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From singular to plural. . . and beyond? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2025-02-05 Jonathan D. Payton
A growing number of philosophers and logicians advocate for plural languages in which we can refer to and quantify over pluralities of individuals. Some go further, advocating for higher‐level languages in which we can refer to and quantify over, not just pluralities of individuals, but pluralities of pluralities, pluralities of pluralities of pluralities, and so on. These languages suggest a metaphysical
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An interpersonal form of faith Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2025-02-03 Yuan Tian
An athlete has faith in her unathletic partner to run a marathon, a teacher has faith in her currently poor‐performing students to improve in the future, and your friend has faith in you to succeed in the difficult project that you have been pursuing, even, and especially, when your chance of failing is non‐trivial. This paper develops and defends a relational view of interpersonal faith by considering
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Hinge trust* Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2025-02-02 Annalisa Coliva
Trust is central to epistemology, particularly in accounts of testimony, where it describes the relationship between a hearer and a speaker (or trustor and trustee), enabling the acquisition of information. The speaker's trustworthiness—marked by sincerity and knowledge—is essential for testimony to transmit knowledge or justified belief. However, trust's nature and role remain conceptually elusive
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Agnostic Wrongs and Pragmatic Disencroachment Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2025-01-21 Mark Schroeder
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Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check1 Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2025-01-21 Alan Hájek
To an unusual extent, philosophers agree that counterfactuals have truth conditions involving the most similar possible worlds where their antecedents are true, in the style of the celebrated and path‐breaking Stalnaker/Lewis accounts. Roughly, these accounts say that the counterfactual if A were the case, C would be the case is true if and only if at the most similar A‐worlds, C is true. I will argue
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Love first Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2025-01-21 P. Quinn White
How should we respond to the humanity of others? Should we care for others' well‐being? Respect them as autonomous agents? Largely neglected is an answer we can find in the religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism: we should love all. This paper argues that an ideal of love for all can be understood apart from its more typical religious contexts and moreover provides a unified and
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The do‐able solution to the interface problem Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2025-01-19 Yair Levy
Philosophers and cognitive scientists increasingly recognize the need to appeal to motor representations over and above intentions in attempting to understand how action is planned and executed. But doing so gives rise to a puzzle, which has come to be known as “the Interface Problem”: How is it that intentions and motor representations manage to interface in producing action? The question has semed
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Can rules ground moral obligations? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-12-27 Luke Robinson
What are the principles that ground our moral obligations? One obvious answer is that they are prescriptive rules that govern conduct by imposing obligations much like (certain) legal rules govern conduct by imposing legal obligations. This rule conception of moral principles merits our attention for at least three reasons. It's the obvious and most straightforward way to develop the analogy between
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Block on perceptual variation, attribution, discrimination, and adaptation Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-12-19 Susanna Schellenberg, Andrew J. P. Fink, Carl E. Schoonover, Mary A. Peterson
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Iconicity, 2nd‐order isomorphism, and perceptual categorization Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-12-19 Steven Gross
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Précis of The Border between Seeing and Thinking Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-12-19 Ned Block
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Remnants of perception: Comments on Block and the function of visual working memory Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-12-19 Jake Quilty‐Dunn
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Let's hope we're not living in a simulation Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-12-17 Eric Schwitzgebel
In Reality+, David Chalmers suggests that it wouldn't be too bad if we lived in a computer simulation. I argue on the contrary that if we live in a simulation, we ought to attach a significant conditional credence to its being a small or brief simulation. Our existence and the existence of many of the people and things we care about would then unfortunately depend on contingencies difficult to assess
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Simulation scenarios and philosophy Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-12-17 Peter Godfrey‐Smith
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Taking the simulation hypothesis seriously Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-12-17 David J. Chalmers
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Pain without inference Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-12-04 Laurenz Casser
A foundational assumption of contemporary cognitive science is that perceptual processing involves inferential transitions between representational states. However, it remains controversial whether accounts of this kind extend to modalities whose perceptual status is a matter of debate. In particular, it remains controversial whether we should attribute inferential mechanisms to the sensory processing
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Judging for ourselves Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-11-28 Justin Khoo
Suppose I hear from a trusted friend that The Shining is scary. Believing them, I decide not to watch the film. Later, we're talking about the movie and I say, “The Shining is scary!” My assertion here is misleading and inappropriate—I misrepresent myself as having seen the film and judged whether it is scary. But why is this? In this paper, I clarify the scope of the observation, discuss existing
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Against anti‐fanaticism Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-11-18 Christian Tarsney
Should you be willing to forego any sure good for a tiny probability of a vastly greater good? Fanatics say you should, anti‐fanatics say you should not. Anti‐fanaticism has great intuitive appeal. But, I argue, these intuitions are untenable, because satisfying them in their full generality is incompatible with three very plausible principles: acyclicity, a minimal dominance principle, and the principle
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Dialetheism and the countermodel problem Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-10-28 Andreas Fjellstad, Ben Martin
According to some dialetheists, we ought to reject the distinction between object and meta‐languages. Given that dialetheists advocate truth‐value gluts within their object‐language, whether in order to solve the liar paradox or for some other reason, this rejection of the object‐/meta‐language distinction comes with the commitment to use a glutty metatheory. While it has been pointed out that a glutty
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The duty to listen Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-10-25 Hrishikesh Joshi, Robin McKenna
In philosophical work on the ethics of conversational exchange, much has been written regarding the speaker side—i.e., on the rights and duties we have as speakers. This paper explores the relatively neglected topic of the duties pertaining to the listeners’ side of the exchange. Following W.K. Clifford, we argue that it's fruitful to think of our epistemic resources as common property. Furthermore
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Better guesses Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-10-22 Niels Linnemann, Feraz Azhar
It has recently become popular to analyze scenarios in which we guess, in terms of a trade‐off between the accuracy of our guess (namely, its credence) and its specificity (namely, how many answers it rules out). Dorst and Mandelkern describe an account of guessing, based on epistemic utility theory (EUT), in which permissible guesses vary depending on how one weighs accuracy against specificity. We
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Bilateralism, coherence, and incoherence Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-10-16 Rea Golan
Bilateralism is the view that the speech act of denial is as primitive as that of assertion. Bilateralism has proved helpful in providing an intuitive interpretation of formalisms that, prima facie, look counterintuitive, namely, multiple‐conclusion sequent calculi. Under this interpretation, a sequent of the form is regarded as the statement that it is incoherent, according to our conversational norms
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Heidegger's argument for fascism Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-10-16 Neil Sinhababu
Heidegger's ontological theories, his observations about liberalism and fascism, and his evaluation of Being are three premises of an argument for fascism. The ontological premise is that integrated wholes and instruments or objects of will are ontologically superior, as Being and Time suggests in discussing Being‐a‐whole and using tools. The social premise is that fascist societies are wholes integrated
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Intellectual humility without limits: Magnanimous humility, disagreement and the epistemology of resistance Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-10-09 Brandon Yip
In this paper, I provide a characterisation of a neglected form of humility: magnanimous humility. Unlike most contemporary analyses of humility, magnanimous humility is not about limitations but instead presupposes that one possesses some entitlement in a context. I suggest that magnanimous intellectual humility (IH) consists in a disposition to appropriately refrain from exercising one's legitimate
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Moral agency under oppression Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-10-08 Sukaina Hirji
In Huckleberry Finn, a thirteen‐year old white boy in antebellum Missouri escapes from his abusive father and befriends a runaway slave named Jim. On a familiar reading of the novel, both Huck and Jim are, in their own ways, morally impressive, transcending the unjust circumstances in which they find themselves in to treat each other as equals. Huck saves Jim's life from two men looking for runaway
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Save the five: Meeting Taurek's challenge Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-10-01 Zach Barnett
Six people are in trouble. We can save five of them or just the sixth. What should we do? John Taurek defends a radical view: We are not required to save the greater number. Taurek has persuaded some. But even the unpersuaded agree that Taurek poses a deep and important challenge: From where does the priority of the many derive? It seems difficult, or even impossible, to convince someone who denies
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I expect you to be happy, so I see you smile: A multidimensional account of emotion attribution Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-25 Leda Berio, Albert Newen
Constructivist theories of emotions and empirical studies have been increasingly stressing the role of contextual information and cultural conventions in emotion recognition. We propose a new account of emotion recognition and attribution that systematically integrates these aspects, and argue that emotion recognition is part of the general process of person impression formation. To describe the structural
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Welfare and autonomy under risk Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-25 Pietro Cibinel
This paper studies the relationship between promoting people's welfare and respecting their autonomy of choice under risk. I highlight a conflict between these two aims. Given compelling assumptions, welfarists end up disregarding people's unanimous preference, even when everyone involved is entirely rational and only concerned with maximizing their own welfare. Non‐welfarist theories of social choice
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Slurring silences Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-23 A. G. Holdier
Silence can be a communicative act. Tanesini (2018) demonstrates how “eloquent” silences can virtuously indicate resistance and dissent; in this paper, I outline one way silence can also be used viciously to cause discursive harm, specifically by slurring victims. By distinguishing between eloquent and “signaling” silences (two kinds of what I call “performative” silences), I show how “slurring” silences
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What is social organizing? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-23 Megan Hyska
While scholars of, and participants in, social movements, electoral politics, and organized labor are deeply engaged in contrasting different theories of how political actors should organize, little recent philosophical work has asked what social organizing is. This paper aims to answer this question in a way that can make sense of typical organizing‐related claims and debates. It is intuitive that
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Attention as selection for action defended Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Wayne Wu
Attention has become an important focal point of recent work in ethics and epistemology, yet philosophers continue to be noncommittal about what attention is. In this paper, I defend attention as selection for action in a weak form, namely that selection for action is sufficient for attention. I show that selection for action in this conception captures how we, the folk, experience it and how the cognitive
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Justification, normalcy and randomness Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Martin Smith
Some random processes, like a series of coin flips, can produce outcomes that seem particularly remarkable or striking. This paper explores an epistemic puzzle that arises when thinking about these outcomes and asking what, if anything, we can justifiably believe about them. The puzzle has no obvious solution, and any theory of epistemic justification will need to contend with it sooner or later. The
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Emotion, attention, and reason Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-15 Andrew Peet, Eli Pitcovski
Our reasons for emotions such as sadness, anger, resentment, and guilt often remain long after we cease experiencing these emotions. This is puzzling. If the reasons for these emotions persist, why do the emotions not persist? Does this constitute a failure to properly respond to our reasons? In this paper we provide a solution to this puzzle. Our solution turns on the close connection between the
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Treating people as individuals and as members of groups Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-15 Lauritz Aastrup Munch, Nicolai Knudsen
Many believe that we ought to treat people as individuals and that this form of treatment is in some sense incompatible with treating people as members of groups. Yet, the relation between these two kinds of treatments is elusive. In this paper, we develop a novel account of the normative requirement to treat people as individuals. According to this account, treating people as individuals requires
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Précis of The World According to Kant―Appearances and Things in Themselves in Critical Idealism, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2021 Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-08 Anja Jauernig
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Kantian appearances and intentional objects Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-07 Lucy Allais
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Intentional objects and experience ―Response to my critics Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-07 Anja Jauernig
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Grounding empirical in transcendental reality Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-07 Markus Kohl
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Ontologically grounding appearances in experience: Transcendental Idealism according to Anja Jauernig's The World According to Kant Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-07 Nicholas Stang
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Number nativism1 Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-02 Sam Clarke
Number Nativism is the view that humans innately represent precise natural numbers. Despite a long and venerable history, it is often considered hopelessly out of touch with the empirical record. I argue that this is a mistake. After clarifying Number Nativism and distancing it from related conjectures, I distinguish three arguments which have been seen to refute the view. I argue that, while popular
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What the golden rule teaches us about ethics Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-02 Shane William Ward
The Golden Rule is regularly used in ordinary life, across many different cultures, to acquire new moral knowledge. At the same time, the Golden Rule is widely ignored both in ethics and metaethics because it seems to be an implausible normative theory. Most philosophers who have paid it any attention have thought that, at best, it is an initially tempting thought whose appeal should be explained by
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Bad faith as true contradiction: On the dialetheist interpretation of Sartre Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-14 Jacob McNulty
This essay defends a modified version of Nahum Browns “dialetheist” interpretation of bad faith. On this interpretation, bad faith, as a form of self‐deception, constitutes a dialetheia or true contradiction. While in agreement with the dialetheist interpretation, I argue that bad faith is just as much a flight from true contradiction and towards what I call “sham consistency.” I also put forward a
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Prudential Value and Impersonal Value Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-13 Eden Lin
Prudential value is the kind of value that something has when it is good for someone, in the sense that is conceptually tied to welfare or well‐being. Impersonal value is the kind of value that something has when it is good simply, absolutely, or “from the point of view of the universe.” According to the Moorean position on prudential value, the concept of prudential value can be analyzed in terms
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Brute ignorance Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-13 Sam Carter
We know a lot about what the world is like. We know less, it seems, about what we know about what the world is like. According to a common thought, it is easier for us to come to know about the state of the world than to come to know about the state of our own knowledge. What explains this gap? An attractively simple hypothesis is that our ignorance about what we know is explained by our ignorance
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Moral equality and social hierarchy Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-12 Han van Wietmarschen
Social egalitarianism holds that justice requires that people relate to one another as equals. To explain the content of this requirement, social egalitarians often appeal to the moral equality of persons. This leads to two very different interpretations of social egalitarianism. The first involves the specification of a conception of the moral equality of persons that is distinctive of the social
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Getting back in shape: Persistence, shape, and relativity Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-06 Jack Himelright, Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez
In this paper, we will introduce a novel argument (the “Region Argument”) that objects do not have frame‐independent shapes in special relativity. The Region Argument lacks vulnerabilities present in David Chalmers' argument for that conclusion based on length contraction. We then examine how views on persistence interact with the Region Argument. We argue that this argument and standard four‐dimensionalist
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Are there subintentional actions? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-06 William Hornett
When I fiddle with my hair, or adjust my posture, it is plausible that these activities fall well below my cognitive radar. Some have argued that these are examples of ‘sub‐intentional actions’, actions which are not intentional under any description at all. If true, they are direct counterexamples to the dominant view on which the difference between actions and other events is their intentionality
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Credences for strict conditionals Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-30 Malte Willer
Less‐than‐certain conditional judgments pose notorious problems for strict analyses of conditionals: across their various incarnations, these analyses have trouble making sense of how conditionals could have non‐trivial probabilities in the first place; minimal constraints on how such probabilities are to be assigned, moreover, lead to results that seem at odds with a strict outlook on the semantics
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Determinism, deliberation, and responsibility Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-27 Robert Audi
In appraising human actions, an important consideration is whether they are free. If they are compelled, this may be excusatory; if controlled by someone other than the agent, this may mitigate; and if selfishly motivated, this may invalidate excuses. Moral appraisals of action by non‐philosophers do not normally consider whether it can be free under determinism. Metaphysical inquiry about action,
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Indirect evaluative voluntarism Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-24 Alex Horne
Is genuine self‐creation – understood as self‐directed value‐acquisition – possible? Many philosophers think not. I disagree. I explain why a recent attempt to solve the problem fails and use it to motivate an alternative proposal: indirect evaluative voluntarism. Indirect evaluative voluntarism is not only well‐suited to explaining how self‐creation is possible; it also unifies two important aspects
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A causal modeler's guide to double effect reasoning Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-22 Gerard J. Rothfus
Trolley problems and like cases are often thought to show the inadequacy of purely consequentialist moral theories. In particular, they are often taken to reveal that consequentialists unduly neglect the moral significance of the causal structure of decision problems. To precisify such critiques and one sort of deontological morality they motivate, I develop a formal modeling framework within which
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Chance, ability, and control Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-19 Matthew Mandelkern
This paper concerns a controversy between two compelling and popular claims in the theory of ability. One is the claim that ability requires control. The other is the claim that success entails ability, that is, that φ‐ing entails that you are able to φ. Since actually φ‐ing obviously does not entail that φ is in your control, these two claims cannot both be true. I introduce a new form of evidence
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Inquiry for the mistaken and confused Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-19 Arianna Falbo
Various philosophers have recently defended norms of inquiry which forbid inquiry into questions which lack true answers. I argue that these norms are overly restrictive, and that they fail to capture an important relationship between inquiry and our position as non‐ideal epistemic agents. I defend a more flexible and forgiving norm: Epistemic Improvement. According to this norm, inquiry into a question