-31 Brendan Murday
Infinitism is often presented as a rival to foundationalism and coherentism as available answers to the epistemic regress problem. The most prominent contemporary defense of infinitism, due to Peter Klein, rests on the notion that an agent can perpetually amplify the justification for her belief insofar as they are able to iteratively answer an interlocutor’s questions why the proffered grounds for
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Pragmatist reflective equilibrium Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-31 Wibren van der Burg
Rawls’ notion of reflective equilibrium has a hybrid character. It is embedded in the pragmatist tradition, but also includes various Kantian and other non-pragmatist elements. I argue that we should discard all non-pragmatist elements and develop reflective equilibrium in a consistently pragmatist manner. I argue that this pragmatist approach is the best way to defend reflective equilibrium against
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Benardete paradoxes, patchwork principles, and the infinite past Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-31 Joseph C. Schmid
Benardete paradoxes involve a beginningless set each member of which satisfies some predicate just in case no earlier member satisfies it. Such paradoxes have been wielded on behalf of arguments for the impossibility of an infinite past. These arguments often deploy patchwork principles in support of their key linking premise. Here I argue that patchwork principles fail to justify this key premise
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Bayesian defeat of certainties Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-31
Abstract When P(E) > 0, conditional probabilities P \((H|E)\) are given by the ratio formula. An agent engages in ratio conditionalization when she updates her credences using conditional probabilities dictated by the ratio formula. Ratio conditionalization cannot eradicate certainties, including certainties gained through prior exercises of ratio conditionalization. An agent who updates her credences
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Don’t get it wrong! On understanding and its negative phenomena Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-30 Haomiao Yu, Stefan Petkov
This paper studies the epistemic failures to reach understanding in relation to scientific explanations. We make a distinction between genuine understanding and its negative phenomena—lack of understanding and misunderstanding. We define explanatory understanding as inclusive as possible, as the epistemic success that depends on abilities, skills, and correct explanations. This success, we add, is
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What is an experiment in mathematical practice? New evidence from mining the Mathematical Reviews Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-30 Henrik Kragh Sørensen, Sophie Kjeldbjerg Mathiasen, Mikkel Willum Johansen
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Functionalism, integrity, and digital consciousness Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-29 Derek Shiller
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Rational factionalization for agents with probabilistically related beliefs Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-29
Abstract General epistemic polarization arises when the beliefs of a population grow further apart, in particular when all agents update on the same evidence. Epistemic factionalization arises when the beliefs grow further apart, but different beliefs also become correlated across the population. I present a model of how factionalization can emerge in a population of ideally rational agents. This kind
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Probabilifying reflective equilibrium Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-25
Abstract This paper aims to flesh out the celebrated notion of reflective equilibrium within a probabilistic framework for epistemic rationality. On the account developed here, an agent’s attitudes are in reflective equilibrium when there is a certain sort of harmony between the agent’s credences, on the one hand, and what the agent accepts, on the other hand. Somewhat more precisely, reflective equilibrium
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Should dualists locate the physical basis of experience in the head? Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-22 Bradford Saad
Dualism holds that experiences are non-physical states that exist alongside physical states. Dualism leads to the postulation of psychophysical laws that generate experiences by operating on certain sorts of physical states. What sorts of physical states? To the limited extent that dualists have addressed this question, they have tended to favor a brain-based approach that locates the physical basis
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Monadic panpsychism Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-22 Nino Kadić
One of the main obstacles for panpsychism, the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, is the difficulty of explaining how simple subjects could combine to form complex subjects. Known as the subject combination problem, it poses a possibly insurmountable challenge to the view. In this paper, I will assume that this challenge cannot be overcome and instead present a version of panpsychism
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Value transparency and promoting warranted trust in science communication Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-22 Kristen Intemann
If contextual values can play necessary and beneficial roles in scientific research, to what extent should science communicators be transparent about such values? This question is particularly pressing in contexts where there appears to be significant resistance among some non-experts to accept certain scientific claims or adopt science-based policies or recommendations. This paper examines whether
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Was Wittgenstein a radical conventionalist? Synthese (IF 1.5) Pub Date : 2024-01-22 Ásgeir Berg
This paper defends a reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics in the Lectures on the Foundation of Mathematics as a radical conventionalist one, whereby our agreement about the particular case is constitutive of our mathematical practice and ‘the logical necessity of any statement is a direct expression of a convention’ (Dummett in Philos Rev 68(3), 1959, p. 329). On this view, mathematical
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