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The Side-Effects of Imprisonment: Harm to the Family Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-07-16 Leonara G. Catuara
Imprisonment affects prisoners’ families. Empirical research tells us that some families benefit from this separation, particularly when they are victims of crime or abuse. But for many, imprisonment has a negative impact on family life, which can be intensified by other pre-existing factors. The main literature on the harm that imprisonment causes family members is empirical, but these empirical findings
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Cruel and Unusual Punishments as Legislative Gross Negligence Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-06-13 Terry Skolnik
Many jurisdictions confer a constitutional right to be protected against cruel and unusual punishments. This right is typically justified by three considerations. First, cruel and unusual punishments undermine human dignity. Second, such punishments shock the community’s conscience or violate evolving standards of decency. Third, grossly excessive sanctions violate proportionality constraints. This
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Crime, Character, and the Evolution of the Penal Message Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-04-01 Adiel Zimran, Netanel Dagan
Scholars depict punishment as a moral dialogue between the community and the offender, which addresses both the offender’s crime and character. However, how the penal message evolves vis a vis that crime and character as it passes through the different stages of the criminal process has remained under-theorized. This article, building on communicative theory, explores the interrelation between crime
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Criminalisation as a Speech-Act: Saying Through Criminalising Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-04-01 J. P. Fassnidge
The act of criminalising conduct has been understood by many theorists as a form of communication. This paper proposes a model, based on speech-act theory, for understanding how that act of communication works. In particular, it focuses on analysing how and where wrongfulness can appear in this speech-act, if one were to argue, as many theorists do, that part of what is being communicated through criminalisation
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A Conceptual Framework for Voluntary Confessions and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-03-29 Jalo Vatjus-Anttila
The privilege against self-incrimination entails that anyone accused of a criminal offence has the right to remain silent. However, waiving the privilege is possible, but such waiver must be voluntary and in accordance with the will of the accused. This article examines the impact of sentence reductions based on confessions on the voluntariness of confessions. I argue that the concept of voluntariness
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Culpability and Moral Vice Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-03-27 Grant Lamond
This paper raises four queries about Simester’s defective engagement with reason account of culpability found in his Fundamentals of Criminal Law: (1) the characterisation of the account in terms of moral ‘vices’; (2) the basis for identifying a vice as a ‘moral’ vice; (3) what is involved in an agent manifesting ‘insufficient care and concern’ for the interests of others; and (4) whether the account
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“Blameworthiness” and “Culpability” are not Synonymous: A Sympathetic Amendment to Simester Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-03-21 Mitchell N Berman
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Espionage and The Harming of Innocents Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-03-20 Lars Christie
In her latest book Spying Through a Glass Darkly: The Ethics of Espionage and Counter-Intelligence, Cécile Fabre suggests that the deception of third parties during an infiltration operation can be justified as a foreseen but unintended side effect. In this essay, I criticize this view. Such deception, I argue, is better justified paternalistically as a means of preventing third parties from becoming
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Criminalizing Sex: Is Consent all that Matters? Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-03-12 Karamvir Chadha
In Criminalizing Sex, Stuart P Green aims to provide a unified liberal theory of sexual offenses law. Green’s strategy is to provide a rational reconstruction of sexual offenses law that centres consent. In this article, I raise some doubts about whether Green fully succeeds in his aim. Nevertheless, Criminalizing Sex is an impressive book, and essential reading for anyone interested in the liberal
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Causalism Without Causation Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-04-01 Carolina Sartorio
Abstract Moore’s Mechanical Choices is ripe with interesting ideas. Here I’ll focus on a particularly intriguing one that intersects with some aspects of my own work. It’s the suggestion that causalism should be amended in a way that doesn’t require causation. At first, this suggestion may sound absurd: How can causalism survive without causation, of all things? But I think that Moore is actually right
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Reflections Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-03-05 Miriam Gur-Arye
Reflections on the various articles which will be published in the criminal law and philosophy dedicated to my retirement.
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Espionage, Ethics, and Law: From Philosophy to Practice Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-03-02 Cécile Fabre
In this paper, I respond to Lars Christie, David Omand and Stephen Ratner for their thoughtful comments on my book Spying through a Glass Darkly. In that book, I provide a philosophical defence of espionage and counter-intelligence activities. I have little to say about how best to implement the moral norms I defend so that they can help guide intelligence officers’ actions, in the world as we know
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Review of Ann Whittle’s Freedom & Responsibility in Context (Oxford University Press, 2021) Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-02-28 Gabriel De Marco
In a recent book, Ann Whittle develops a view of freedom and responsiblity according to which their attribution to agents is sensitive to the speakers' contexts. This review provides a summary of the main argument, and briefly mentions some points that will be of interest in further developing the view.
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Espionage, Secrecy, and Institutional Moral Reasoning Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-02-24 Steven Ratner
Cecile Fabre’s Through a Glass Darkly offers a compelling account of the ethics of espionage drawn from both interpersonal morality and democratic and cosmopolitan political theory. Yet the spying that her theory finds permissible or prohibited does not map onto the spying that states undertake and that international law either explicitly or implicitly authorizes. That law allows or tolerates significant
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Harmfulness and Wrongfulness in Sex-by-Deception Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Rachel C. Tolley
In Criminalizing Sex, Stuart Green wisely eschews any attempt to fully analyse the problem of ‘sex-by-deception’ in a single chapter, instead offering a ‘basic framework’ for determining whether an expansion of the law of ‘rape by deceit’ might be justified. In this article, I offer a revision to that framework. Green begins from an account of rape centred on the right to (negative) sexual autonomy
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Courage, Consistency, and Other Conundra Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-01-24 Gopal Sreenivasan
I am very grateful to Rachel Barney and Christian Miller for their helpful and challenging comments on my book, Emotion and Virtue (Princeton, 2020). My response aims first to clarify and then to fortify my position on some of the many excellent points they raise in this symposium.
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Compatibilism and Control over the Past: A New Argument Against Compatibilism Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-01-22 Philip Swenson
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Not in My Neighborhood: The Ethics of Excluding Ex-offenders from Housing Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-01-12 Thomas Søbirk Petersen, Sebastian Jon Holmen
The policy adopted by housing authorities of denying prospective tenants with a criminal record access to housing is an important barrier to ex-offenders seeking somewhere to live. The policy is legal, but are there any good reasons in favor of it when we know that having no, or limited, access to secure and affordable housing increases the probability of recidivism? The primary aim of this article
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Review of Christopher Nathan, The Ethics of Undercover Policing (Routledge, 2022) Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2024-01-10 Jonas Haeg
This paper reviews The Ethics of Undercover Policing by Christopher Nathan.
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Why Command Responsibility May (not) Be a Solution to Address Responsibility Gaps in LAWS Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-12-11 Ann-Katrien Oimann
The possible future use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) and the challenges associated with assigning moral responsibility leads to several debates. Some authors argue that the highly autonomous capability of such systems may lead to a so-called responsibility gap in situations where LAWS cause serious violations of international humanitarian law. One proposed solution is the doctrine of
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Human Dignity and the Innocent Agent Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-12-01 Shachar Eldar
Courts and commentators do not differentiate between defendants who perpetrate crimes by means of inanimate weapons or trained animals and those who perpetrate crimes by means of other human beings used as innocent agents. I argue that this widely accepted comparability is grossly insensitive to the violation of the human dignity of the person whom the perpetrator has turned into an instrument to an
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Examining the Ethics of Spying: A Practitioner’s View Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-10-20 David Omand
This paper examines from the point of view of an intelligence practicioner the utility of the philosophical method that Professor Cecile Fabre has applied to intelligence ethics. Her emphasis on the duty that lies on governments to be sufficiently well informed about those who pose a real risk of serious violations of fundamental human rights is seen as a valuable addition to discourse on the ethics
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Idealizing Abolition Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-10-06 Daniel Fryer
The United States system of policing is in drastic need of change. Some recent critics have encouraged that we avoid trying to repair the system—and abolish it altogether. In advancing this position, they often invoke ideas of “dreams,” “speculative imagination,” and “horizons” to guide efforts at fixing the problems of policing. In this essay, I caution against the overuse of this sort of idealized
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Public Wrongs and Power Relations in Non-Democratic & Illiberal Polities Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-09-16 Hend Hanafy
One of the influential contributions to criminalisation theories is Duff’s work on public wrongs, which offers a thin master principle of criminalisation, proposing that we have a reason to criminalise a type of conduct if it constitutes a public wrong; one that violates a polity’s civil order and forms part of that polity’s proper business. The nature of the civil order, the scope of its proper business
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Justification and Motivation Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-09-08 James Edwards
According to the motivational thesis (MT), we are justified in performing an action if and only if we perform that action for the right reason(s). Proponents of MT disagree about how it is best interpreted—about what count as reasons of the right kind. In Fundamentals of Criminal Law, Andrew Simester criticises an interpretation offered by John Gardner. Here, I explore some of Simester's reasons for
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Criminal Responsibility Reconsidered Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-08-30 Stephen J. Morse
This essay review addresses the central responsibility thesis of David Brink's "Fair. Opportunity and Responsibility" and then considers two applications of the central. Thesis: legal insanity and diminished capacity.
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Excuses and Exemptions: Is it Really a Mistake to Understand the Category of Excuses to Include Infancy and Insanity? Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-08-23 Marcia Baron
Moral responsibility is a prerequisite for culpability. One can be morally responsible for φing without being culpable for it, but not vice versa. I agree with Andrew Simester on this, and agree that it is important to differentiate moral responsibility from culpability. That moral responsibility is a prerequisite for culpability is often taken to require sharply distinguishing excuses from what are
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When is Disbelief Epistemic Injustice? Criminal Procedure, Recovered Memories, and Deformations of the Epistemic Subject Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-08-16 Jan Christoph Bublitz
People can be treated unjustly with respect to the level of credibility others accord to their testimony. This is the core idea of the philosophical idea of epistemic justice. It should be of utmost interest to criminal law which extensively deals with normative issues of evidence and testimony. It may reconstruct some of the long-standing criticisms of criminal law regarding credibility assessments
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Reporting Crimes and Arresting Criminals: Citizens’ Rights and Responsibilities Under Their Criminal Law Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-08-12 R. A. Duff, S. E. Marshall
Taking as its starting point Miri Gur-Arye’s critical discussion of a legal duty to report crime, this paper sketches an idealising conception of a democratic republic whose citizens could be expected to recognise a civic responsibility to report crime, in order to assist the enterprise of a criminal law that is their common law. After explaining why they should recognise such a responsibility, what
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Justifications and Rights-Displacements Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-08-05 Mark Dsouza
In articles published ten years apart in 2011 and 2021, Gur-Arye argues that when considering an agent’s explanation for doing something that looks, prima facie, like a criminal offence, we should distinguish between a plea of justification, and an assertion that one acted within one’s power. The former explains an agent’s reasons for having committed a pro tanto offence (i.e., actus reus + mens rea)
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How does Structural Injustice Impact Criminal Responsibility? Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-08-05 Katrina L. Sifferd
David Brink’s book Fair Opportunity & Responsibility is a meticulously argued and ultimately convincing book that carefully articulates the requirements for criminal guilt and punishment. As the title suggests, Brink argues that only one who has a fair opportunity to be law-abiding ought to be held responsible when they commit a crime. It is unfair to hold a person responsible if they lack abilities
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The Structure of Criminal Law Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-07-29 Re’em Segev
According to a common view, criminal law should be structured in a way that allocates the conditions of criminal liability to different types of legal rules, given the content of the condition and the nature of the rule. This view classifies some conditions as elements of offenses and others as (part of) justificatory defenses or of excusatory defenses. While this view is attractive, I argue that it
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The Voice of the Criminal Law Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-07-25 Michelle Madden Dempsey
In whose voice does the criminal law speak, and why does it matter? Miriam Gur-Arye argues that the answer to the first question depends on the kind of duty violated by the crime at issue. In some cases (say, election fraud or tax evasion), the criminal law speaks in the voice of the polity—but in other cases (say, murder or rape), it speaks in the voice of human beings. Or so argues Gur-Ayre. Not
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Moore on Degrees of Responsibility Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-07-17 Alex Kaiserman
In his latest book Mechanical Choices, Michael Moore provides an explication and defence of the idea that responsibility comes in degrees. His account takes as its point of departure the view that free action and free will consist in the holding of certain counterfactuals. In this paper, I argue that Moore’s view faces several familiar counterexamples, all of which serve to motivate Harry Frankfurt’s
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Official Disobedience: Bureaucrats & Unjust Laws Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-07-10 Mario I. Juarez-Garcia
A legitimate expectation in a liberal democracy is that public officials enforce the law regardless of its content; when they don’t do so, their actions tend to be publicly condemned. This expectation puts street-level bureaucrats in a moral dilemma when they consider that a certain law is unjust: either they don’t enforce the law and violate their duties to the citizenry, or they enforce it and become
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Criminal Law Theory: Introduction Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-07-09 Mark Dsouza, Alon Harel, Re’em Segev
This is an introduction to the special issue on criminal law theory.
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The Legal Artifice of Liberty: On Beccaria’s Philosophy Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-07-08 Dario Ippolito
Beccaria’s penal philosophy hinges on the doctrinal paradigm of liberty through law. Inconceivable in the absence of laws and unattainable in the presence of arbitrary powers, liberty is profiled as the legal situation of the person who may act, within the sphere of what is not forbidden and not bound, without suffering illicit interference from private individuals or organs of the state. Thus, the
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Awareness and the Recklessness/Negligence Distinction Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-07-07 Alexander Greenberg
The distinction between the criminal fault elements of recklessness and negligence is one of Anglo-American criminal law’s key distinctions. It is a distinction with practical significance, as many serious crimes require at least recklessness and cannot be committed negligently. The distinction is standardly marked by awareness. Recklessness requires awareness that one’s conduct carries a risk of harm
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Standing and Pre-trial Misconduct: Hypocrisy, ‘Separation’, Inconsistent Blame, and Frustration Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-07-07 Findlay Stark
Existing justifications for exclusionary rules and stays of proceedings in response to pre-trial wrongdoing by police officers and prosecutors are often thought to be counter-productive or disproportionate in their consequences. This article begins to explore whether the concept of standing to blame can provide a fresh justification for such responses. It focuses on a vice related to standing—hypocrisy—and
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The Role of Mens Rea in Mediating the Scope of Prohibitions Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-07-07 Doug Husak
Among the most noteworthy and impressive aspects of A.P. Simester’s monumental Fundamentals of Criminal Law is its pervasive pluralism. Many philosophers of criminal law, I have frequently complained, are excessively monistic on a number of basic questions about which pluralism is the more defensible option. I fear, however, that Simester’s views are sometimes too pluralistic. In particular, he assigns
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Reasonable Doubt, Robust Evidential Probability and the Unknown Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-06-24 Hylke Jellema
Most legal evidence scholars agree that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt requires the belief that the defendant probably committed the alleged acts. However, they also agree that this is not a sufficient condition, as this belief may be unreasonable. I focus on two popular proposals for additional conditions: (i) that the degree of belief should be robust and (ii) that it should be reasonable
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On What Underlies Excuse Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-06-23 Leora Dahan Katz
In this paper, I address the theory of excuse, or more precisely, exculpatory excuse, and the question of what it is that justifies the category of excuse. I address different potential grounds for the law of excuse, which are often run together in ways that confound rather than clarify, focusing on the role of blamelessness and unfairness of expectations in the theory of excuse.
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Good Faith as a Normative Foundation of Policing Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-06-15 Luke William Hunt
The use of deception and dishonesty is widely accepted as a fact of life in policing. This paper thus defends a counterintuitive claim: Good faith is a normative foundation for the police as a political institution. Good faith is a core value of contracts, and policing is contractual in nature both broadly (as a matter of social contract theory) and narrowly (in regard to concrete encounters between
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The Concept of the Police Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-06-17 Eric J. Miller
The organization of the modern police is a contingent social choice about how to engage in the process of governance when regulating public order on the street. The police are the agency authorized to act upon the state’s duty to govern in response to public emergencies. The duty to govern exists when there is some urgent social need that could be resolved by acting, and some person or institution
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Should Detection Avoidance Be Criminalized? Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-06-09 Wayne A. Logan
Human nature being what it is, individuals engaging in unlawful activity will often seek to avoid having their misconduct detected by law enforcement. This article provides the first legal analysis of what are termed detection avoidance measures, and evaluates whether, and how, they should be subject to criminalization.
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Plea Bargaining with Wrong Reasons: Coercive Plea-Offers and Responding to the Wrong Kind of Reason Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-05-30 Benjamin Newman
The notion of a defendant submitting a false guilty plea due to the penal incentive offered is not an uncommon phenomenon. While the practice has been legitimised based on the defendant’s voluntary informed consent, it has often been argued that the structure of the plea-bargaining practice is coercive. Such can be the case whenever the plea offer entails a significant sentence differential, discrepancy
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Evidentiary Graded Punishment: A New Look at Criminal Liability for Failing to Report Criminal Activity Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-05-22 Doron Teichman
This Article presents a theory whereby criminal punishments are routinely distributed in proportion to the weight of the evidence mounted against the defendant. According to this theory, the law relaxes the stringent decision threshold in criminal trials—beyond a reasonable doubt—by creating easy-to-prove evidentiary offenses. These offenses, in turn, are associated with less severe sanctions, thus
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Is Fair Opportunity a Comprehensive Theory of Responsibility? Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-05-16 Douglas Husak
I challenge the adequacy of David Brink’s “master principle” of culpability. I allege that it fails to account for the moral relevance of ignorance of wrongdoing. I describe three cases in which I believe that Brink’s theory of normative competence cannot account for the significance of a variable that bears on culpability. In most of this paper I attempt to anticipate and reply to the various responses
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Craving and Control Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-05-15 Victor Tadros
Pre-reflectively, many addicts seem either not responsible, or less responsible, for their addictive conduct, at least if they lack responsibility for their addiction. Moore believes roughly the following. Addicts lack responsibility, when they do, because addicts are unable to control their conduct. They are unable when certain modal conditions are satisfied. Moore offers different modal conditions
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Gopal Sreenivasan, Emotion and Virtue: Five Questions About Courage Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-05-03 Rachel Barney
An important virtue of Emotion and Virtue is its careful and sophisticated discussion of the central yet ill-understood virtue of courage. However, Sreenivasan’s treatment of courage raises as many questions as it answers; several of these can be brought into sharper focus by comparison with the argument of Plato and Aristotle on the topic.
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What is Hate Speech? The Case for a Corpus Approach Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-04-26 Maxime Lepoutre, Sara Vilar-Lluch, Emma Borg, Nat Hansen
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Flight and Force Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-04-20 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Rachel Harmon
Sometimes a police officer can only stop a fleeing suspect by striking or shooting him. When is it morally justified to use such force rather than let the suspect go? Beginning with deadly force, this article disentangles key considerations. First, it distinguishes justifications for force that are premised on a liability or forfeiture from justifications premised upon lesser-evils considerations.
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Mechanical Choices: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-03-31 Christian List
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Too Objective for Culpability? Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-03-21 Alex Sarch
To help explain in a principled way why criminal law doctrine tends to abstract away from motives and other individualized circumstances, I have defended an insufficient regard theory of criminal culpability that is more objective in certain respects than other views in the same camp. This has led Alec Walen to object that my view is too objective to be an account of culpability and is better understood
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On the Necessity Defense in a Democratic Welfare State: Leaving Pandora’s Box Ajar Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-03-21 Ivó Coca-Vila
The necessity defense is barely accepted in contemporary Western case law. The courts, relying on the opinion held by the majority of legal scholars, have reduced its margin of application to practically zero, since in the framework of contemporary welfare states, there is almost always a “legal alternative.” The needy person who acts on their own behalf, regardless of whether they save an interest
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Deserving Blame, and Sometimes Punishment Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-03-21 Katrina L. Sifferd
Michael S. Moore is a whole-hearted retributivist. The triumph of Mechanical Choices is that Moore provides a thoroughly physicalist, reductionist-friendly, compatibilist account of the features that make persons deserving of blame and punishment. Many who embrace scientific accounts of psychology worry that from this perspective the grounds for desert disappear; but Moore argues that folk psychological
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Introduction to Symposium on Policing and Political Philosophy Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-03-10 Stephen R. Galoob, Jake Monaghan
This introduction summarizes a broad divide within philosophical scholarship on policing, then summarizes the papers in this symposium in light of that divide.
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Against the Evidence-Relative View of Liability to Defensive Harm Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-02-27 Eduardo Rivera-López, Luciano Venezia
According to the evidence-relative view of liability to defensive harm, a person is so liable if and only if she acts in a way that provides sufficient evidence to justify a (putative) victim’s belief that the person poses a threat of unjust harm, which may or may not be the case. Bas van der Vossen defends this position by analyzing, in relation to a version of Frank Jackson’s famous drug example
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The Right to Do Wrong: Morality and the Limits of Law, by Mark Osiel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 2019 Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-02-22 Daniel Muñoz
It's a masterpiece.
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Moral Entanglement in Group Decision-Making: Explaining an Odd Rule in Corporate Criminal Liability Criminal Law and Philosophy (IF 0.7) Pub Date : 2023-02-15 Sylvia Rich
Acting as part of a corporation may allow an individual more easily to rationalize participating in a harmful act, but there are countervailing forces in corporate action that increase moral oversight and accountability. Making use of group agency to explain membership as a special feature of some corporate agents, I argue that when someone becomes a member of an organized group like a company, their