Choices confront us with questions. How we act depends on our answers to those questions. So the way our beliefs guide our choices is not just a function of their informational content, but also depends systematically on the questions those beliefs address. This paper gives a precise account of the interplay between choices, questions and beliefs, and harnesses this account to obtain a principled approach to the problem of deduction. The result is a novel theory of belief-guided action that explains and predicts the decisions of agents who, like ourselves, fail to be logically omniscient: that is, of agents whose beliefs may not be deductively closed, or even consistent.

中文翻译：

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行动中的问题

选择使我们面临问题。我们如何行动取决于我们对这些问题的回答。因此，我们的信念引导我们选择的方式不仅取决于它们的信息内容，而且还系统地取决于这些信念所解决的问题。本文对选择、问题和信念之间的相互作用进行了精确的说明，并利用这种说明来获得解决演绎问题的原则方法。结果是一种新的信念引导行动理论，它解释和预测了像我们一样不能在逻辑上无所不知的代理人的决定：也就是说，代理人的信念可能不是演绎封闭的，甚至是一致的。