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Slurring silences Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-23 A. G. Holdier
Silence can be a communicative act. Tanesini (2018) demonstrates how “eloquent” silences can virtuously indicate resistance and dissent; in this paper, I outline one way silence can also be used viciously to cause discursive harm, specifically by slurring victims. By distinguishing between eloquent and “signaling” silences (two kinds of what I call “performative” silences), I show how “slurring” silences
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What is social organizing? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-23 Megan Hyska
While scholars of, and participants in, social movements, electoral politics, and organized labor are deeply engaged in contrasting different theories of how political actors should organize, little recent philosophical work has asked what social organizing is. This paper aims to answer this question in a way that can make sense of typical organizing‐related claims and debates. It is intuitive that
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Attention as selection for action defended Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Wayne Wu
Attention has become an important focal point of recent work in ethics and epistemology, yet philosophers continue to be noncommittal about what attention is. In this paper, I defend attention as selection for action in a weak form, namely that selection for action is sufficient for attention. I show that selection for action in this conception captures how we, the folk, experience it and how the cognitive
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Justification, normalcy and randomness Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Martin Smith
Some random processes, like a series of coin flips, can produce outcomes that seem particularly remarkable or striking. This paper explores an epistemic puzzle that arises when thinking about these outcomes and asking what, if anything, we can justifiably believe about them. The puzzle has no obvious solution, and any theory of epistemic justification will need to contend with it sooner or later. The
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Emotion, attention, and reason Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-15 Andrew Peet, Eli Pitcovski
Our reasons for emotions such as sadness, anger, resentment, and guilt often remain long after we cease experiencing these emotions. This is puzzling. If the reasons for these emotions persist, why do the emotions not persist? Does this constitute a failure to properly respond to our reasons? In this paper we provide a solution to this puzzle. Our solution turns on the close connection between the
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Treating people as individuals and as members of groups Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-15 Lauritz Aastrup Munch, Nicolai Knudsen
Many believe that we ought to treat people as individuals and that this form of treatment is in some sense incompatible with treating people as members of groups. Yet, the relation between these two kinds of treatments is elusive. In this paper, we develop a novel account of the normative requirement to treat people as individuals. According to this account, treating people as individuals requires
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Précis of The World According to Kant―Appearances and Things in Themselves in Critical Idealism, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2021 Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-08 Anja Jauernig
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Kantian appearances and intentional objects Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-07 Lucy Allais
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Intentional objects and experience ―Response to my critics Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-07 Anja Jauernig
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Grounding empirical in transcendental reality Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-07 Markus Kohl
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Ontologically grounding appearances in experience: Transcendental Idealism according to Anja Jauernig's The World According to Kant Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-07 Nicholas Stang
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Number nativism1 Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-02 Sam Clarke
Number Nativism is the view that humans innately represent precise natural numbers. Despite a long and venerable history, it is often considered hopelessly out of touch with the empirical record. I argue that this is a mistake. After clarifying Number Nativism and distancing it from related conjectures, I distinguish three arguments which have been seen to refute the view. I argue that, while popular
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What the golden rule teaches us about ethics Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-02 Shane William Ward
The Golden Rule is regularly used in ordinary life, across many different cultures, to acquire new moral knowledge. At the same time, the Golden Rule is widely ignored both in ethics and metaethics because it seems to be an implausible normative theory. Most philosophers who have paid it any attention have thought that, at best, it is an initially tempting thought whose appeal should be explained by
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Bad faith as true contradiction: On the dialetheist interpretation of Sartre Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-14 Jacob McNulty
This essay defends a modified version of Nahum Browns “dialetheist” interpretation of bad faith. On this interpretation, bad faith, as a form of self‐deception, constitutes a dialetheia or true contradiction. While in agreement with the dialetheist interpretation, I argue that bad faith is just as much a flight from true contradiction and towards what I call “sham consistency.” I also put forward a
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Prudential Value and Impersonal Value Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-13 Eden Lin
Prudential value is the kind of value that something has when it is good for someone, in the sense that is conceptually tied to welfare or well‐being. Impersonal value is the kind of value that something has when it is good simply, absolutely, or “from the point of view of the universe.” According to the Moorean position on prudential value, the concept of prudential value can be analyzed in terms
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Brute ignorance Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-13 Sam Carter
We know a lot about what the world is like. We know less, it seems, about what we know about what the world is like. According to a common thought, it is easier for us to come to know about the state of the world than to come to know about the state of our own knowledge. What explains this gap? An attractively simple hypothesis is that our ignorance about what we know is explained by our ignorance
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Moral equality and social hierarchy Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-12 Han van Wietmarschen
Social egalitarianism holds that justice requires that people relate to one another as equals. To explain the content of this requirement, social egalitarians often appeal to the moral equality of persons. This leads to two very different interpretations of social egalitarianism. The first involves the specification of a conception of the moral equality of persons that is distinctive of the social
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Getting back in shape: Persistence, shape, and relativity Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-06 Jack Himelright, Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez
In this paper, we will introduce a novel argument (the “Region Argument”) that objects do not have frame‐independent shapes in special relativity. The Region Argument lacks vulnerabilities present in David Chalmers' argument for that conclusion based on length contraction. We then examine how views on persistence interact with the Region Argument. We argue that this argument and standard four‐dimensionalist
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Are there subintentional actions? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-08-06 William Hornett
When I fiddle with my hair, or adjust my posture, it is plausible that these activities fall well below my cognitive radar. Some have argued that these are examples of ‘sub‐intentional actions’, actions which are not intentional under any description at all. If true, they are direct counterexamples to the dominant view on which the difference between actions and other events is their intentionality
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Credences for strict conditionals Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-30 Malte Willer
Less‐than‐certain conditional judgments pose notorious problems for strict analyses of conditionals: across their various incarnations, these analyses have trouble making sense of how conditionals could have non‐trivial probabilities in the first place; minimal constraints on how such probabilities are to be assigned, moreover, lead to results that seem at odds with a strict outlook on the semantics
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Determinism, deliberation, and responsibility Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-27 Robert Audi
In appraising human actions, an important consideration is whether they are free. If they are compelled, this may be excusatory; if controlled by someone other than the agent, this may mitigate; and if selfishly motivated, this may invalidate excuses. Moral appraisals of action by non‐philosophers do not normally consider whether it can be free under determinism. Metaphysical inquiry about action,
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Indirect evaluative voluntarism Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-24 Alex Horne
Is genuine self‐creation – understood as self‐directed value‐acquisition – possible? Many philosophers think not. I disagree. I explain why a recent attempt to solve the problem fails and use it to motivate an alternative proposal: indirect evaluative voluntarism. Indirect evaluative voluntarism is not only well‐suited to explaining how self‐creation is possible; it also unifies two important aspects
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A causal modeler's guide to double effect reasoning Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-22 Gerard J. Rothfus
Trolley problems and like cases are often thought to show the inadequacy of purely consequentialist moral theories. In particular, they are often taken to reveal that consequentialists unduly neglect the moral significance of the causal structure of decision problems. To precisify such critiques and one sort of deontological morality they motivate, I develop a formal modeling framework within which
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Chance, ability, and control Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-19 Matthew Mandelkern
This paper concerns a controversy between two compelling and popular claims in the theory of ability. One is the claim that ability requires control. The other is the claim that success entails ability, that is, that φ‐ing entails that you are able to φ. Since actually φ‐ing obviously does not entail that φ is in your control, these two claims cannot both be true. I introduce a new form of evidence
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Inquiry for the mistaken and confused Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-07-19 Arianna Falbo
Various philosophers have recently defended norms of inquiry which forbid inquiry into questions which lack true answers. I argue that these norms are overly restrictive, and that they fail to capture an important relationship between inquiry and our position as non‐ideal epistemic agents. I defend a more flexible and forgiving norm: Epistemic Improvement. According to this norm, inquiry into a question
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Two concepts of directed obligation Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-06-24 Brendan de Kenessey
This paper argues that there are two importantly distinct normative relations that can be referred to using phrases like ‘X is obligated to Y,’ ‘Y has a right against X,’ or ‘X wronged Y.’ When we say that I am obligated to you not to read your diary, one thing we might mean is that I am subject to a deontological constraint against reading your diary that gives me a non‐instrumental, agent‐relative
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Responding to second‐order reasons Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-05-31 Sophie Keeling
A rich literature has discussed what it is to respond to a reason, e.g., to believe or act on the basis of some consideration or another. In comparison, what it would be to respond to a second‐order reason has been underexplored. Yet formulating an account of this is vital for maintaining the existence of second‐order reasons in both the practical and epistemic domains. And indeed, there are reasons
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Perspectives and good dispositions Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-05-22 Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio
In some cases we can only conform to norms like Choose the best! by luck, in a way that is not creditable to us. According to the perspectivist diagnosis, the problem with such norms is that they make reference to facts that may lie outside our perspectives. The first aim of this paper is to argue that the perspectivist diagnosis of the problem of luck is not ultimately correct. The correct diagnosis
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The identity of what? Pluralism, practical interests, and individuation Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-05-21 Vilius Dranseika, Shaun Nichols, David Shoemaker
In this paper, we present a set of preregistered studies inspired by both Lockean pluralism about individuation and discussions of conjoined twinning in the contemporary personal identity debate. In combination, these studies provide evidence of folk pluralism about individuation of “individuals like us” and also ways in which individuation judgments are integral to practical interests. First, our
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States of affairs and our connection with the good Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-05-21 Miles Tucker
ionists claim that the only bearers of intrinsic value are abstract, necessarily existing states of affairs. I argue that abstractionism cannot succeed. Though we can model concrete goods such as lives, projects, and outcomes with abstract states, conflating models of goods with the goods themselves has surprising and unattractive consequences. I suggest that concrete states of affairs or facts are
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What is philosophical progress? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-05-10 Finnur Dellsén, Tina Firing, Insa Lawler, James Norton
What is it for philosophy to make progress? While various putative forms of philosophical progress have been explored in some depth, this overarching question is rarely addressed explicitly, perhaps because it has been assumed to be intractable or unlikely to have a single, unified answer. In this paper, we aim to show that the question is tractable, that it does admit of a single, unified answer,
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Why prevent human extinction? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-05-02 James Fanciullo
Many of us think human extinction would be a very bad thing, and that we have moral reasons to prevent it. But there is disagreement over what would make extinction so bad, and thus over what grounds these moral reasons. Recently, several theorists have argued that our reasons to prevent extinction stem not just from the value of the welfare of future lives, but also from certain additional values
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Internalizing rules Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-04-27 Spencer Paulson
The aim of this paper is to give an account of what it is to internalize a rule. I claim that internalization is the process of redistributing the burden of instruction from the teacher to the student. The process is complete when instruction is no longer needed, and the rule has reshaped perceptual classification of the circumstances in which it applies. Teaching a rule is the initiation of this process
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Marcus on self‐conscious knowledge of belief Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-04-18 James R. Shaw
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Replies to Leite, Shaw, and Campbell Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Eric Marcus
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Marcus on forms of judgment and the theoretical orientation of the mind Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Lucy Campbell
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Some challenges raised by unconscious belief Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Adam Leite
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Precis of belief, inference, and the self‐conscious mind Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Eric Marcus
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Regions, extensions, distances, diameters Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-04-09 Claudio Calosi
Extended simple regions have been the focus of recent developments in philosophical logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of physics. However, only a handful of works provides a rigorous characterization of an extended simple region. In particular, a recent paper in this journal defends a definition based on an extrinsic notion of least distance. Call it the Least Distance proposal. This paper provides
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Probability discounting and money pumps Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-04-05 Petra Kosonen
In response to cases that involve tiny probabilities of huge payoffs, some argue that we ought to discount small probabilities down to zero. However, this paper shows that doing so violates Independence and Continuity, and as a result of these violations, those who discount small probabilities can be exploited by money pumps. Various possible ways of avoiding exploitation will be discussed. This paper
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Parity and Pareto Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-04-02 Brian Hedden
Pareto principles are at the core of ethics and decision theory. The Strong Pareto principle says that if one thing is better than another for someone and at least as good for everyone else, then the one is overall better than the other. But a host of famous figures express it differently, with ‘not worse’ in place of ‘at least as good.’ In the presence of parity (or incommensurability), this results
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Resolving to believe: Kierkegaard's direct doxastic voluntarism Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-04-02 Z Quanbeck
According to a traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, he endorses a strong form of direct doxastic voluntarism on which we can, by brute force of will, make a “leap of faith” to believe propositions that we ourselves take to be improbable and absurd. Yet most leading Kierkegaard scholars now wholly reject this reading, instead interpreting Kierkegaard as holding that the will can affect what we
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Replies to Alex Byrne, Mike Martin, and Nico Orlandi Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-28 Berit “Brit” Brogaard
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Language and representationalism1 Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-28 Nico Orlandi
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Précis of Seeing and Saying Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-28 Berit “Brit” Brogaard
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Episodic imagining, temporal experience, and beliefs about time Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-27 Anthony Bigg, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Shira Yechimovitz
We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these
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Leibniz as a virtue ethicist Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-26 Hao Dong
In this paper I argue that Leibniz's ethics is a kind of virtue ethics where virtues of the agent are explanatorily primary. I first examine how Leibniz obtained his conception of justice as a kind of love in an early text, Elements of Natural Law. I show that in this text Leibniz's goal was to find a satisfactory definition of justice that could reconcile egoism with altruism, and that this was achieved
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The new evil demon problem at 40 Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Peter J. Graham
1 THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM I shall use ‘epistemic warrant’ and ‘epistemic justification’ interchangeably for a normative property that provides a good route to true belief and knowledge.1 Here are two facts: FACT ONE: Beliefs based on taking perceptual experiences at face value are defeasibly epistemically warranted. FACT TWO: Defeasibly taking perceptual experience at face value is a reliable route
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Knowledge‐by‐Acquaintance First Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-27 Uriah Kriegel
Bertrand Russell's epistemology had the interesting structural feature that it made propositional knowledge (“S knows that p”) asymmetrically dependent upon what Russell called knowledge by acquaintance. On this view, a subject lacking any knowledge by acquaintance would be unable to know that p for any p. This is something that virtually nobody has defended since Russell, and in this paper I initiate
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Causal modeling in multilevel settings: A new proposal Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-06 Thomas Blanchard, Andreas Hüttemann
An important question for the causal modeling approach is how to integrate non-causal dependence relations such as asymmetric supervenience into the approach. The most prominent proposal to that effect (due to Gebharter) is to treat those dependence relationships as formally analogous to causal relationships. We argue that this proposal neglects some crucial differences between causal and non-causal
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Commonsense morality and contact with value Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-29 Adam Lovett, Stefan Riedener
There seem to be many kinds of moral duties. We should keep our promises; we should pay our debts of gratitude; we should compensate those we've wronged; we should avoid doing or intending harm; we should help those in need. These constitute, some worry, an unconnected heap of duties: the realm of commonsense morality is a disorganized mess. In this paper, we outline a strategy for unifying commonsense
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Autonomy and aesthetic valuing Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-22 Nick Riggle
Accounts of aesthetic valuing emphasize two constraints on the formation of aesthetic belief. We must form our own aesthetic beliefs by engaging with aesthetic value first-hand (the acquaintance principle) and by using our own capacities (the autonomy principle). But why? C. Thi Nguyen's proposal is that aesthetic valuing has an inverted structure. We often care about inquiry and engagement for the
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Abstraction and grounding Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-12-29 Louis deRosset, Øystein Linnebo
The idea that some objects are metaphysically “cheap” has wide appeal. An influential version of the idea builds on abstractionist views in the philosophy of mathematics, on which numbers and other mathematical objects are abstracted from other phenomena. For example, Hume's Principle states that two collections have the same number just in case they are equinumerous, in the sense that they can be
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On behalf of the moral realist Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-12-25 Gideon Rosen
The overarching thesis of Clark-Doane's gripping book (Clarke-Doane, 2020) is that despite the many deep similarities between the views, realism about mathematics is a tenable position whereas moral realism is not. The closing chapters develop two main arguments for this thesis. The Argument from Safety (as I'll call it) wields a general epistemological principle to argue that moral realism leads to
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Realism, disagreement, and explanation Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-12-25 Brian Leiter
Morality and Mathematics by Justin Clarke-Doane (2020; hereafter “JCD”) is a richly argued and deeply original contribution to meta-ethics. My focus will be primarily on the arguments in Chapters 2 and 3, purporting to show that moral beliefs and mathematical beliefs are actually on a par when it comes to both a priori and a posteriori justification (what I will call the “Symmetry Thesis”).1 I start
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Inquiry beyond knowledge Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-12-08 Bob Beddor
Why engage in inquiry? According to many philosophers, the goal of inquiring into some question is to come to know its answer. While this view holds considerable appeal, this paper argues that it stands in tension with another highly attractive thesis: knowledge does not require absolute certainty. Forced to choose between these two theses, I argue that we should reject the idea that inquiry aims at