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Partisan bias in securities enforcement The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-27 Reilly S Steel
In this article, I present a partisan theory of agency enforcement and empirically investigate the possibility of partisan bias in the enforcement of the federal securities laws. Leveraging plausibly exogenous shocks to partisan control of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), I find evidence that a firm’s partisan alignment with the SEC substantially reduces the likelihood of enforcement
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Markets and morality: how markets shape our (dis)regard for others The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-30 Daniel L Chen, Eric Reinhart
Scholars since Hume and Smith have debated possible causal connections between market experiences and moral beliefs. Here, we study the impact of market interactions on utilitarian versus deontological values, charitable donations, and whether individuals have differential in-group/out-group moral views. We randomly assign workers residing across several nations of varying income levels to different
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Money and cooperative federalism: evidence from EPA civil litigation The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-16 Juan Pablo González, Hye Young You
The federalism structure of the US government requires active cooperation from state governments to successfully enforce federal environmental regulations. What explains the variation in state governments’ participation in lawsuits against firms that are accused of violating major environmental statutes? We argue that firms’ political connections with state politicians affect a state government’s decision
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Politics and gender in the executive suite The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-12 Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, David Weiss
Recent years have seen increased interest in gender diversity within corporate America. CEOs’ political preferences have been shown to influence many corporate decisions. Evidence suggests that views on gender equality align more with political preferences than an individual’s gender. We investigate if CEOs’ political leanings correlate with female representation and compensation in the executive suite
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Censorship, industry structure, and creativity: evidence from the Catholic Inquisition in Renaissance Venice The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-05-22 Stefano Comino, Alberto Galasso, Clara Graziano
We examine the effects of the book censorship implemented by the Catholic Inquisition on printing outcomes in Renaissance Venice. We collect detailed information on indexes of prohibited books and publication activities by the main printers active in Venice during the 1500s. We construct treatment and comparison groups based on the specialization of each printer in transgressive publications before
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Sweeping the dirt under the rug: measuring spillovers of an anti-corruption measure The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-04-27 Andrea Tulli
This article studies the spillover effects of an Italian anti-corruption measure targeting municipalities colluding with organized crime. We assess its impact on neighboring municipalities’ procurement practices. Our findings reveal that neighboring municipalities increase contracts falling below the 40,000 Euro threshold, which bear lighter evidentiary requirements, and are consequently harder to
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Strangers’ property The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-07 Marco Fabbri, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Matteo Rizzolli
Why are impartial institutions such as formalized property rights so important for the emergence of impersonal trade? Previous literature has stressed the role of such institutions in providing third-party enforcement to shield strangers from locals’ opportunism. We document the existence of a second mechanism based on the role of formalized property rights in inducing respect for the property of strangers
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Police militarization and local sheriff elections The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Christos Mavridis, Orestis Troumpounis, Maurizio Zanardi
We investigate how transfers of military equipment in the United States through the 1033 Program impact the electoral performance of sheriffs that receive a significant share of equipment while directly accountable to voters. To address this question, we have compiled a unique dataset covering 7281 sheriff elections in 2714 counties between 2006 and 2016. Our findings indicate that an increase in military
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Organizational Culture: Structure and Evolution The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-16 Mark Gradstein
We present a model of the formation and evolution of organizational culture and its effect on performance. The analysis reveals circumstances under which, because of cultural externalities, excessive polarization or, alternatively, homogeneity may result, indicating inter alia an important role for the performance of managing cultural diversity in organizations. The exhibited framework can be useful
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Legal research as a collective enterprise: an examination of data availability in empirical legal scholarship The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-16 Abigail A Matthews, Jason Rantanen
While most social sciences confronted data sharing, transparency, and reproducibility sometime in the last two decades, the legal academy has largely been absent from these discussions. In this study, we examine the degree to which the information underlying empirical studies is available. Using an original dataset of every empirical study published in top law journals from 2010 to 2022, we find that
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Terrorist violence and the fuzzy frontier: national and supranational identities in Britain The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-16 Georgios Efthyvoulou, Harry Pickard, Vincenzo Bove
We explore the effect of terrorism on individuals’ perceptions about national identity in the context of Great Britain, where national and supranational identities overlap. We find that exposure to terrorist attacks strengthens identification with Britain but has no effect on identification with its constituent nations. The estimated effects last for about 45 days, but subside over time as the threat
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Intrinsic adherence to law: physical versus intellectual property The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-20 Stefan Bechtold, Gabriel Gertsch, Martin Schonger
Infringement of intellectual property seems to be much more common than infringement of physical property. Intellectual property rights protect goods that are non-rival in consumption, while physical property rights protect rival goods. Nonrivalry implies that the owner suffers no direct harm from infringement. This could explain lower respect for property rights in nonrival goods. To test this hypothesis
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Fines, nonpayment, and revenues: evidence from speeding tickets The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-11-13 Traxler Christian, Dušek Libor
We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform-induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10% increase in the fine (i.e., the payment obligation)
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First, do no harm, second, say sorry? Investigating the impact of a new tort reform The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-19 Philip DeCicca, Natalie Malak
We investigate the effect of so-called “apology laws” on physician procedure choice and birth outcomes. Advocates believe they may reduce litigation since a harmed person who receives an apology or explanation may be less likely to sue, all else equal. In the medical context, this could translate into a reduction in defensive medicine practiced. To investigate this possibility, we examine the impact
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Ownership networks and labor income The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-16 Federico Huneeus, Borja Larrain, Mauricio Larrain, Mounu Prem
We document a novel relationship between networks of firms linked through ownership (i.e., business groups) and labor income using matched employer–employee data for Chile. Business group affiliation is associated with higher wages, even after controlling for firm size and individual worker effects. The group premium is stronger for top workers; hence, group firms have higher wage dispersion. The premium
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The Direct Effect of Corporate Law on Entrepreneurship The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-09-25 Jorge Guzman
From 1946 to 1983, US states modernized their corporate law by adopting the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), a compendium of legal best practices. Better corporate law increased entrepreneurship. After the adoption of the MBCA, the number of new local corporations increased by 26% on average, half of which was substitution from other firm types, and the rest was net-new firms. States that only
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Welcome to Waco! The impact of judge shopping on litigation The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-09-06 Christian Helmers, Brian J Love
We analyze the effect of judge shopping in patent litigation following the appointment of a former patent litigator as the sole district judge assigned to the Waco Division of the US District Court for the Western District of Texas (WDTX). We find that patent enforcers’ ability to select, with certainty, a judge widely regarded as patentee-friendly increased the number of cases filed, especially by
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Board composition and performance of state-owned enterprises: quasi-experimental evidence The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-08-23 Audinga Baltrunaite, Mario Cannella, Sauro Mocetti, Giacomo Roma
We analyze the impact of board composition on the performance of companies controlled by public entities in Italy, using a reform-induced change. The law’s provisions, aimed at increasing female representation and at reducing the revolving-door phenomenon, were binding for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but not for companies with a minority share of public ownership, allowing to adopt a difference-in-differences
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Improving the signal quality of grades The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-08-04 Adam Chilton, Peter Joy, Kyle Rozema, James Thomas
We investigate how improving the signal quality of grades could enhance the matching of students to selective opportunities that are awarded early in academic programs. To do so, we develop methods to measure the signal quality of grades and to estimate the impact of changes to university policies on the identification of exceptional students for these opportunities. We focus on law schools, a setting
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Competition policy and the labor share The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-07-11 Amit Zac, Carola Casti, Christopher Decker, Ariel Ezrachi
Recent years have seen intense debate about the causes of the observed decline in the labor share. We extend this inquiry by investigating whether the design and enforcement of competition law and policy are associated with changes in the labor share. Using a panel of 22 industries in 12 OECD economies, we find a positive statistical association between the effectiveness of competition policy and changes
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The role of personal and impersonal relational contracts on partner selection and efficiency The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-07-05 Manuel Muñoz-Herrera, Ernesto Reuben
In this article, we use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of relational contracts on market efficiency in environments with different degrees of contract enforceability and market competition. By exogenously varying the communication protocol, we create relational contracts that are more personal or impersonal. On the one hand, personal relational contracts improve efficiency by promoting
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Peer pressure and discrimination: evidence from international cricket The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-06-29 A Nilesh Fernando, Siddharth Eapen George
We study how peers affect in-group bias. Exploiting several umpiring reforms in international cricket matches—where two umpires make independent decisions in each other’s presence—we show that home-team umpires are less biased when working with a neutral colleague, that is, one who is neither a national of the home nor the foreign team. This temporary debiasing is driven by the social pressure umpires
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Labor provisions in trade agreements: recasting the protectionist debate The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-06-09 Desirée LeClercq, Raymond Robertson, Daniel Samaan
Labor provisions are integral to regional trade agreements (RTAs). Critics argue that they are a protectionist measure by reducing trade flows. Efforts to test that argument by employing various economic gravity models to trade agreements with labor provisions have failed to apply clear legal criteria and updated estimation methods. Drawing from the law of transnational contracts, we apply clear legal
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Product liability and firm owners’ delegation to overconfident managers The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-05-20 Tim Friehe, Cat Lam Pham
This article analyzes the socially optimal liability allocation when strictly liable Cournot firms delegate their safety and output choices to managers whose potential biases are chosen by firm owners and consumers misperceive product risks. Firm owners always hire managers who are overconfident about their product safety’s effectiveness in reducing product-related accident risk. However, the extent
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Anti-money-laundering oversight and banks’ reporting of suspicious transactions: some empirical evidence The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-04-13 Mario Gara, Francesco Manaresi, Domenico J Marchetti, Marco Marinucci
We investigate the relation between anti-money-laundering (AML) inspections and banks’ ability and effort to identify and report suspicious transactions. We do so by using detailed data from the Bank of Italy and the Italian Financial Intelligence Unit, which include information on (i) authorities’ on-site inspections and enforcement actions, (ii) quantity and quality of suspicious transactions reports
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The Congressional Leadership Dilemma The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-02-27 Christian Fong
Previous theories assume that congressional party leaders internalize the welfare of the parties they lead. Accordingly, existing work deemphasizes the role of agency problems in explaining the conditions under which parties grant more political resources to their leaders. To show how agency problems can still arise even when the party leader wants only to maximize collective goods and stay in office
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International politics and oil trade: evidence from Russian oil exports The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-02-25 Sergey Mityakov, Margarita Portnykh, Kevin K Tsui
Oil is often considered a “political” good affected by the changes in international political relations. Using a novel dataset on Russian oil-exporting companies over 1999–2011, we find that a worsening in political relations between Russia and an oil-importing country results in a considerable reduction in oil shipments by Russian oil exporting firms into that country, the effect being stronger for
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Transactional-governance structures:new cross-country data and an application to the effect of uncertainty The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-02-16 Peter Murrell, Nona Karalashvili, David C Francis
To what extent are personal trust, mutual interests, and third parties important in enforcing agreements to trade? How do firms combine these to form transactional-governance structures? This article answers these questions in a whole-economy, cross-country setting that considers a full spectrum of transactional-governance strategies. The data collection requires a new survey question answerable in
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How informative is the text of securities complaints? The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-02-16 Adam B Badawi
Much of the research in law and finance reduces complex texts down to a handful of variables. Legal scholars have voiced concerns that this dimensionality reduction loses important detail that is embedded in legal text. This article assesses this critique by asking whether text analysis can capture meaningful predictive information. It does so by applying text analysis and machine learning to a corpus
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Overcoming contractual incompleteness: the role of guiding principles The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-01-25 David Frydlinger, Oliver Hart
Transactions of any complexity between buyers and sellers are supported by long-term contracts and these contracts are inevitably incomplete. We propose an approach for overcoming contractual incompleteness based on the idea that most people are inclined to follow widely accepted social norms, such as being fair-minded and acting with integrity. We suggest that this tendency can be reinforced if these
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Approval regulation and learning, with application to timing of merger control The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-01-09 Marco Ottaviani, Abraham L Wickelgren
This article analyzes the optimal combination of ex ante and ex post regulation of an activity in a two-period model. Additional information about the sign and extent of the externality associated with the activity becomes available only once a private party undertakes the activity, but undoing the activity at that stage is costly. We characterize when the regulator should commit not to reevaluate
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Does corruption hinder female political participation? Evidence from a measure against organized crime The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-09-14 Anna Laura Baraldi, Carla Ronza
This article analyzes the effect of anti-corruption measures on female political empowerment. We exploit a measure that prescribes the dissolution of city councils for mafia infiltration, leading to an exogenous decrease in the level of corruption within local government. We find that the percentage of female councilors and aldermen elected after compulsory administrations, as well as the probability
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The Benefits of Trade Secret Legal Protection: Evidence from Firms’ Cost Structure Decisions The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-08-05 Feng Gao, Xue Wang, Benda Yin
We investigate whether better trade secret legal protection permits a firm to shift resources from protecting trade secrets to expanding its fixed operation capacity, thus reducing cost elasticity. We employ the staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by US state courts as a plausibly exogenous shock that improves trade secret legal protection. We find a reduction, on average
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Law Matters—Less Than We Thought The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-08-04 Daniel Klerman, Holger Spamann
In a pre-registered 2 × 2 × 2 factorial between-subject randomized lab experiment with 61 federal judges, we test if the law influences judicial decisions, if it does so more under a rule than under a standard, and how its influence compares to that of legally irrelevant sympathies. Participating judges received realistic materials and a relatively long period of time (50 min) to decide an auto accident
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Political Agency and Implementation Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-08-03 Benjamin Blumenthal
Voters are frequently ill-equipped to monitor politicians’ actions. Politicians are expected to implement projects, whose benefits sometimes partially accrue to interest groups (IGs) and not entirely to voters. IGs thus have an incentive to affect which projects politicians implement by providing implementation subsidies to lower the cost of policymaking that politicians incur. This article shows how
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Emotional Cues and Violent Behavior: Unexpected Basketball Losses Increase Incidents of Family Violence The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-07-29 Alexander Cardazzi, Bryan C McCannon, Brad R Humphreys, Zachary Rodriguez
Domestic violence generates long-term effects on offenders, victims, and other household members. While coercive behavior explains some family violence, aggression can also be reactive, triggered by emotional stimulus. Insight into triggers of family violence can inform policy and mitigate abusive behavior. Card, D. and G. B. Dahl. (2011). “Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional
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How Does Court Stability Affect Legal Stability? The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-07-18 Álvaro Bustos, Nuno Garoupa
Judicial ideology in court has attracted the attention of political scientists and legal economists. The question we address here is the extent to which ideological stability impacts the law. We consider a model where a court has two judicial ideological inclinations, majority and minority. However, they may change their relative influence over time. We show that, while both sides have a preferred
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The Unintended Consequences of Welfare Reforms: Universal Credit, Financial Insecurity, and Crime The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-07-09 Rocco d’Este, Alex Harvey
We evaluate the unintended effects of Universal Credit (UC), a monumental welfare reform that has increased the stringency of the UK social security payment system. We exploit the rollout of UC across constituencies, targeting first-time claimants, predominantly young males. Using monthly data from 2010 to 2019 for England and Wales, we first document the negative economic impacts of UC, showing it
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Markets for Scientific Attribution The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-06-21 Joshua S Gans, Fiona Murray
Formal attribution provides a means of recognizing scientific contributions as well as allocating scientific credit. This article examines the processes by which attribution arises and its interaction with market assessments of the relative contributions of members of scientific teams and communities—a topic of interest for the organizational economics of science and in understanding scientific labor
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Does Information About AI Regulation Change Manager Evaluation of Ethical Concerns and Intent to Adopt AI? The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-04-23 Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar,Benjamin Larsen,Yong Suk Lee,Michael Webb
Abstract We examine the impacts of potential artificial intelligence (AI) regulations on managers’ perceptions on ethical issues related to AI and their intentions to adopt AI technologies. We conduct a randomized online survey experiment on more than a thousand managers in the United States. We randomly present managers with different proposed AI regulations, and ask about ethical issues related to
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Fighting Organized Crime by Targeting their Revenue: Screening, Mafias, and Public Funds The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-03-28 Gianmarco Daniele,Gemma Dipoppa
Abstract Repressive policies to fight criminal organizations are often met with a violent response from criminal groups. Are non-repressive strategies more effective? Targeting criminal revenues can be a powerful tool if the threat of investigation is credible and if criminals are unable to displace their activity to avoid controls. We study an Italian policy designed to tackle mafia misappropriation
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The Ownership of Data The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-02-03 Anastasios Dosis, Wilfried Sand-Zantman
We study the effects of property rights over the use of data on market outcomes. To do so, we consider a model in which a monopolistic firm offers a service to a set of heterogeneous users. The use of the service generates valuable data, but data monetization entails a privacy cost for users. A trade-off emerges between under-processing and over-monetization of data. We show that both the firm and
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The Dynamics of the Debate About Gay Rights: Evidence from US Newspapers The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-01-11 Alan Manning, Paolo Masella
Changing attitudes are the result of a battle for hearts and minds in which agents for and against change try to persuade others. We know very little about this process. We develop a methodology for measuring the intensity and the contents of media coverage for and against an idea which we apply to attitudes to gay rights. We uncover several stylized facts: First, the diffusion process of both pro-
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The Differential Effects of Malpractice Reform: Defensive Medicine in Obstetrics The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2022-01-04 Javier Cano-Urbina, Daniel Montanera
Recent studies argue that different types of patients are affected differently by changes in malpractice pressure. We argue that defensive medicine causes these differential effects. Our theoretical model predicts that reduced malpractice pressure decreases health care spending among patients with good access to care, but increases spending among those with poor access. We test this theory by estimating
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Deterrence of Orchestrated Cheating: Group versus Individual Punishment The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-12-28 Shmuel Leshem, Abraham L Wickelgren
In the wake of a state-sponsored doping scandal, the World Anti-Doping Agency recommended banning all Russian athletes from the Rio Olympic Games. We study the circumstances in which such group penalties deter a group leader, whose payoff is tied to the group’s benefits and sanctions, from helping cheating group members avoid detection. We show that relative to individual punishment, group punishment
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Peer Effects and Recidivism: The Role of Race and Age The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-12-10 Kegon Teng Kok Tan, Mariyana Zapryanova
Recidivism rates are a growing concern due to the high cost of imprisonment and the high rate of ex-prisoners returning back to prison. One policy-relevant and potentially important determinant of recidivism is the composition of peer inmates. In this paper, we study the role of peer effects within a correctional facility using data on almost 80,000 individuals serving time in Georgia. We exploit randomness
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Doing It by the Book: Political Contestability and Public Contract Renegotiations The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-12-02 Jean Beuve, Marian W Moszoro, Pablo T Spiller
We present a public procurement model in which contractual flexibility and political tolerance for contractual deviations determine renegotiations. In the model, contractual flexibility allows for adaptation without formal renegotiation, while political tolerance for deviations decreases with political competition. We then compare renegotiation rates of procurement contracts in which the procurer is
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A Statistical Test for Legal Interpretation: Theory and Applications The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-11-11 Julian Nyarko, Sarath Sanga
Many questions of legal interpretation hinge on whether two groups of people assign different meanings to the same word. For example: Do 18th- and 21st-century English speakers assign the same meaning to commerce? Do judges and laypersons agree on what makes conduct reasonable? We propose a new statistical test to answer such questions. In three applications, we use our test to (1) quantify differences
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Electoral Sentencing Cycles The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-11-10 David Abrams, Roberto Galbiati, Emeric Henry, Arnaud Philippe
We add to our understanding of the optimal method of judicial selection by exploiting an unusual feature in North Carolina: judges rotate location every 6 months. This allows us to identify the existence and source of sentencing variation over the electoral cycle. We show that when elections approach, felony sentences rise. This increase is found exclusively when judges are sentencing in their district
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Judicial Review by the People Themselves: Democracy and the Rule of Law in Ancient Athens The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-11-02 Federica Carugati, Randall Calvert, Barry R Weingast
Modern democratic constitutions mediate the tension between democracy and the rule of law through institutions that check unrestrained popular rule with expert judicial bodies. This paper considers the alternative arrangement that existed in ancient Athens, where checks on popular rule coexisted with strong popular control. Judicial review in Athens, however, raised two additional threats to democracy
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Signaling in the “Before” Model of Final Offer Arbitration The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-10-28 Amy Farmer, Paul Pecorino
We develop a signaling model of final offer arbitration (FOA) in which the informed party makes the final settlement demand to the uninformed party. In FOA, each party submits a proposal to an arbitrator and if no agreement is reached, the arbitrator must select one of the two submitted proposals. We analyze a “before” model of FOA in which all settlement activity occurs prior to the exchange of proposals
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A Potentially Known Confidential Settlement The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-10-27 Frances Xu Lee
This article studies the incentive to settle confidentially, openly, or to go to trial given that the existence of a confidential settlement might become publicly known. Depending on whether the defendant (D) or the plaintiff cares more about the Public’s inference from the litigation outcome, a confidential settlement may signal a more-culpable or less-culpable D. The informational disadvantage of
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Task Discretion, Labor-market Frictions, and Entrepreneurship The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-10-20 Andrea Canidio, Patrick Legros
An agent can perform a job in several ways, which we call tasks. Choosing agents’ tasks is the prerogative of management within firms, and of agents themselves if they are entrepreneurs. While agents’ comparative advantage at different tasks is unknown, it can be learned by observing their performance. However, tasks that generate more information could lead to lower short-term profits. Hence, firms
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Measuring the Legislative Design of Judicial Review of Agency Actions The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-10-20 Pamela J Clouser McCann, Charles R Shipan, Yuhua Wang
When Congress writes and passes statutes, it can include detailed provisions designating how judicial review of agency actions will operate. Yet despite their importance, empirical research has suffered from a lack of a systematic measure or assessment of these review provisions. In this project, we create a new measure of exposure to judicial review by hand-coding judicial review provisions in the
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On the Cyclicality of Real Wages and Employment: New Evidence and Stylized Facts from Performance Pay and Fixed Wage Jobs The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-10-16 Christos A Makridis, Maury Gittleman
Using the National Compensation Survey between 2004 and 2017, we document four stylized facts and quantify cyclical heterogeneity among performance pay (PP) and fixed wage (FW) jobs. First, there is substantial dispersion in the incidence of PP, even within the same occupation; hourly compensation growth in PP jobs has been nearly three-times as large as that in FW jobs; the share of PP is increasing
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Acknowledgements The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-10-05
The Editorial Board of the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization acknowledges the assistance of:
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Withdrawn as duplicate: Social Ties and the Influence of Public Policies on Individual Opinions: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage Laws The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-10-07 Sylvie Blasco, Eva Moreno Galbis, Jeremy Tanguy
This article has been withdrawn due to a publisher error that caused the article to be duplicated. The definitive version of this article is published under DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewab001.
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How Representation Reduces Minority Criminal Victimization: Evidence from Scheduled Castes in India The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-10-01 Abhay Aneja, S K Ritadhi
In this paper, we consider whether the representation of historically disenfranchised minorities in government can reduce violence suffered by these groups. To answer this question, we examine the impact of political parties that represent India’s marginalized Scheduled Castes (SCs). We address the endogenous selection of minority-favoring parties using state-level variation in aggregations of close
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Who Watches the Watchmen: Evidence of the Effect of Body-Worn Cameras on New York City Policing The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-10-01 Mitchell E Zamoff, Brad N Greenwood, Gordon Burtch
We present a multi-year study of the rollout of Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs) to the New York City Police Department (NYPD). Our study adds to the prior body of work by clarifying some of the discord within it, particularly with respect to large urban police departments. We estimate the effect of BWC deployment on precinct volumes of citizen stops, arrests, complaints against officers, and use-of-force
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Concealment as Responsibility Shifting in Overlapping Generations Organizations* The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2021-10-01 Tomoya Tajika
Firms sometimes have problems with their products or management systems: problems that can lead to catastrophic events. However, while workers in these firms are often aware of these problems, they sometimes fail to report them to their superiors. This paper examines workers’ incentives for concealing problems within an overlapping generations organization consisting of a subordinate and a manager