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Provocation, Self‐Defense, and Protective Duties Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-10 Jonas Haeg
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Unjust Shadows: Living with the Burden of Distrust Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-10 Nikolas Kirby
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From Stranger to Parent: Duties of Care in Intentional Pregnancies Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-10 David Wasserman
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Moral Understanding Between You and Me Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2024-05-27 Samuel Dishaw
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Cultural Appropriation and Social Recognition Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2024-05-15 Hochan Kim
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The Role of Civility in Political Disobedience Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-12 Steve Coyne
I. INTRODUCTION In modern liberal democracies, politically motivated disobedience of the law is generally tolerated as a way of challenging and changing social and legal practices. This paper concerns the role of civility in such political disobedience.1 In his seminal work on political disobedience, John Rawls identified three characteristics that many philosophers now take to be the crux of civility:
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Political Equality and Epistemic Constraints on Voting Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-17 Michele Giavazzi
I. INTRODUCTION The idea that voting procedures should be accessible to every citizen who wishes to participate is a fundamental principle of democracy. In recent years, however, this idea has been challenged. As part of a resurgent skepticism about the epistemic qualities of democracy, some political philosophers have argued that participation in voting practices should be made conditional, through
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Mobilizing Falsehoods Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-15 Maxime Lepoutre
I. INTRODUCTION In July 1852, on the occasion of the American Independence Day celebration, the former slave and abolitionist Frederick Douglass delivered a blistering attack on his contemporaries' continued toleration of slavery. In this celebrated speech, Douglass famously accused his contemporaries of failing to honor the ideals championed by the American “Founders”: The signers of the Declaration
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Joint Ought Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2023-11-07 Rowan Mellor
I INTRODUCTION Sometimes, what you ought to do depends on what other people will do: whether or not Dad ought to pick the kids up from school depends on whether Mom is going to do it. This seems obvious enough. Yet, it leads to a problem. Suppose that several agents each have two options: A or B. It would be best if they all did A, significantly worse if they all did B, and worst of all if some did
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Social Science, Policy and Democracy Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-17 Johanna Thoma
1 INTRODUCTION Can social science provide policy-guidance without undermining some basic democratic values? It would clearly be devastating if the answer was “no”: Most people are deeply committed both to democracy, as well as to the idea that policy decisions should be informed by the best available science, including the best available social science. Accordingly, the many philosophers who have worried
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Bad Question! Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2023-09-25 Sam Berstler
Individuals…exude expressions.1 Performers can stop giving expressions but cannot stop giving them off.2
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High Risk, Low Reward: A Challenge to the Astronomical Value of Existential Risk Mitigation Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2023-08-22 David Thorstad
I INTRODUCTION Derek Parfit invites us to consider two scenarios. In the first, a war kills 99% of the world's human population. Such an event, Parfit urges, would be a great tragedy. Billions would die and the rest would suffer terribly. Nations would fall. Cities and monuments would be destroyed. Recovering from such a catastrophe would take centuries. In a second scenario, the same war kills every
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The Wrong of Wrongful Manipulation Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2023-07-10 Sophie Gibert
I INTRODUCTION Why is it wrong to engage in manipulation, when it is wrong to do so? Manipulating someone can be wrong not (or not only) because it's manipulative, but because it has other bad effects. I am interested in the first sort of wrong. What is it about wrongful instances of manipulation that makes them wrong, other things being equal? Most philosophers think this question can be answered
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Assisting the Assisters: The Comparative Claims of Afghan Refugees Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2023-06-19 Helen Frowe
I INTRODUCTION The recent withdrawal of Western states from Afghanistan saw widespread endorsement of the view that these states owe especially stringent duties of rescue to Afghans who assisted their armed forces during the 20 years of Western intervention and occupation.1 Although concern has been expressed for those who worked with Western states quite broadly, it is the treatment of those who directly
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The Value of Unity Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2023-05-02 Leif Wenar
I. INTRODUCTION Two debates over value are nearly coeval with philosophy itself. One debate is over what is good for its own sake (intrinsically good), the other is over what contributes to an individual's welfare (“what would make this person's life go, for him, as well as possible”).1 These two debates, over “the good” and “the good-for,” are distinct, yet they have been parallel both in their leading
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Reconciling Algorithmic Fairness Criteria Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2023-04-10 Fabian Beigang
I INTRODUCTION When the discussion about algorithmic fairness first started to receive academic attention, much of the debate was about criteria that use aggregate statistics of observed data to determine whether a predictive model is fair. At the center of the debate were the two criteria equalized odds and predictive parity. Equalized odds requires that false positive and false negative error rates
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A Pluralist Approach to Joint Responsibility Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2023-03-29 Nicolai K. Knudsen
I. INTRODUCTION Sometimes reactive attitudes target groups rather than individuals.1 This suggests that groups are sometimes morally responsible. A growing number of moral philosophers agree with this, yet fail to recognize just how diverse the set of morally responsible groups is. Dominant approaches to group responsibility thus suggest that only one type of group is morally responsible, namely, those
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The Etiquette of Equality Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2023-02-14 Benjamin Eidelson
I INTRODUCTION Imagine a classroom discussion of Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision holding sodomy laws unconstitutional.1 One student argues that the Court's ruling was correct because a state may not base its criminal laws on bare moral disapproval. Another student picks up on Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion and responds that, if that principle were sound, polygamy
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How to Assess Claims in Multiple-Option Choice Sets Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2022-12-18 Jonas Harney, Jake Khawaja
CONFLICT OF INTEREST The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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Refusing Protection Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2022-12-11 David J. Clark
I INTRODUCTION Refusal sometimes has the power to render protection impermissible. Consider, for example: Siblings: Adam, Teresa, and Dan are adult siblings. Jealous about being left out of their mother's will, Adam attempts to break Teresa's leg. The attack can only be stopped only if either Teresa or Dan break Adam's leg first. Dan prepares to harm his brother, but Teresa—who is a committed pacifist
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The Possibility of Democratic Autonomy Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2022-10-11 Adam Lovett, Jake Zuehl
CONFLICT OF INTEREST The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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Beyond the Scope of Consent Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2022-09-10 Victor Tadros
I INTRODUCTION When, why, and in what ways, do a person's errors have a bearing on whether they validly consent to another person's conduct? One answer relies on the scope of consent. Consider the following schematic set of facts. Y owes X a set of consent-sensitive duties not to perform some set of token acts {v1-vn}. A consent-sensitive duty (not) to perform an act is a duty (not) to perform an act
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What is a speaker owed? Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2022-06-25 Sanford C. Goldberg
I. Suppose someone tells you something. Under what conditions do you owe it to her to accept what she's said? I will call this The Question. The Question raises an issue of philosophical significance. For one thing, the issue appears to be at the heart of #BelieveWomen, that part of the #MeToo movement focusing on the proper way to respond to allegations of sexual harassment. Do we owe it to women
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Algorithmic Fairness and Base Rate Tracking Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2022-03-01 Benjamin Eva
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Making the All‐Affected Principle Safe for Democracy Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2022-02-09 James Lindley Wilson
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Market Harms and Market Benefits Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2022-02-08 Hayden Wilkinson
I MARKET HARMS IN THE WILD Until the early 2000s, grain collected from the quinoa plant was eaten almost exclusively in its native Peru and Bolivia. But that changed rapidly as western shoppers learned of its nutritional properties—between 2005 and 2015, the amount of quinoa shipped out of Peru and Bolivia grew more than tenfold.11 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Crops,” accessed
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Little Republics: Authority and the Political Nature of the Firm Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2021-12-29 Iñigo González‐Ricoy
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Time for Caution Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2021-11-19 Johanna Thoma
I INTRODUCTION Policymakers ought to make laws aiming to phase out or restrict activities that could plausibly lead to catastrophe. Individuals ought not to engage in activities that pose a significant threat to the lives of others. Prudentially, they should not make choices that come with a substantial risk of financial ruin. Precautionary principles such as these are frequently appealed to both in
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“The Language of the Unheard”: Rioting as a Speech Act Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2021-09-01 Matthew Chrisman,Graham Hubbs
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An Argument for All‐Luck Egalitarianism Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2021-09-01 Carl Knight
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Demographic Objections to Epistocracy: A Generalization Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2021-08-18 Sean Ingham,David Wiens
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The Power of Numbers: On Agential Power‐With‐Others Without Power‐Over‐Others Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2021-06-01 Arash Abizadeh
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Ethical Consumerism, Democratic Values, and Justice Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2021-05-27 Brian Berkey
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Taking offense: An emotion reconsidered Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2021-03-25 Emily McTernan
A stranger in the pub bumps into you spilling your drink and then doesn't apologize, or someone pushes past to grab a seat on the train. A colleague makes a dismissive remark about your work in front of your boss. A man catcalls a woman on the street, or wears a T‐shirt declaring, “keep calm, watch lesbians.” One reaction to affronts like these is to take offense. Philosophers have said a great deal
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On statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2021-03-01 Brian Hedden
Predictive algorithms are playing an increasingly prominent role in society, being used to predict recidivism, loan repayment, job performance, and so on. With this increasing influence has come an increasing concern with the ways in which they might be unfair or biased against individuals in virtue of their race, gender, or, more generally, their group membership. Many purported criteria of algorithmic
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Virtue Signaling and Moral Progress Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2021-02-23 Evan Westra
‘Virtue signaling’ is the practice of using moral talk in order to enhance one’s moral reputation. Many find this kind of behavior irritating. However, some philosophers have gone further, arguing that virtue signaling actively undermines the proper functioning of public moral discourse and impedes moral progress. Against this view, I argue that widespread virtue signaling is not a social ill, and
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In Defense of National Climate Change Responsibility: A Reply to the Fairness Objection Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2020-12-30 Blake Francis
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Partiality, Identity, and Procreation Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2020-12-02 Abelard Podgorski
According to commonsense morality, while we have reason to be concerned about the effects of our actions on anyone’s welfare, we also have reason to be partial towards the welfare of people to whom we have certain special relationships. I have, for example, more reason to make sure that my own child gets into a good school than that my neighbor’s child does. In this paper, I want to examine a kind
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Fair Play, Coercion, and the Costs of Children: A Reply to Olsaretti Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2020-10-07 Sabine Hohl
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What's So Special About Human Dignity? Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2020-10-01 Adam Etinson
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Why You Should Vote to Change the Outcome Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2020-09-30 Zach Barnett
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Government Policy Experiments and the Ethics of Randomization Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2020-08-30 Douglas MacKay
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Informed Consent, Disclosure, and Understanding Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2020-03-01 Tom Dougherty
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Illusions of Justice in International Taxation Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2020-03-01 Adam Kern
International tax law determines which states may tax what. Despite its significance, its normative foundations are poorly understood—cursorily treated by tax experts, and almost entirely neglected by philosophers. In this essay, I criticize a common way of thinking about justice in international taxation, and I propose an alternative. My critical target is a claim I call the Capture Principle. Common
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Pitting People Against Each Other Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2020-01-01 Waheed Hussain
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Freedom and Trust: A Rejoinder to Lovett and Pettit Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2019-11-01 Thomas W. Simpson
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Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Concept of Political Wrongdoing Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2019-11-01 Annette Zimmermann
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Against the Political Use of Religious Exemptions Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2019-07-01 Brian Hutler
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The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2019-07-01 Georgi Gardiner
According to a common conception of legal proof, satisfying a legal burden requires establishing a claim to a numerical threshold. Beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often glossed as 90% or 95% likelihood given the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is interpreted as meaning at least 50% likelihood given the evidence. In light of problems with the common conception, I propose a new ‘relevant
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Moral Risk and Communicating Consent Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2019-04-01 Renée Jorgensen Bolinger
In addition to protecting agents’ autonomy, consent plays a crucial social role: it enables agents to secure partners in valuable interactions that would be prohibitively morally risk otherwise. To do this, consent must be observable: agents must be able to track the facts about whether they have received a consent-based permission. I argue that this morally justifies a consent-practice on which communicating
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Civic Friendship, Public Reason Philosophy & Public Affairs (IF 3.3) Pub Date : 2019-01-01 R. J. Leland
For conversations or written comments concerning this paper, thanks to Paul Billingham, Mark Budolfson, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Luara Ferracioli, Sarah Hannan, Ben Miller, Blain Neufeld, Lachlan Umbers, Han van Wietmarschen, Chad Van Schoelandt, two anonymous editors at Philosophy and Public Affairs, and the students in Neufeld’s "Justice as Fairness: Justification and Application" seminar at the University