-
Limited Aggregation’s Non-Fatal Non-Dilemma Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-09-18 James Hart
Limited aggregationists argue that when deciding between competing claims to aid we are sometimes required and sometimes forbidden from aggregating weaker claims to outweigh stronger claims. Joe Ho...
-
Against Instantiation Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-09-15 Christopher Frugé
According to traditional universalism, properties are instantiated by objects, where instantiation is a ‘tie’ that binds objects and properties into facts. I offer two arguments against this view. ...
-
Reciprocity and the Rule of Law Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-09-11 Alexander Motchoulski
Fair-play theories of political obligation hold that persons have a duty to obey the law based on the fact that they benefit from the law and have a duty of reciprocity to comply in return. These a...
-
Structural Irrationality Does Not Consist in Having Attitudes You Ought Not to Have: A New Dilemma for Reasons-Violating Structural Irrationality Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Julian Fink
This paper presents a new argument against the view that structural (or attitude-based) irrationality consists in failing to respond correctly to normative reasons. According to this view, a patter...
-
Counterevidentials Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-09-02 Laura Caponetto, Neri Marsili
Moorean constructions are famously odd: it is infelicitous to deny that you believe what you claim to be true. But what about claiming that p, only to immediately put into question your evidence in...
-
Knowledge and Ability Externalism Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-08-27 John Turman
Contemporary alternatives to belief-based accounts of knowledge include, among others, accounts of knowledge as a mental state, such as Williamson’s (2000), and ability-based accounts of knowledge ...
-
Deliberative Control and Eliminativism about Reasons for Emotions Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-08-27 Conner Schultz
In this paper, I argue for Strong Eliminativism—the view that there are no reasons for emotions. My argument for this claim has two premises. The first premise is that there is a deliberative const...
-
Public Reason Illiberalism and Ideology Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-08-19 Jason Brennan, Jessica Flanigan, Christopher Freiman
This paper describes public reason communitarianism, a theory which is isomorphic to public reason liberalism. It contains the same internal diversity and debates, and the same fundamental structur...
-
Chains of Being: Infinite Regress, Circularity, and Metaphysical Explanation Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-08-12 D. Gene Witmer
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)
-
Knowledge of the Future and Reliable Belief-Forming Processes Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-08-14 Stephan Torre
This paper embraces the view that we have substantial knowledge of the future and investigates how such knowledge fundamentally differs from knowledge of the past and present. I argue for a new sou...
-
Fallibility and Dogmatism Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-08-09 Bernhard Salow
The strongest version of the dogmatism puzzle argues that, when we know something, we should resolve to ignore or avoid evidence against it. The best existing responses are fallibilist, and hold th...
-
Dreier Is a Great Dad in All Possible Worlds: A Challenge to Moral Contingentism Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-08-04 Alexis Morin-Martel
In this paper, I raise a challenge to Gideon Rosen’s defence of moral contingentism against Jamie Dreier’s moral luck argument. Dreier argues that if moral contingentism is true, acting in a morall...
-
Three Kinds of Causal Indeterminacy Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-08-04 Vera Hoffmann-Kolss
The goal of this paper is to argue that there is indeterminacy in causation. I present three types of cases in which it is indeterminate whether an event c caused another event e: (1) cases of abse...
-
Competitive Value, Noncompetitive Value, and Life's Meaning Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-07-30 Iddo Landau
This paper explores the notions of competitive and noncompetitive value and examines how they both affect meaning in life. The paper distinguishes, among other things, between engaging with competi...
-
Unconscious Pleasure as Dispositional Pleasure Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-07-23 James Fanciullo
A good deal of recent debate over the nature of pleasure and pain has surrounded the alleged phenomenon of unconscious sensory pleasure and pain, or pleasures and pains whose subjects are entirely ...
-
Counting Your Chickens Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-07-07 Yoaav Isaacs, Adam Lerner, Jeffrey Sanford Russell
Suppose that, for reasons of animal welfare, it would be better if everyone stopped eating chicken. Does it follow that you should stop eating chicken? Proponents of the ‘inefficacy objection’ argu...
-
The Buddha’s Lucky Throw and Pascal’s Wager Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-05-30 Bronwyn Finnigan
The Apaṇṇaka Sutta, one of the early recorded teachings of the Buddha, contains an argument for accepting the doctrines of karma and rebirth that Buddhist scholars claim anticipates Pascal’s wager....
-
Hermeneutical Sabotage Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-05-20 Han Edgoose
In this paper I identify a distinct form of epistemic injustice and oppression which I call ‘hermeneutical sabotage’. Hermeneutical sabotage occurs when dominantly situated knowers actively maintai...
-
Hypocrisy and Conditional Requirements Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-05-14 John Brunero
This paper considers the formulation of the moral requirement against hypocrisy, paying particular attention to the logical scope of ‘requires’ in that formulation. The paper argues (i) that we sho...
-
The Varieties of Prudence Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-05-05 Simone Gubler
We sometimes face personal choices that are so momentous they appear to give rise to an intrapersonal analogue to the non-identity problem. Where the non-identity problem presents as a problem for ...
-
The Problem of Blame: Making Sense of Moral Anger Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-05-09 Adam Piovarchy
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)
-
The Ethical Implications of Panpsychism Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-05-08 Joseph Gottlieb, Bob Fischer
The history of philosophy is a history of moral circle expansion. This history correlates with a history of expansionism about consciousness. Recently, expansionism about consciousness has exploded...
-
Generalized Quantification in an Axiomatic Truth Theory Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-05-05 Ian Rumfitt
Bruno Whittle (2019) has recently extended Kripke’s semantical theory of truth to languages containing generalized quantifiers. There are reasons for axiomatizing semantical theories, and for regar...
-
Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-05-05 Zeev Goldschmidt
Several philosophers have proposed Knowledge-Based Decision Theories (KDTs)—theories that require agents to maximize expected utility as yielded by utility and probability functions that depend on ...
-
Intersectional Disadvantage Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-05-02 Annina Loets
When people simultaneously occupy multiple social identities, ascriptions of disadvantage and advantage, as well as our reasoning with them, need to be handled with care. For instance, as various U...
-
The Golden Rule: A Defence Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-05-02 Daniel Rönnedal
According to the so-called golden rule, we ought to treat others as we want to be treated by them. This rule, in one form or another, is part of every major religion, and it has been accepted by ma...
-
The Moral Inefficacy of Carbon Offsetting Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-04-30 Tyler M John, Amanda Askell, Hayden Wilkinson
Many real-world agents recognise that they impose harms by choosing to emit carbon, for example, by flying. Yet many do so anyway, and then attempt to make things right by offsetting those harms. S...
-
Virtue and Action: Selected Papers Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-04-30 Karen Stohr
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)
-
Better Foundations for Subjective Probability Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-04-23 Sven Neth
How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by representation theorems, going back to Ramsey (1926), which tell us how to define or measure subjec...
-
Frontloading and the Necessary A Posteriori Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-04-22 Mikkel Gerken
In this paper, I reevaluate Kripke’s arguments for the necessary a posteriori contra a Kantian pure modal rationalism according to which modal cognition is a priori. I argue that Kripke’s critique ...
-
Mental Causation for Standard Dualists Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Bram Vaassen
The standard objection to dualist theories of mind is that they seemingly cannot account for the obvious fact that mental phenomena cause our behaviour. On the plausible assumption that all our beh...
-
Options and Agency Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Sophie Kikkert, Barbara Vetter
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)
-
Causation and the Time-Asymmetry of Knowledge Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-03-24 Thomas Blanchard
This paper argues that the knowledge asymmetry (the fact that we know more about the past than the future) can be explained as a consequence of the causal Markov condition. The causal Markov condit...
-
Philosophy Moves Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-03-24 David Kelley
In this paper, I introduce the notion of ‘philosophy moves’: prominent tropes featured in contemporary academic philosophy. Moves are more than patterns—they are tools for advancing and enriching p...
-
Worldly Indeterminacy and the Provisionality of Language Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-03-21 Chien-hsing Ho
Theorists who advocate worldly (metaphysical or ontological) indeterminacy—the idea that the world itself is indeterminate in one or more respects—should address how we understand the signifying na...
-
Avowing the Avowal View Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-03-07 Elizabeth Schechter
This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that ¬p and yet is sincere in asserting that p. I argue that...
-
Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-03-03 Alec Hinshelwood
We know our own intentional actions in a distinctively first-personal way. Many accounts of knowledge of intentionally doing something, A, assume that grounds for the knowledge would have to establ...
-
Serious Actualism and Nonexistence Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-03-03 Christopher James Masterman
Serious actualism is the view that it is metaphysically impossible for an entity to have a property, or stand in a relation, and not exist. Fine (1985) and Pollock (1985) influentially argue that t...
-
Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-03-03 Adam Bradley
Are we acquainted with the self in experience? It may seem so. After all, we tend to be confident in our own existence. A natural explanation for this confidence is that the self somehow shows up i...
-
Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize? Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-02-21 Michael Zhao
Call ‘radical moral theorizing’ the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral judgments, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency,...
-
The Grounds of a Critique of Pure Reason Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-02-20 Joe Stratmann
For the realist metaphysician, certain notions in metaphysics are objectively theory-guiding. But what makes them so? Echoing others, Dasgupta (2018) suggests that the realist metaphysician faces t...
-
Ambiguity Tests, Polysemy, and Copredication Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-02-19 David Liebesman, Ofra Magidor
A family of familiar linguistic tests purport to help identify when a term is ambiguous. These tests are philosophically important: a familiar philosophical strategy is to claim that some phenomeno...
-
The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-02-19 Benj Hellie
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 102, No. 3, 2024)
-
Amphibians and the Particular-Universal Distinction Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-02-15 Chiao-Li Ou
I defend a new conception of the particular-universal distinction based on considerations about what David Lewis calls ‘amphibians’. I argue, first, that given the possibility of amphibians, two re...
-
Bad Beliefs: Why they Happen to Good People Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-02-15 David Coady
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 102, No. 3, 2024)
-
Engineering Human Beauty with More Caution Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-02-15 Xinkan Zhao
Ravasio (2023) recently presents an interesting discussion of strategies to deal with lookism. He categorizes strategies into revisionary and redistributive ones and argues for a case against the f...
-
Sharing Pain: A Hybrid Expressivist Account Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-02-15 Jada Wiggleton-Little
When one communicates that they are in pain, it is often assumed that the speaker is providing an assertion or report. Call this the cognitivist stance of pain utterances. Nevertheless, many senten...
-
The Reasons to Follow Conventional Practices Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-02-15 C. M. Melenovsky
This article challenges a reductive analysis of social practices by distinguishing five kinds of reason for following the rules of conventional practices. Depending on one’s preferred intellectual ...
-
Delusions and the Predictive Mind Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-01-03 Federico Bongiorno, Philip R. Corlett
A growing number of studies in both the scientific and the philosophical literature have drawn on a Bayesian predictive processing framework to account for the formation of delusions. The key here ...
-
Perspective and spatial experience Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-01-04 Alex Kerr
Distant things look smaller, in a sense. Why? I argue that the reason is not that our experiences have a certain subject matter, or are about certain mind-independent things and features. Instead, ...
-
The Parmenidean Ascent Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Kenneth L. Pearce
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 102, No. 2, 2024)
-
The Horizonal Structure of Visual Experience Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2023-12-07 Jonathan Mitchell
How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite being limited, in any given perceptual moment, to perceiving the sides facing us from a specific spatial perspec...
-
Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2023-12-03 Tammo Lossau
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 102, No. 2, 2024)
-
Attention And Attentiveness: A Defence of The Argument for Adverbialism Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2023-12-03 Christopher Mole
In recent philosophical work on attention, several authors have employed versions of an argument purporting to show that attention is not identical to any cognitive process. Others have criticised ...
-
The Architectonic of Reason: Purposiveness and Systematic Unity in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2023-11-30 I.S. Blecher
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 102, No. 2, 2024)
-
Multidimensional Adjectives Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2023-11-28 Justin D’Ambrosio, Brian Hedden
Multidimensional adjectives are ubiquitous in natural language. An adjective F is multidimensional just in case whether F applies to an object or pair of objects depends on how those objects stand ...
-
Coherence as Joint Satisfiability Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2023-10-29 Samuel Fullhart, Camilo Martinez
According to many philosophers, rationality is, at least in part, a matter of one’s attitudes cohering with one another. Theorists who endorse this idea have devoted much attention to formulating v...
-
Reasons First Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2023-10-23 Errol Lord
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 102, No. 2, 2024)
-
A Defence of Ontological Innocence: Response to Barker Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2023-10-23 Jonas Werner
In a recent paper in this journal, Jonathan Barker argues against the claim that grounded entities are ontologically innocent. In this paper I defend the ontological innocence of grounded entities ...
-
Why Is Proof the Only Way to Acquire Mathematical Knowledge? Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2023-10-15 Marc Lange
This paper proposes an account of why proof is the only way to acquire knowledge of some mathematical proposition’s truth. Admittedly, non-deductive arguments for mathematical propositions can be s...