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  •   Necessity and Other-Defense
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-08-22
    Linda Eggert

    This paper examines the necessity requirement in cases in which more than one defensive agent could avert the same threat of harm. It argues that the most compelling view of necessity is one that seeks to minimize harms by extending the constraint across agents pursuing the same defensive aim. Whether it is necessary, and to that extent permissible, for one agent to use defensive force may depend on

  •   Comparativist Theories or Conspiracy Theories?
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-08-22
    Caspar Jacobs

    Although physical theories routinely posit absolute quantities, such as absolute position or intrinsic mass, it seems that only comparative quantities such as distance and mass ratio are observable. But even if there are in fact only distances and mass ratios, the success of absolutist theories means that the world looks just as if there are absolute positions and intrinsic masses. If comparativism

  •   The Weight of Suffering
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-07-16
    Andreas Mogensen

    How should we weigh suffering against happiness? This paper highlights the existence of an argument from intuitively plausible axiological principles to the striking conclusion that, in comparing different populations, there exists some depth of suffering that cannot be compensated for by any measure of well-being. In addition to a number of structural principles, the argument relies on two key premises

  •   The Poets of Our Lives
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-22
    Kenneth Walden

    This article proposes a role for aesthetic judgment in our practical thought. The role is related to those moments when practical reason seems to give out, when it fails to yield a judgment about what to do in the face of a choice we cannot avoid. I argue that these impasses require agents to create, but that not any creativity will do. For we cannot regard a response to one of these problems as arbitrary

  •   Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues: Redux
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-22
    Peter Hawke

    I construe Relevant Alternatives Theory (RAT) as an abstract combination of anti-skepticism and epistemic modesty, then re-evaluate the challenge posed to it by the missed clue counterexamples of Schaffer. The import of this challenge has been underestimated, as Schaffer’s specific argument invites distracting objections. I offer a novel formalization of RAT, accommodating a suitably wide class of

  •   Wanting Is Not Expected Utility
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-17
    Tomasz Zyglewicz

    In this paper, I criticize Ethan Jerzak’s view that ‘want’ has only one sense, the mixed expected utility sense. First, I show that his appeals to ‘really’-locutions fail to explain away the counterintuitive predictions of his view. Second, I present a class of cases, which I call “principled indifference” cases, that pose difficulties for any expected utility lexical entry for ‘want’. I argue that

  •   Credit for Dummies
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-17
    Shane Ward

    A popular view is that you deserve credit for a successful performance only if you were aware in some way of what you were doing. It has been argued that some such cognitive condition on creditworthy performance must be true because it is the only way to ensure that one’s success is not an accident. In this paper, I argue against cognitive conditions on creditworthy performance: cognitive conditions

  •   Wronging Oneself
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-06-17
    Daniel Muñoz,Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt

    When, if ever, do we wrong ourselves? The Self-Other Symmetric answer is: when we do to ourselves what would wrong a consenting other. The standard objection, which has gone unchallenged for decades, is that Symmetry seems to imply that we wrong ourselves in too many cases—where rights are unwaivable, or “self-consent” is lacking. I argue that Symmetry not only survives these would-be counterexamples;

  •   Responsibility and Perception
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-11
    Benjamin Henke

    I argue that beliefs based on irresponsibly formed experiences—whose causes were not appropriately regulated by the subject—are doxastically unjustified. Only this position, I claim, accounts for the higher epistemic standard required of perceptual experts. Section I defends this standard and applies it to a pair of cases in which either an expert umpire or a complete novice judge a force play in baseball

  •   Optimization and Beyond
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-11
    Akshath Jitendranath

    This paper will be concerned with hard choices—that is, choice situations where an agent cannot make a rationally justified choice. Specifically, this paper asks: if an agent cannot optimize in a given situation, are they facing a hard choice? A pair of claims are defended in light of this question. First, situations where an agent cannot optimize because of incompleteness of the binary preference

  •   Many-to-One Intentionalism
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-02
    Manolo Martínez,Bence Nanay

    Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of this paper is to make explicit an ambiguity in usual formulations of intentionalism, and to argue in favor of one way to disambiguate it. It concerns whether perceptual phenomenology depends on the content of one and only one representation (often construed as being identical to a certain perceptual experience)

  •   Truthfulness and Sense-Making: Two Modes of Respect for Agency
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-02
    Jeanette Kennett,Steve Matthews

    According to a Kantian conception truthfulness is characterised as a requirement of respect for the agency of another. In lying we manipulate the other’s rational capacities to achieve ends we know or fear they may not share. This is paradigmatically a failure of respect. In this paper we argue that the importance of truthfulness also lies in significant part in the ways in which it supports our agential

  •   Safety, Closure, and Extended Methods
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-09
    Simon Goldstein,John Hawthorne

    Recent research has identified a tension between the Safety principle that knowledge is belief without risk of error, and the Closure principle that knowledge is preserved by competent deduction. Timothy Williamson reconciles Safety and Closure by proposing that when an agent deduces a conclusion from some premises, the agent’s method for believing the conclusion includes their method for believing

  •   Logic as a Science of Patterns?
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-09
    Jaroslav Peregrin

    I propose that logic may be seen as a science of patterns—however, not in the sense in which mathematics is a science of patterns, but rather in the sense in which physics is. The proposal is that logic identifies, explores, and fixes the inferential patterns which de facto govern our argumentative practices. It can be seen, I argue, as picking up the patterns and working from them toward the state

  •   Epistemic Possibility, Concessive Knowledge Attributions, and Fallibilism
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-12-01
    Wayne A. Davis

    I argue that modal terms have an epistemic interpretation on which concessive knowledge attributions are semantically contradictory. This is compatible with the fallibilist view that the basis on which we know something need not entail it, but not with the view that what is known need not be epistemically certain or necessary. The apparent contradictoriness of concessive knowledge attributions is not

  •   God and the Numbers
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-12-01
    Paul Studtmann

    According to Augustine, abstract objects are ideas in the mind of God. Because numbers are a type of abstract object, it would follow that numbers are ideas in the mind of God. Call such a view the “Augustinian View of Numbers” (AVN). In this paper, I present a formal theory for AVN. The theory stems from the symmetry conception of God as it appears in Studtmann (2021). I show that the theory in Studtmann’s

  •   The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-10-31
    Christopher Willard-Kyle

    A growing number of epistemologists have endorsed the Ignorance Norm for Inquiry. Roughly, this norm says that one should not inquire into a question unless one is ignorant of its answer. I argue that, in addition to ignorance, proper inquiry requires a certain kind of knowledge. Roughly, one should not inquire into a question unless one knows it has a true answer. I call this the Knowledge Norm for

  •   Counterfactual Probability
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-10-31
    Ginger Schultheis

    Stalnaker’s Thesis about indicative conditionals says, roughly, that the probability one ought to assign to an indicative conditional is equal to the probability that one ought to assign to its consequent conditional on its antecedent. Skyrms’s Thesis about counterfactual conditionals says, roughly, that the probability that one ought to assign to a counterfactual conditional equals one’s rational

  •   Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-09-21
    Christopher Cowie

    Moral error theory has many troubling and counterintuitive consequences. It entails, for example, that actions we ordinarily think of as obviously wrong are not wrong at all. This simple observation is at the heart of much opposition to error theory. I provide a new defense against it. The defense is based on the impossibility of finding satisfying solutions to a wide range of puzzles and paradoxes

  •   Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items - Bentham vs. Rawls on Envy
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-22
    Steven J. Brams,D. Marc Kilgour,Christian Klamler,Fan Wei

    Suppose two players wish to divide a finite set of indivisible items, over which each distributes a specified number of points. Assuming the utility of a player’s bundle is the sum of the points it assigns to the items it contains, we analyze what divisions are fair. We show that if there is an envy-free (EF) allocation of the items, two other desirable properties—Pareto-optimality (PO) and Maximinality

  •   Uniqueness, Intrinsic Value, and Reasons
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-22
    Gwen Bradford

    Uniqueness appears to enhance intrinsic value. A unique stamp sells for millions of dollars; Stradivarius violins are all the more precious because they are unlike any others. This observation has not gone overlooked in the value theory literature: uniqueness plays a starring role recalibrating the dominant Moorean understanding of the nature of intrinsic value. But the thesis that uniqueness enhances

  •   Small Worlds with Cosmic Powers
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-22
    William M. R. Simpson

    The wave function of quantum mechanics can be understood in terms of the dispositional role it plays in the dynamics of a distribution of matter in three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional spacetime). There is more than one way, however, of specifying its dispositional role. This paper considers Suárez’s theory of ‘Bohmian dispositionalism’, in which the particles are endowed with their own ‘Bohmian

  •   Schmoughts for Naught? Reply to Vermaire
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-03
    Matti Eklund

    In his article "Against Schmought" (The Journal of Philosophy, CXVIII 2021), Matthew Vermaire discusses the central problems I focus on in my book Choosing Normative Concepts (2017). Vermaire defends an attempted solution, or dissolution, of these problems. While there is much in Vermaire’s discussion to admire, I do not think Vermaire’s solution works, and here I explain why. Key to my response is

  •   Grounds of Goodness
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-03
    Jeremy David Fix

    What explains why we are subjects for whom objects can have value, and what explains which objects have value for us? Axiologicians say that the value of humanity is the answer. I argue that our value, no matter what it is like, cannot perform this task. We are animals among others. An explanation of the value of objects for us must fit into an explanation of the value of objects for animals generally

  •   Justice and Contribution: A Narrow Argument for Living Wages
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-03
    Julia Maskivker

    This paper examines whether certain workers have a moral claim to decent wages for work that contributes to the social surplus in a fundamental way. This "fundamental" way refers to work whose fruits other members of society need to live acceptably good lives (not maximally good ones). The paper argues that what is due to this type of worker is based on the nature of the benefit that her labor produces

  •   Nothing Is True
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-06-28
    Will Gamester

    This paper motivates and defends alethic nihilism, the theory that nothing is true. I first argue that alethic paradoxes like the Liar and Curry motivate nihilism; I then defend the view from objections. The critical discussion has two primary outcomes. First, a proof of concept. Alethic nihilism strikes many as silly or obviously false, even incoherent. I argue that it is in fact well-motivated and

  •   McTaggart's Overlooked Second Construction of the Argument against the Reality of Time in the A-Series
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-06-27
    Wai-Hung Wong

    McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time was first published in the 1908 article “The Unreality of Time,” and a revised version appeared in the 1927 book The Nature of Existence. I argue that these two versions are significantly different. The second construction of the argument is important because it neutralizes a compelling objection. McTaggart’s initial argument tries to show that the conception

  •   Supererogatory Rescues
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-06-27
    Linda Eggert

    Recent debates about supererogatory rescues have sought to explain how it can be wrong to perform a suboptimal rescue although it would be permissible not to rescue at all. This paper proposes a new solution to this puzzle. It argues that existing accounts have neglected two critical considerations. First, contrary to what is commonly assumed, a rescue’s supererogatory nature has no bearing on the

  •   A New Defense of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-06-01
    Michael Della Rocca

    This paper offers a defense of a much-maligned Leibnizian argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the principle according to which whatever is has a sufficient reason or explanation. While Leibniz’s argument is widely thought to rely on a question-begging premise, the paper offers a wholly original and non-question-begging defense of that premise, a defense that Leibniz did not anticipate

  •   Quantifier Variance, Vague Existence, and Metaphysical Vagueness
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-06-01
    Rohan Sud

    This paper asks: Is the quantifier variantist committed to metaphysical vagueness? My investigation of this question goes via a study of vague existence. I’ll argue that the quantifier variantist is committed to vague existence and that the vague existence posited by the variantist requires a puzzling sort of metaphysical vagueness. Specifically, I distinguish between (what I call) positive and negative

  •   Would Disagreement Undermine Progress?
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-25
    Finnur Dellsén,Insa Lawler,James Norton

    In recent years, several philosophers have argued that their discipline makes no progress (or not enough in comparison to the “hard sciences”). A key argument for this pessimistic position appeals to the purported fact that philosophers widely and systematically disagree on most major philosophical issues. In this paper, we take a step back from the debate about progress in philosophy specifically

  •   Standpoints: A Study of a Metaphysical Picture
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-25
    Martin A. Lipman

    There is a type of metaphysical picture that surfaces in a range of philosophical discussions, is of intrinsic interest, and yet remains ill-understood. According to this picture, the world contains a range of standpoints relative to which different facts obtain. Any true representation of the world cannot but adopt a particular standpoint. The aim of this paper is to propose a regimentation of a metaphysics

  •   Ways of Being and Logicality
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-10
    Owen Griffiths,A. C. Paseau

    Ontological monists hold that there is only one way of being, while ontological pluralists hold that there are many; for example, concrete objects like tables and chairs exist in a different way from abstract objects like numbers and sets. Correspondingly, the monist will want the familiar existential quantifier as a primitive logical constant, whereas the pluralist will want distinct ones, such as

  •   Wishing, Decision Theory, and Two-Dimensional Content
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-10
    Kyle Blumberg

    This paper is about two requirements on wish reports whose interaction motivates a novel semantics for these ascriptions. The first requirement concerns the ambiguities that arise when determiner phrases, such as definite descriptions, interact with ‘wish’. More specifically, several theorists have recently argued that attitude ascriptions featuring counterfactual attitude verbs license interpretations

  •   Interpretative Modesty
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-14
    Mark McCullagh

    Philosophers have wanted to work with conceptions of word-competence, or concept-possession, on which being a competent practitioner with a word amounts to being a competent judge of its uses by others. I argue that our implicit conception of competence with a word does not have this presupposition built into it. One implication of this is what I call "modesty" in interpretation: we allow for others

  •   Interpersonal Comparisons of What?
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-14
    Jean Baccelli

    I examine the once popular claim according to which interpersonal comparisons of welfare are necessary for social choice. I side with current social choice theorists in emphasizing that, on a narrow construal, this necessity claim is refuted beyond appeal. However, I depart from the opinion presently prevailing in social choice theory in highlighting that on a broader construal, this claim proves not

  •   Questions of Reference and the Reflexivity of First-Person Thought
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-12-07
    Michele Palmira

    Tradition has it that first-person thought is somehow special. It is also commonplace to maintain that the first-person concept obeys a rule of reference to the effect that any token first-person thought is about the thinker of that thought. Following Annalisa Coliva and, more recently, Santiago Echeverri, I take the specialness claim to be the claim that thinking a first-person thought comes with

  •   Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-12-07
    Thomas Raleigh

    According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according to Rich views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ properties

  •   Ambiguous Statements about Akrasia
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-12-07
    Luis Rosa

    Epistemologists take themselves to disagree about whether there are situations where it is rational for one to believe that p and rational for one to believe that one’s evidence does not support p (rational akrasia). The embedded sentence ‘one’s evidence does not support p’ can be interpreted in two ways, however, depending on what the semantic contribution of ‘one’s evidence’ is taken to be. ‘One’s

  •   Saying, Commitment, and the Lying-Misleading Distinction
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-12-01
    Neri Marsili,Guido Löhr

    How can we capture the intuitive distinction between lying and misleading? According to a traditional view, the difference boils down to whether the speaker is saying (as opposed to implying) something that they believe to be false. This view is subject to known objections; to overcome them, an alternative view has emerged. For the alternative view, what matters is whether the speaker can consistently

  •   What Is the Commitment in Lying
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-12-01
    Jessica Pepp

    Emanuel Viebahn accounts for the distinction between lying and misleading in terms of what the speaker commits to, rather than in terms of what the speaker says, as on traditional accounts. Although this alternative type of account is well motivated, I argue that Viebahn does not adequately explain the commitment involved in lying. He explains the commitment in lying in terms of a responsibility to

  •   (Counter)factual Want Ascriptions and Conditional Belief
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-12-01
    Thomas Grano,Milo Phillips-Brown

    What are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According to an influential approach, they are intimately connected to the agent’s beliefs: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff, within S’s belief set, S prefers the p worlds to the not-p worlds. This approach faces a well-known problem, however: it makes the wrong predictions for what we call (counter)factual want ascriptions, wherein the agent either believes

  •   Counterparts and Counterpossibles: Impossibility without Impossible Worlds
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-11-16
    Michael Townsen Hicks

    Standard accounts of counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents take them to by trivially true. But recent work shows that nontrivial countermetaphysicals are frequently appealed to in scientific modeling and are indispensable for a number of metaphysical projects. I focus on three recent discussions of counterpossible counterfactuals, which apply counterpossibles in both scientific

  •   Inferentialism, Conventionalism, and A Posteriori Necessity
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-11-16
    Jared Warren

    In the mid twentieth century, logical positivists and many other philosophers endorsed a simple equation: something was necessary just in case it was analytic just in case it was a priori. Kripke’s examples of a posteriori necessary truths showed that the simple equation is false. But while positivist-style inferentialist approaches to logic and mathematics remain popular, there is no inferentialist

  •   Crossed Wires: Blaming Artifacts for Bad Outcomes
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-09-20
    Justin Sytsma

    Philosophers and psychologists often assume that responsibility and blame only apply to certain agents. But do our ordinary concepts of responsibility and blame reflect these assumptions? I investigate one recent debate where these assumptions have been applied—the back-and-forth over how to explain the impact of norms on ordinary causal attributions. I investigate one prominent case where it has been

  •   Self-Making and Subpeople
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-09-20
    David Mark Kovacs

    On many currently popular ontologies of material objects, we share our place with numerous shorter-lived things ("subpeople," to borrow a term from Eric Olson) that came into existence after we did or will go out of existence before we will. Subpeople are intrinsically indistinguishable from possible people, and as several authors (Eric Olson, Mark Johnston, A. P. Taylor) pointed out, this raises grave

  •   Everything and More: The Prospects of Whole Brain Emulation
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-09-08
    Eric Mandelbaum

    Whole Brain Emulation (WBE) has been championed as the most promising, well-defined route to achieving both human-level artificial intelligence and superintelligence. It has even been touted as a viable route to achieving immortality through brain uploading. WBE is not a fringe theory: the doctrine of Computationalism in philosophy of mind lends credence to the in-principle feasibility of the idea

  •   The Dispute between Two Accounts of the Continuum
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-09-08
    Montgomery Link

    The topic of this paper is the debate between two accounts of the continuum. On one account the continuum has discrete elements. On the other it has no discrete elements. Each account has its own strengths and weaknesses. The paper introduces several different explications of continuity before stating and discussing an antinomy and some options to resolve it. An assessment follows in which certain

  •   Pluralities as Nothing Over and Above
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-09-08
    Sam Roberts

    This paper develops an account of pluralities based on the following simple claim: some things are nothing over and above the individual things they comprise. For some, this may seem like a mysterious statement, perhaps even meaningless; for others, like a truism, trivial and inferentially inert. I show that neither reaction is correct: the claim is both tractable and has important consequences for

  •   Rethinking Convergence to the Truth
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-07-26
    Simon M. Huttegger

    The Bayesian theorem on convergence to the truth states that a rational inquirer believes with certainty that her degrees of belief capture the truth about a large swath of hypotheses with increasing evidence. This result has been criticized as showcasing a problematic kind of epistemic immodesty when applied to infinite hypotheses that can never be approximated by finite evidence. The central point

  •   Generality Explained
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-07-26
    Øystein Linnebo

    What explains the truth of a universal generalization? Two types of explanation can be distinguished. While an ‘instance-based explanation’ proceeds via some or all instances of the generalization, a ‘generic explanation’ is independent of the instances, relying instead on completely general facts about the properties or operations involved in the generalization. This intuitive distinction is analyzed

  •   Should an Ontological Pluralist Be a Quantificational Pluralist?
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-07-11
    Byron Simmons

    Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different fundamental ways of being. Recent defenders of this view—such as Kris McDaniel and Jason Turner—have taken these ways of being to be best captured by semantically primitive quantifier expressions ranging over different domains. They have thus endorsed, what I shall call, quantificational pluralism. I argue that this focus on quantification

  •   Ungrounded Payoffs: A Tale of Perfect Love and Hate
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-07-11
    Eleonora Cresto

    I explore a game-theoretic analysis of social interactions in which each agent’s well-being depends crucially on the well-being of another agent. As a result of this, payoffs are interdependent and cannot be fixed, and hence the overall assessment of strategies becomes ungrounded. A paradigmatic example of this general phenomenon occurs when both players are ‘reflective altruists’, in a sense to be

  •   Formulating Moral Error Theory
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-06-09
    Caleb Perl

    This paper shows how to formulate moral error theories given a contextualist semantics like the one that Angelika Kratzer pioneered, answering the concerns that Christine Tiefensee developed.

  •   How to Be a Spacetime Substantivalist
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-06-09
    Trevor Teitel

    The consensus among spacetime substantivalists is to respond to Leibniz’s classic shift arguments, and their contemporary incarnation in the form of the hole argument, by pruning the allegedly problematic metaphysical possibilities that generate these arguments. Some substantivalists do so by directly appealing to a modal doctrine akin to anti-haecceitism. Other substantivalists do so by appealing

  •   The Qualitative Thesis
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-05-18
    David Boylan,Ginger Schultheis

    The Qualitative Thesis says that if you leave open P, then you are sure of if P, then Q just in case you are sure of the corresponding material conditional. We argue the Qualitative Thesis provides compelling reasons to accept a thesis that we call Conditional Locality, which says, roughly, the interpretation of an indicative conditional depends, in part, on the conditional’s local embedding environment

  •   What's Social about Social Epistemology?
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-05-18
    Helen E. Longino

    A thin conception of the social pervades much philosophical writing in social epistemology. A thicker form of sociality is to be found in scientific practice, as represented in much recent history and philosophy of science. Typical social epistemology problems, such as disagreement and testimony, take on a different aspect when viewed from the perspective of scientific practice. Here interaction among

  •   Defusing Existential and Universal Threats to Compatibilism - A Strawsonian Dilemma for Manipulation Arguments
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-05-03
    Andrew J. Latham,Hannah Tierney

    Many manipulation arguments against compatibilism rely on the claim that manipulation is relevantly similar to determinism. But we argue that manipulation is nothing like determinism in one relevant respect. Determinism is a "universal" phenomenon: its scope includes every feature of the universe. But manipulation arguments feature cases where an agent is the only manipulated individual in her universe

  •   Questions in Action
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-05-03
    Daniel Hoek

    Choices confront us with questions. How we act depends on our answers to those questions. So the way our beliefs guide our choices is not just a function of their informational content, but also depends systematically on the questions those beliefs address. This paper gives a precise account of the interplay between choices, questions and beliefs, and harnesses this account to obtain a principled approach

  •   Composing Spacetime
    J. Philos. (IF 1.6) Pub Date : 2022-03-18
    Sam Baron,Baptiste Le Bihan

    According to a number of approaches in theoretical physics, spacetime does not exist fundamentally. Rather, spacetime exists by depending on another, more fundamental, non-spatiotemporal structure. A prevalent opinion in the literature is that this dependence should not be analyzed in terms of composition. We should not say, that is, that spacetime depends on an ontology of non-spatiotemporal entities

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