
显示样式: 排序: IF: - GO 导出
-
Acknowledgements The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2021-04-10
The Editorial Board of the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization acknowledges the assistance of:
-
The Behavioral Effects of (Unenforceable) Contracts The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-12-31 Evan Starr, J J Prescott, Norman Bishara
Do contracts influence behavior independent of the law governing their enforceability? We explore this question in the context of employment noncompetes using nationally representative data for 11,500 labor force participants. We show that noncompetes are associated with reductions in employee mobility and changes in the direction of that mobility (i.e., toward noncompetitors) in both states that do
-
Unintended Consequences of Products Liability: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Market The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-11-10 Eric Helland, Darius Lakdawalla, Anup Malani, Seth A Seabury
We explain a surprising effect of tort liability in the market for prescription drugs. Greater punitive damage risk seems to increase prescription drug utilization in states without non-economic damage caps but decrease utilization in states with such caps. We offer an explanation for this puzzle. The vertical production process for drugs involves national upstream producers (drug companies) and local
-
Media and Crime Perceptions: Evidence from Mexico The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-08-04 Aurora Alejandra Ramírez-Álvarez
This paper examines whether individuals' crime perceptions and crime avoidance behavior respond to changes in crime news coverage. I use data from Mexico, where major media groups agreed to reduce coverage of violence in March 2011. Using a unique dataset on national news content and machine learning techniques, I document that after the Agreement, crime news coverage on television, radio, and newspapers
-
Conservation Agreements: Relational Contracts with Endogenous Monitoring The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-06-27 Heidi Gjertsen, Theodore Groves, David A Miller, Eduard Niesten, Dale Squires, Joel Watson
Abstract This article examines the structure and performance of conservation agreements, which are relational contracts used across the world to protect natural resources. Key elements of these agreements are (1) they are ongoing arrangements between a local community and an outside party, typically a nongovernmental organization (NGO); (2) they feature payments in exchange for conservation services;
-
Worker Trust in Management and Delegation in Organizations The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-06-13 Kieron J Meagher, Andrew Wait
Using a unique employee–establishment survey, we find a causal relationship between an individual employee’s trust of management and their decision-making rights (delegation). We utilize both fixed effects (FE) and instrumental variables to control for unobserved factors: establishment-level FE control for management quality, practices, culture, and other characteristics; our instruments of inherited
-
Accountability to Contain Corruption in Procurement Tenders The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-05-17 Bernard Caillaud, Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky
This paper addresses the issue of favoritism at the design stage of a complex procurement auction. A community of citizens wants to procure a project and lacks the knowledge and the ability to translate its preferences into operational technical specifications. This task is delegated to a public officer who may collude with one of the firms at the design stage of the procurement auction in exchange
-
Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-05-09 Francesco Decarolis, Leonardo M Giuffrida, Elisabetta Iossa, Vincenzo Mollisi, Giancarlo Spagnolo
To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that
-
The Illicit Benefits of Local Party Alignment in National Elections The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-05-04 Oana Borcan
How do central politicians in young democracies secure electoral support at grassroots level? I show that alignment with local governments is instrumental in swaying national elections through, inter alia, electoral fraud. A regression discontinuity design with Romanian local elections and a president impeachment referendum in 2012 uncovers higher referendum turnouts in localities aligned with the
-
In-House and Arm’s Length: Productivity Heterogeneity and Variation in Organizational Form The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-05-03 Stephen F Lin, Catherine Thomas, Arturs Kalnins
This paper analyzes firm boundaries in the US hotel industry. Hotel properties of a given brand are often managed either by a chain employee or by a franchisee. We document that brand properties with the lowest and the highest occupancy rates are more likely to be managed at arm’s length by franchisees. Variation in organizational form is consistent with a model in which the incentives embodied in
-
Reducing Unjust Convictions: Plea Bargaining, Trial, and Evidence Disclosure The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-03-19 Daughety A, Reinganum J.
AbstractWe develop a dynamic model of a criminal case, from arrest through plea bargaining and (possibly) trial, allowing for the potential discovery of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors (who choose whether to disclose it) and defendants. We consider three regimes: (1) no disclosure required; (2) disclosure only required before trial; and (3) early disclosure required from arrest onward. These regimes
-
Risk Preferences and Incentives for Evidence Acquisition and Disclosure The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-03-14 Giffin E, Lillethun E.
AbstractCivil disputes feature parties with biased incentives acquiring evidence with costly effort. Evidence may then be revealed at trial or concealed to persuade a judge or jury. Using a persuasion game, we examine how a litigant’s risk preferences influence evidence acquisition incentives. We find that high risk aversion depresses equilibrium evidence acquisition. We then study the problem of designing
-
Continuing Contracts The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-01-29 Halonen-Akatwijuka M, Hart O.
AbstractParties often regulate their relationships through “continuing” contracts that are not fixed term but roll over: employment is a leading example. Our premise is that parties apply fairness when they revise a continuing contract and that prior terms, together with market information, will be a reference point. A continuing contract can reduce (re)negotiation costs relative to a short-term or
-
Justifications, Excuses, and Affirmative Defenses The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2020-01-25 Mungan M.
AbstractA defendant who admits to having committed an offense may nevertheless be acquitted if he can provide a legally cognizable justification or excuse for his actions by raising an affirmative defense. This article explains how affirmative defenses generate social benefits in the form of avoided unnecessary punishment. It then asks what kind of evidentiary standards must be used in order to balance
-
Job Hopping and Adverse Selection in the Labor Market The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2019-12-12 Xiaodong Fan, Jed DeVaro
A model of employer learning (both symmetric and asymmetric) about worker ability from job histories is constructed, and testable implications are derived to detect asymmetric learning empirically. The model predicts that early-career bad job matches are particularly damaging when learning is asymmetric. Analysis of NLSY79 data reveals that job hopping is associated with lower wages for college graduates
-
Do Managers Matter? A Natural Experiment from 42 R&D Labs in India The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2019-12-02 Prithwiraj Choudhury, Tarun Khanna, Christos A Makridis
We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the staggered entry of new managers into India’s 42 public R&D labs between 1994 and 2006 to study how alignment between the CEO and middle-level managers affects research productivity. We show that the introduction of new lab managers aligned with the national R&D reforms raised patenting and multinational licensing revenues by 58% and 75%, respectively
-
Social Welfare Programs and Trust: Evidence from Six Latin American Cities The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2019-10-29 Chong A, Ríos-Salas V, Ñopo H.
AbstractUsing individual-level data that are representative at the city level for six Latin American capital cities (Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo, and San José), we find that participation in government social welfare programs is negatively associated to trust, a result that is robust to the inclusion of individual risk measures and a broad array of controls. Our findings support
-
Lateral Moves, Promotions, and Task-Specific Human Capital: Theory and Evidence The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2019-08-27 Xin Jin, Michael Waldman
This paper studies the link between lateral mobility and promotions. The first part of the paper extends the theoretical literature by incorporating lateral moves into a job assignment model with task-specific human capital accumulation. The model thus predicts that workers who are laterally moved in one period are more likely to be subsequently promoted and experience larger wage growth compared with
-
But-for Causation and the Implementability of Compensatory Damages Rules The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2019-07-30 Schweizer U.
AbstractA damages rule is called compensatory if it requires compensation of each party who complied with the due care standard for harm caused by deficient precaution of the other party. The two main contributions of this article are as follows. First, we show that any Nash equilibrium of the game induced by a compensatory damages rule enhances welfare compared to the welfare that would have been
-
Inherited Institutions: Cooperation in the Light of Democratic Legitimacy The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2019-05-27 Pascal Langenbach, Franziska Tausch
We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a social dilemma. Subjects inherit the institutional setting from a previous generation of subjects who either decided on the implementation of the institution democratically by majority vote or were exogenously assigned a setting. In order to isolate the impact of the voting procedure,
-
Never too Late: Gender Quotas in the Final Round of a Multistage Tournament The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2019-04-22 Eszter Czibor, Silvia Dominguez Martinez
Affirmative action policies have been shown to induce talented women to compete in laboratory contexts. However, evidence from actual policy changes is more ambiguous. While existing laboratory experiments have exclusively analyzed gender quotas in one-shot tournaments, we focus on a setting that models real life examples, such as quotas in corporate boards, more closely: quotas implemented at the
-
Quality Review of Mass Adjudication: A Randomized Natural Experiment at the Board of Veterans Appeals, 2003–16 The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2019-03-29 Daniel E Ho, Cassandra Handan-Nader, David Ames, David Marcus
We study a unique natural experiment, during which 5-10% of draft opinions by judges of the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA) were randomly selected for “quality review” by a team of full-time staff attorneys for nearly 15 years. This performance program had the express goals of measuring accuracy and reducing reversal rates on appeal. In cases of legal error, the quality review team wrote memoranda
-
The Effects of Electoral Incentives on Fiscal Policy: Evidence from a Legislative Change at the Local Government Level The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2019-01-18 Linda Gonçalves Veiga, Francisco José Veiga
This paper analyzes how electoral incentives shape fiscal policy, focusing on the introduction of mayoral term limits in Portugal. Applying a difference-in-differences approach, we find evidence that when a municipality has a term-limited (TL) mayor, it experiences a fall in revenues and expenditures. The effect seems to be driven by lower effort of lame-duck mayors, relative to reelection-eligible
-
Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 0.952) Pub Date : 2019-01-09 Aidin Hajikhameneh, Jared Rubin
Principal-agent problems can reduce gains from exchange available in long distance trade. One solution historically used to mitigate such problems is multilateral punishment, whereby groups of principals jointly punish cheating agents by giving them bad reputations. But how does such punishment work when there is uncertainty regarding whether an agent actually cheated or was just the victim of bad