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Civic Friendship, Public Reason
Philosophy & Public Affairs ( IF 3.3 ) Pub Date : 2019-01-01 , DOI: 10.1111/papa.12141
R. J. Leland

For conversations or written comments concerning this paper, thanks to Paul Billingham, Mark Budolfson, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Luara Ferracioli, Sarah Hannan, Ben Miller, Blain Neufeld, Lachlan Umbers, Han van Wietmarschen, Chad Van Schoelandt, two anonymous editors at Philosophy and Public Affairs, and the students in Neufeld’s "Justice as Fairness: Justification and Application" seminar at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 1. This principle is broadly Rawlsian, characterized by its demand that citizens premise their political decisions on considerations that are deliberative common ground among their reasonable co-citizens (even if the conclusions reached by reasoning from these premises are sometimes controversial). I use “political liberals” to refer to theorists who understand the principle in this general way. Classic statements of political liberalism include Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” University of Chicago Law Review 64, (1997): 765–807. For more recent systematic interpretation and defense, see Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Other theorists of public reason have endorsed competing understandings of mutual justifiability, often ones demanding that political conclusions be ones we could expect reasonable citizens to converge in accepting, regardless of whether these conclusions are supported by considerations drawn from reasonable citizens’ deliberative common ground. See, for instance, Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation (New York: Routledge, 2014). My focus here is on offering a defense of political liberalism, so I don’t discuss these alternative views here. Subsequent talk of “public reason” should be interpreted as referring only to politically liberal understandings of the principle.

中文翻译:

公民友谊,公共理性

感谢 Paul Billingham、Mark Budolfson、Kyla Ebels-Duggan、Luara Ferracioli、Sarah Hannan、Ben Miller、Blain Neufeld、Lachlan Umbers、Han van Wietmarschen、Chad Van Schoelandt、Philosophy 的两位匿名编辑对本文的对话或书面评论和公共事务,以及纽菲尔德在威斯康星大学密尔沃基分校举办的“作为公平的正义:理由和应用”研讨会的学生。1. 这一原则从广义上讲是罗尔斯式的,其特点是要求公民以合理的共同公民之间的协商共识为基础进行政治决策(即使根据这些前提推理得出的结论有时会引起争议)。我使用“政治自由主义者”来指代以这种一般方式理解该原则的理论家。政治自由主义的经典陈述包括 Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 1996);约翰罗尔斯,政治自由主义(纽约:哥伦比亚大学出版社,1996 年);John Rawls,“重新审视公共理性的想法”,芝加哥大学法律评论 64,(1997):765-807。有关最近的系统解释和辩护,请参阅 Jonathan Quong,《不完美的自由主义》(牛津:牛津大学出版社,2011 年)和 Paul Weithman,《为什么是政治自由主义?(牛津:牛津大学出版社,2011 年)。其他公共理性理论家支持对相互正当性的相互竞争的理解,通常要求政治结论是我们可以期望理性的公民收敛于接受的结论,无论这些结论是否得到从理性公民的审议共同点中得出的考虑的支持。例如,参见 Gerald Gaus,The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World,(剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,2011 年);Jürgen Habermas,在事实与规范之间:对法律与民主话语理论的贡献,反式。W. Rehg(剑桥:麻省理工学院出版社,1996 年);Kevin Vallier,自由政治和公共信仰:超越分离(纽约:Routledge,2014 年)。我在这里的重点是为政治自由主义辩护,所以我不在这里讨论这些不同的观点。随后对“公共理性”的讨论应被解释为仅指对该原则的政治自由主义理解。The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World,(剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,2011);Jürgen Habermas,在事实与规范之间:对法律与民主话语理论的贡献,反式。W. Rehg(剑桥:麻省理工学院出版社,1996 年);Kevin Vallier,自由政治和公共信仰:超越分离(纽约:Routledge,2014 年)。我在这里的重点是为政治自由主义辩护,所以我不在这里讨论这些不同的观点。随后对“公共理性”的讨论应被解释为仅指对该原则的政治自由主义理解。The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World,(剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,2011);Jürgen Habermas,在事实与规范之间:对法律与民主话语理论的贡献,反式。W. Rehg(剑桥:麻省理工学院出版社,1996 年);Kevin Vallier,自由政治和公共信仰:超越分离(纽约:Routledge,2014 年)。我在这里的重点是为政治自由主义辩护,所以我不在这里讨论这些不同的观点。随后对“公共理性”的讨论应被解释为仅指对该原则的政治自由主义理解。反式。W. Rehg(剑桥:麻省理工学院出版社,1996 年);Kevin Vallier,自由政治和公共信仰:超越分离(纽约:Routledge,2014 年)。我在这里的重点是为政治自由主义辩护,所以我不在这里讨论这些不同的观点。随后对“公共理性”的讨论应被解释为仅指对该原则的政治自由主义理解。反式。W. Rehg(剑桥:麻省理工学院出版社,1996 年);Kevin Vallier,自由政治和公共信仰:超越分离(纽约:Routledge,2014 年)。我在这里的重点是为政治自由主义辩护,所以我不在这里讨论这些不同的观点。随后对“公共理性”的讨论应被解释为仅指对该原则的政治自由主义理解。
更新日期:2019-01-01
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