International tax law determines which states may tax what. Despite its significance, its normative foundations are poorly understood—cursorily treated by tax experts, and almost entirely neglected by philosophers. In this essay, I criticize a common way of thinking about justice in international taxation, and I propose an alternative. My critical target is a claim I call the Capture Principle. Common ground among many government officials, leading tax scholars, and several of the few philosophers who have thought about international taxation, the Capture Principle asserts that each state should have rights to tax income generated from economic activities within its territory. The Capture Principle appears to embody an ideal of reciprocity. I argue that this appearance is illusory. I examine three arguments that connect those two ideas, and I argue that each fails on its own terms. Even if we ought not to free-ride off others, ought to pay compensation for the burdens we place on others’ public sectors, ought to reward people for the surplus value that they create—the Capture Principle does not follow. This critical work reveals an interesting new research agenda for thinking about justice in international taxation.

中文翻译：

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国际税收中的正义幻觉

国际税法决定了哪些州可以对什么征税。尽管它很重要，但其规范基础却知之甚少——税务专家草率地对待它，而哲学家几乎完全忽视了它。在这篇文章中，我批评了一种普遍的国际税收正义思考方式，并提出了一种替代方案。我的关键目标是我称之为捕获原则的声明。许多政府官员、领先的税务学者和少数几位思考过国际税收的哲学家之间的共同点是，俘获原则断言每个州都应该有权对其领土内的经济活动产生的收入征税。捕获原则似乎体现了互惠的理想。我认为这种现象是虚幻的。我检查了连接这两个想法的三个论点，我认为每个人都以自己的方式失败。即使我们不应该搭便车，应该为我们给他人公共部门带来的负担支付补偿，应该奖励人们创造的剩余价值——捕获原则不遵循。这项重要的工作揭示了一个有趣的新研究议程，用于思考国际税收中的正义。