We present a multi-year study of the rollout of Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs) to the New York City Police Department (NYPD). Our study adds to the prior body of work by clarifying some of the discord within it, particularly with respect to large urban police departments. We estimate the effect of BWC deployment on precinct volumes of citizen stops, arrests, complaints against officers, and use-of-force

How to allocate personnel is a central question in the organization of the state. We link survey data on the performance of 1471 elite civil servants in India to their personnel records between 1975 and 2005 to study how home allocations affect their performance and careers. Using exogenous variation in home assignment generated by an allocation rule, we find that bureaucrats assigned to their home

Firms sometimes have problems with their products or management systems: problems that can lead to catastrophic events. However, while workers in these firms are often aware of these problems, they sometimes fail to report them to their superiors. This paper examines workers’ incentives for concealing problems within an overlapping generations organization consisting of a subordinate and a manager

AbstractWe study the selection of people when unequal payoffs are inevitable, but fair procedures are feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job. We show that allocators may be influenced by their similarity with a recipient, leading to favoritism in outcomes. We study four interventions to reduce favoritism and induce fair procedures, without restricting the allocator’s

The Editorial Board of the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization acknowledges the assistance of:

Firms engage in off-the-books activities to avoid taxes and government oversight. We conjecture, however, that hidden transactions also increase a firm’s opacity, which leads to ex ante contracting frictions that may be particularly costly when trading partners have little legal recourse for contract abrogation. We study these tradeoffs using Russian firm- and transaction-level data. Consistent with

AbstractWe present the results of a randomized control trial on the effect of the introduction of formalized property rights on individuals’ moral judgments and, in particular, on utilitarian morality. We show that institutions shape morality: being exposed to private property institutions makes individuals more utilitarian when confronted with moral dilemmas. Our results shed light on a possible institutional

Secure Communities is a recently introduced immigration enforcement policy in the United States, intended to improve public safety by making it easier to identify and deport criminal immigrants and immigration violators. In this article, we examine the effect of Secure Communities on crime by utilizing the variation in its timing of activation across counties. We extend previous research by exploring

Disparities along racial and ethnic lines persist across domains. Distinguishing among the possible sources of such disparities matters. This article introduces an absolute test for identifying prejudice in the presence of statistical discrimination. In the context of police officers deciding whether to conduct vehicle searches, the key intuition of the test is that each officer’s search decisions

Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. McAdams, John Rappaport

Biases in legal decision-making are difficult to identify as type II errors (wrongful acquittals) are hardly observable and type I errors (wrongful convictions) are only observed for the subsample of subsequently exonerated convicts. Our data on the first German soccer league allow us to classify each referee decision accurately as correct, type I error or type II error. The potential bias we are interested

We analyze the extent to which private defensive litigation insurance deters patent assertion by non-practicing entities (NPEs). We study the effect that a patent-specific defensive insurance product, offered by a leading litigation insurer, had on the litigation behavior of insured patents’ owners, all of which are NPEs. We first model the impact of defensive litigation insurance on the behavior of

Class actions feature severe agency problems, resulting from the divergence of interests between class members and the class attorney. This article proposes a novel mechanism for selecting the class attorney and aligning her interests with those of the represented class. The mechanism applies a combined percentage and hourly litigation fee structure, suggested by Polinsky, Mitchell A., and Daniel L

Private damage claims against cartels may have negative effects on leniency: whereas whistleblowers obtain full immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage claims. This may stabilize cartels. We run an experiment to study this issue. Firms choose whether to join a cartel, may apply for leniency afterward, and then potentially

Drawing on experimental games and a survey conducted with university students at an elite legal academy in Ukraine, this study compares the behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic traits of students aspiring to public sector legal careers as judges, prosecutors, and investigators with their counterparts aiming to pursue private sector legal careers as defense attorneys and commercial lawyers. I find

AbstractWe study an agent’s incentives to discover where her talents lie before putting them to productive use. In our setting, an agent can specialize and learn about the same type of talent repeatedly, or experiment and learn about different types of talent. While experimentation is efficient for a range of distributions of talent and initial signals, labor-market institutions play a crucial role

AbstractWe study an agent’s incentives to discover where her talents lie before putting them to productive use. In our setting, an agent can specialize and learn about the same type of talent repeatedly, or experiment and learn about different types of talent. While experimentation is efficient for a range of distributions of talent and initial signals, labor-market institutions play a crucial role

AbstractThis study analyzes US federal cooperative agreements (CAs) that reflect federal agencies’ willingness to invest in shared administrative governance with third-party organizations. A logic anchored in organizational economics predicts that US federal agency investments to collaborate with other non-federal organizations is positively related to an agency head’s policy-specific expertise, and

This study analyzes US federal cooperative agreements (CAs) that reflect federal agencies’ willingness to invest in shared administrative governance with third-party organizations. A logic anchored in organizational economics predicts that US federal agency investments to collaborate with other non-federal organizations is positively related to an agency head’s policy-specific expertise, and that this

The Editorial Board of the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization acknowledges the assistance of:

The Editorial Board of the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization acknowledges the assistance of:

AbstractUsing new data at the police department level, I propose an identification strategy for estimating the causal effect that police militarization has on reducing violent crime. I show that previous estimates are likely to be contaminated by unobserved factors that simultaneously determine militarization and violent crime. Upon addressing this issue, I find a point estimate that is 20 times larger

Do contracts influence behavior independent of the law governing their enforceability? We explore this question in the context of employment noncompetes using nationally representative data for 11,500 labor force participants. We show that noncompetes are associated with reductions in employee mobility and changes in the direction of that mobility (i.e., toward noncompetitors) in both states that do

Do contracts influence behavior independent of the law governing their enforceability? We explore this question in the context of employment noncompetes using nationally representative data for 11,500 labor force participants. We show that noncompetes are associated with reductions in employee mobility and changes in the direction of that mobility (i.e., toward noncompetitors) in both states that do

AbstractPrevious literature has explored the effects of economic conditions on voting behavior. In this article, I analyze how the economy affects legislative polarization. Using recently available state legislator ideal point estimates, I find a strong negative relationship between state economic activity and political polarization. States that fared worse economically have experienced greater increases

AbstractUsing micro-level data on local Italian elections and exploiting a discontinuity at a population cutoff, I study the effect of electoral systems on politician selection and re-election. Evidence shows that the mayor’s probability of re-election is 25 percentage points higher in majoritarian systems than in proportional systems. Ruling coalitions elected under the majoritarian system enjoy a

We explain a surprising effect of tort liability in the market for prescription drugs. Greater punitive damage risk seems to increase prescription drug utilization in states without non-economic damage caps but decrease utilization in states with such caps. We offer an explanation for this puzzle. The vertical production process for drugs involves national upstream producers (drug companies) and local

We explain a surprising effect of tort liability in the market for prescription drugs. Greater punitive damage risk seems to increase prescription drug utilization in states without non-economic damage caps but decrease utilization in states with such caps. We offer an explanation for this puzzle. The vertical production process for drugs involves national upstream producers (drug companies) and local

This paper examines whether individuals' crime perceptions and crime avoidance behavior respond to changes in crime news coverage. I use data from Mexico, where major media groups agreed to reduce coverage of violence in March 2011. Using a unique dataset on national news content and machine learning techniques, I document that after the Agreement, crime news coverage on television, radio, and newspapers

Abstract This article examines the structure and performance of conservation agreements, which are relational contracts used across the world to protect natural resources. Key elements of these agreements are (1) they are ongoing arrangements between a local community and an outside party, typically a nongovernmental organization (NGO); (2) they feature payments in exchange for conservation services;

Using a unique employee–establishment survey, we find a causal relationship between an individual employee’s trust of management and their decision-making rights (delegation). We utilize both fixed effects (FE) and instrumental variables to control for unobserved factors: establishment-level FE control for management quality, practices, culture, and other characteristics; our instruments of inherited

Using a unique employee–establishment survey, we find a causal relationship between an individual employee’s trust of management and their decision-making rights (delegation). We utilize both fixed effects (FE) and instrumental variables to control for unobserved factors: establishment-level FE control for management quality, practices, culture, and other characteristics; our instruments of inherited

This paper addresses the issue of favoritism at the design stage of a complex procurement auction. A community of citizens wants to procure a project and lacks the knowledge and the ability to translate its preferences into operational technical specifications. This task is delegated to a public officer who may collude with one of the firms at the design stage of the procurement auction in exchange

To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that

To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that

How do central politicians in young democracies secure electoral support at grassroots level? I show that alignment with local governments is instrumental in swaying national elections through, inter alia, electoral fraud. A regression discontinuity design with Romanian local elections and a president impeachment referendum in 2012 uncovers higher referendum turnouts in localities aligned with the

How do central politicians in young democracies secure electoral support at grassroots level? I show that alignment with local governments is instrumental in swaying national elections through, inter alia, electoral fraud. A regression discontinuity design with Romanian local elections and a president impeachment referendum in 2012 uncovers higher referendum turnouts in localities aligned with the

This paper analyzes firm boundaries in the US hotel industry. Hotel properties of a given brand are often managed either by a chain employee or by a franchisee. We document that brand properties with the lowest and the highest occupancy rates are more likely to be managed at arm’s length by franchisees. Variation in organizational form is consistent with a model in which the incentives embodied in

This paper analyzes firm boundaries in the US hotel industry. Hotel properties of a given brand are often managed either by a chain employee or by a franchisee. We document that brand properties with the lowest and the highest occupancy rates are more likely to be managed at arm’s length by franchisees. Variation in organizational form is consistent with a model in which the incentives embodied in

AbstractWe develop a dynamic model of a criminal case, from arrest through plea bargaining and (possibly) trial, allowing for the potential discovery of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors (who choose whether to disclose it) and defendants. We consider three regimes: (1) no disclosure required; (2) disclosure only required before trial; and (3) early disclosure required from arrest onward. These regimes

AbstractWe develop a dynamic model of a criminal case, from arrest through plea bargaining and (possibly) trial, allowing for the potential discovery of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors (who choose whether to disclose it) and defendants. We consider three regimes: (1) no disclosure required; (2) disclosure only required before trial; and (3) early disclosure required from arrest onward. These regimes

AbstractCivil disputes feature parties with biased incentives acquiring evidence with costly effort. Evidence may then be revealed at trial or concealed to persuade a judge or jury. Using a persuasion game, we examine how a litigant’s risk preferences influence evidence acquisition incentives. We find that high risk aversion depresses equilibrium evidence acquisition. We then study the problem of designing

AbstractCivil disputes feature parties with biased incentives acquiring evidence with costly effort. Evidence may then be revealed at trial or concealed to persuade a judge or jury. Using a persuasion game, we examine how a litigant’s risk preferences influence evidence acquisition incentives. We find that high risk aversion depresses equilibrium evidence acquisition. We then study the problem of designing

AbstractParties often regulate their relationships through “continuing” contracts that are not fixed term but roll over: employment is a leading example. Our premise is that parties apply fairness when they revise a continuing contract and that prior terms, together with market information, will be a reference point. A continuing contract can reduce (re)negotiation costs relative to a short-term or

AbstractParties often regulate their relationships through “continuing” contracts that are not fixed term but roll over: employment is a leading example. Our premise is that parties apply fairness when they revise a continuing contract and that prior terms, together with market information, will be a reference point. A continuing contract can reduce (re)negotiation costs relative to a short-term or

AbstractA defendant who admits to having committed an offense may nevertheless be acquitted if he can provide a legally cognizable justification or excuse for his actions by raising an affirmative defense. This article explains how affirmative defenses generate social benefits in the form of avoided unnecessary punishment. It then asks what kind of evidentiary standards must be used in order to balance

AbstractA defendant who admits to having committed an offense may nevertheless be acquitted if he can provide a legally cognizable justification or excuse for his actions by raising an affirmative defense. This article explains how affirmative defenses generate social benefits in the form of avoided unnecessary punishment. It then asks what kind of evidentiary standards must be used in order to balance

A model of employer learning (both symmetric and asymmetric) about worker ability from job histories is constructed, and testable implications are derived to detect asymmetric learning empirically. The model predicts that early-career bad job matches are particularly damaging when learning is asymmetric. Analysis of NLSY79 data reveals that job hopping is associated with lower wages for college graduates

We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the staggered entry of new managers into India’s 42 public R&D labs between 1994 and 2006 to study how alignment between the CEO and middle-level managers affects research productivity. We show that the introduction of new lab managers aligned with the national R&D reforms raised patenting and multinational licensing revenues by 58% and 75%, respectively

AbstractUsing individual-level data that are representative at the city level for six Latin American capital cities (Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo, and San José), we find that participation in government social welfare programs is negatively associated to trust, a result that is robust to the inclusion of individual risk measures and a broad array of controls. Our findings support

AbstractUsing individual-level data that are representative at the city level for six Latin American capital cities (Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo, and San José), we find that participation in government social welfare programs is negatively associated to trust, a result that is robust to the inclusion of individual risk measures and a broad array of controls. Our findings support

This paper studies the link between lateral mobility and promotions. The first part of the paper extends the theoretical literature by incorporating lateral moves into a job assignment model with task-specific human capital accumulation. The model thus predicts that workers who are laterally moved in one period are more likely to be subsequently promoted and experience larger wage growth compared with

AbstractA damages rule is called compensatory if it requires compensation of each party who complied with the due care standard for harm caused by deficient precaution of the other party. The two main contributions of this article are as follows. First, we show that any Nash equilibrium of the game induced by a compensatory damages rule enhances welfare compared to the welfare that would have been

AbstractA damages rule is called compensatory if it requires compensation of each party who complied with the due care standard for harm caused by deficient precaution of the other party. The two main contributions of this article are as follows. First, we show that any Nash equilibrium of the game induced by a compensatory damages rule enhances welfare compared to the welfare that would have been

We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a social dilemma. Subjects inherit the institutional setting from a previous generation of subjects who either decided on the implementation of the institution democratically by majority vote or were exogenously assigned a setting. In order to isolate the impact of the voting procedure,

Affirmative action policies have been shown to induce talented women to compete in laboratory contexts. However, evidence from actual policy changes is more ambiguous. While existing laboratory experiments have exclusively analyzed gender quotas in one-shot tournaments, we focus on a setting that models real life examples, such as quotas in corporate boards, more closely: quotas implemented at the

We study a unique natural experiment, during which 5-10% of draft opinions by judges of the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA) were randomly selected for “quality review” by a team of full-time staff attorneys for nearly 15 years. This performance program had the express goals of measuring accuracy and reducing reversal rates on appeal. In cases of legal error, the quality review team wrote memoranda

This paper analyzes how electoral incentives shape fiscal policy, focusing on the introduction of mayoral term limits in Portugal. Applying a difference-in-differences approach, we find evidence that when a municipality has a term-limited (TL) mayor, it experiences a fall in revenues and expenditures. The effect seems to be driven by lower effort of lame-duck mayors, relative to reelection-eligible

Principal-agent problems can reduce gains from exchange available in long distance trade. One solution historically used to mitigate such problems is multilateral punishment, whereby groups of principals jointly punish cheating agents by giving them bad reputations. But how does such punishment work when there is uncertainty regarding whether an agent actually cheated or was just the victim of bad

In an environment in which sellers can reduce the probability of defective delivery through cooperative investment, and in which enforcement of default remedies for breach of contract is imperfect, an optimal performance standard grants buyers the option to reject goods for some but not all defects, in other words, when the delivery is sufficiently defective and the seller said to be in "material breach"