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Slurring silences Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-23 A. G. Holdier
Silence can be a communicative act. Tanesini (2018) demonstrates how “eloquent” silences can virtuously indicate resistance and dissent; in this paper, I outline one way silence can also be used viciously to cause discursive harm, specifically by slurring victims. By distinguishing between eloquent and “signaling” silences (two kinds of what I call “performative” silences), I show how “slurring” silences
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What is social organizing? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-23 Megan Hyska
While scholars of, and participants in, social movements, electoral politics, and organized labor are deeply engaged in contrasting different theories of how political actors should organize, little recent philosophical work has asked what social organizing is. This paper aims to answer this question in a way that can make sense of typical organizing‐related claims and debates. It is intuitive that
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Moral expertise as skilled practice Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-22 Sarah Stroud
Contemporary discussions of moral expertise have raised a host of problems for the very idea of a “moral expert.” This article interrogates the conception of moral expertise that such discussions seem to assume and proposes instead that we understand moral expertise as a species of practical skill. On this model, a skilled moral agent is more similar to a skilled pianist than she is to a theoretical
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The nature and value of firsthand insight Philosophical Studies (IF 1.1) Pub Date : 2024-09-21 Elijah Chudnoff
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Incommensurability, the sequence argument, and the Pareto principle Philosophical Studies (IF 1.1) Pub Date : 2024-09-19 Gustaf Arrhenius, H. Orri Stefánsson
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The boundaries of gnoseology Philosophical Studies (IF 1.1) Pub Date : 2024-09-19 Jesús Navarro, Dani Pino
According to Sosa (2015, 2021), the domain of epistemic normativity divides into gnoseology and intellectual ethics, a boundary that results from the key notion that gnoseological assessments are telic. We share this view here and highlight the implications that the telic claim has for different debates in contemporary epistemology. However, we also raise the complaint that Sosa’s analogy of the archer
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The monotonicity of essence Philosophical Studies (IF 1.1) Pub Date : 2024-09-19 William Vincent
Kit Fine’s logic of essence and his reduction of modality crucially rely on a principle called the ‘monotonicity of essence’. This principle says that for all pluralities, xx and yy, if some xx belong to some yy, then if it is essential to xx that p, it is also essential to yy that p. I argue that on the constitutive notion of essence, this principle is false. In particular, I show that this principle
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The quest for a qualitative hedonism Noûs (IF 1.8) Pub Date : 2024-09-20 Dale Dorsey
In this paper, I attempt to articulate a version of qualitative hedonism, grounded in the value theory of the British Moralists. I argue that this view is novel, presents substantial advantages over alternative hedonisms (including rival approaches to qualitative hedonism and its quantitative cousin), and can avoid classic challenges to qualitative hedonism that emerged in the post‐Mill era. If I succeed
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On Algebra Relativisation Mind (IF 1.8) Pub Date : 2024-09-20 Chloé de Canson
Katie Steele and H. Orri Stefánsson argue that, to reflect an agent’s limited awareness, the algebra of propositions on which that agent’s credences are defined should be relativised to their awareness state. I argue that this produces insurmountable difficulties. But the project of relativising the agent’s algebra to reflect their partial perspective need not be abandoned: the algebra can be relativised
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Implicit commitments of instrumental acceptance: A case study Philos. Q. (IF 1.1) Pub Date : 2024-09-20 Luca Castaldo, Maciej Głowacki
When accepting an axiomatic theory S, we are implicitly committed to various statements that are independent of its axioms. Examples of such implicit commitments include consistency statements and reflection principles for S. While foundational acceptance has received considerable attention in this context, the study of implicit commitments triggered by weaker notions remains underdeveloped. This article
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What do we do when we suspend judgement? Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-20 Anne Meylan
According to a classical view, suspension of judgement is, like belief and disbelief, a cognitive state. However, as some authors (Crawford 2022; Lord 2020; McGrath 2021a, 2021b; Sosa 2019, 2021) have pointed out, to suspend judgement is also to perform a certain mental action. The main goal of this article is to defend a precise account of the action that we take when we suspend our judgement: the
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Scientific understanding as narrative intelligibility Philosophical Studies (IF 1.1) Pub Date : 2024-09-18 Gabriel Siegel
When does a model explain? When does it promote understanding? A dominant approach to scientific explanation is the interventionist view. According to this view, when X explains Y, intervening on X can produce, prevent or alter Y in some predictable way. In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, I reject a position that many interventionist theorists endorse. This position is that to explain some
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Limited Aggregation’s Non-Fatal Non-Dilemma Australasian Journal of Philosophy (IF 1.0) Pub Date : 2024-09-18 James Hart
Limited aggregationists argue that when deciding between competing claims to aid we are sometimes required and sometimes forbidden from aggregating weaker claims to outweigh stronger claims. Joe Ho...
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Perceiving secondary qualities Philosophical Studies (IF 1.1) Pub Date : 2024-09-18 Boyd Millar
Thomas Reid famously claimed that our perceptual experiences reveal what primary qualities are in themselves, while providing us with only an obscure notion of secondary qualities. I maintain that this claim is largely correct and that, consequently, any adequate theory of perception must explain the fact that perceptual experiences provide significantly less insight into the nature of secondary qualities
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Practical Knowledge and the Structural Challenge Mind (IF 1.8) Pub Date : 2024-09-18 Lucy Campbell
Elizabeth Anscombe characterised practical knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’. As Anscombe recognised, accepting this view involves rejecting certain basic orthodox epistemological assumptions. But even once this is done, a challenge remains for a conception of practical knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’. For while practical knowledge would appear to be a kind of propositional knowledge, intentions
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Freedom of thought Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-18 Matthew Chrisman
This paper develops a novel conception of freedom of thought as the right to epistemic self‐realization. The recognition of this right is characterized here as a modally robust normative status that I think one has as a potential knower in an epistemic community. It is a status that one cannot enjoy without a specific form of institutionalized intellectual respect and support. To explain and defend
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How emotions grasp value Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-18 Antti Kauppinen
It's plausible that we only fully appreciate the value of something, say a painting or a blameworthy action, when we have a fitting emotional response to it, such as admiration or guilt. But exactly how and why do we grasp value through emotion? I propose, first, that a subject S phenomenally grasps property P only if what it is to be P is manifest in the phenomenal character of S's experience. Second
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Unification without pragmatism Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-18 Keshav Singh
Both actions and beliefs are subject to normative evaluation as rational or irrational. As such, we might expect there to be some general, unified story about what makes them rational. However, orthodox approaches suggest that the rationality of action is determined by practical considerations, while the rationality of belief is determined by properly epistemic considerations. This apparent disunity
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Attention as selection for action defended Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Wayne Wu
Attention has become an important focal point of recent work in ethics and epistemology, yet philosophers continue to be noncommittal about what attention is. In this paper, I defend attention as selection for action in a weak form, namely that selection for action is sufficient for attention. I show that selection for action in this conception captures how we, the folk, experience it and how the cognitive
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Justification, normalcy and randomness Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Martin Smith
Some random processes, like a series of coin flips, can produce outcomes that seem particularly remarkable or striking. This paper explores an epistemic puzzle that arises when thinking about these outcomes and asking what, if anything, we can justifiably believe about them. The puzzle has no obvious solution, and any theory of epistemic justification will need to contend with it sooner or later. The
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Zetetic supererogation Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Jaakko Hirvelä
Several authors have recently argued that knowledge is not the aim of inquiry since it can make sense to inquire into a question even though one knows the answer. I argue that this a faulty diagnostic for determining whether one has met the constitutive standard of success of an activity type. The constitutive standards of success tell us when an activity is successful, but such standards can be exceeded
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Structural encroachment Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Aliosha Barranco Lopez
Moral encroachment states that moral factors can make a difference to what we are epistemically justified in believing. I present two motivating cases that resemble a common example in the moral encroachment literature to show that the agent's commitments and beliefs, and not the moral factors of the situation, influence epistemic justification. I call this view Structural Encroachment.
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Subjectivism and the morally conscientious person's concern to avoid acting wrongly Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Peter A. Graham
Subjectivism about moral wrongness is the view that the moral wrongness of an action (if and how wrong that action is) is grounded solely in facts about the agent's mental state at the time of action. Antisubjectivism is the denial of subjectivism. I offer an argument against subjectivism, and for antisubjectivism, based on an examination of the main concern of the morally conscientious person, viz
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Being understood Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Samuel Dishaw
Philosophical work in the ethics of thought focuses heavily on the ethics of belief, with, in recent years, a particular emphasis on the ways in which we might wrong other people either through our beliefs about them, or our failure to believe what they tell us. Yet in our own lives we often want not merely to be believed, but rather to be understood by others. What does it take to understand another
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The value of incoherence Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Claire Field
I argue that level‐incoherence is epistemically valuable in a specific set of epistemic environments: those in which it is easy to acquire justified false beliefs about normative requirements of epistemic rationality. I argue that in these environments level‐incoherence is the rationally dominant strategy. Nevertheless, level‐incoherent combinations exhibit a distinctive tension, and this tension has
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Doxastic dilemmas and epistemic blame Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Sebastian Schmidt
What should we believe when epistemic and practical reasons pull in opposite directions? The traditional view states that there is something that we ought epistemically to believe and something that we ought practically to (cause ourselves to) believe, period. More recent accounts challenge this view, either by arguing that there is something that we ought simpliciter to believe, all epistemic and
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Is moral understanding a kind of moral vision? Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Alison Hills
Understanding is often descibed as a kind of “seeing”, and that would make moral understanding a kidn of moral vision. Recently the idea of moral perception has been explored. I suggest that the identification of moral understanding with moral perception is promising, as it seems to give a good account of what is distinctively valuable about moral understanding. But in the end it faces a difficult
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Non‐ideal epistemic rationality Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Nick Hughes
I develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non‐ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non‐ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.
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Blaming the victim Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Paulina Sliwa
Feminists critique acts and practices as victim‐blaming. Victim‐blaming is a moral phenomenon: to call a communicative act victim blaming is to criticise it. It is also a political phenomenon. As feminists point out, it plays a important role in perpetuating oppression. But what makes a communicative act an act of victim‐blaming? I propose that victim‐blaming communicative acts attribute responsibility
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Emotions and the phenomenal grasping of epistemic blameworthiness Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Tricia Magalotti
In this paper, I consider the potential implications of the observation that epistemic judgment seems to be less emotional than moral judgment. I argue that regardless of whether emotions are necessary for blame, blaming emotions do play an important epistemic role in the moral domain. They allow us to grasp propositions about moral blameworthiness and thereby to appreciate their significance in a
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Gratitude and believing in someone Philosophical Issues (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-17 Max Lewis
I aim to vindicate the claim that we can owe someone gratitude for believing in us and to show how this seemingly prosaic fact has important upshots for the normativity of gratitude. I start by sketching a novel account of what it is to believe in someone according to which it consists in holding an affective attitude of confident optimism toward their general ability in some domain(s). I then argue
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Emotion, attention, and reason Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-15 Andrew Peet, Eli Pitcovski
Our reasons for emotions such as sadness, anger, resentment, and guilt often remain long after we cease experiencing these emotions. This is puzzling. If the reasons for these emotions persist, why do the emotions not persist? Does this constitute a failure to properly respond to our reasons? In this paper we provide a solution to this puzzle. Our solution turns on the close connection between the
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Treating people as individuals and as members of groups Philos. Phenomenol. Res. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-09-15 Lauritz Aastrup Munch, Nicolai Knudsen
Many believe that we ought to treat people as individuals and that this form of treatment is in some sense incompatible with treating people as members of groups. Yet, the relation between these two kinds of treatments is elusive. In this paper, we develop a novel account of the normative requirement to treat people as individuals. According to this account, treating people as individuals requires
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Galileo's ship and the relativity principle Noûs (IF 1.8) Pub Date : 2024-09-14 Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez
It is widely acknowledged that the Galilean Relativity Principle, according to which the laws of classical systems are the same in all inertial frames in relative motion, has played an important role in the development of modern physics. It is also commonly believed that this principle holds the key to answering why, for example, we do not notice the orbital velocity of the Earth as we go about our
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Each counts for one Philosophical Studies (IF 1.1) Pub Date : 2024-09-11 Daniel Muñoz
After 50 years of debate, the ethics of aggregation has reached a curious stalemate, with both sides arguing that only their theory treats people as equals. I argue that, on the issue of equality, both sides are wrong. From the premise that “each counts for one,” we cannot derive the conclusion that “more count for more” or its negation. The familiar arguments from equality to aggregation presuppose
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Keeping ideology in its place Philosophical Studies (IF 1.1) Pub Date : 2024-09-11 Dan Moller
Most people don’t want their teachers, scientists, or journalists to be too ideological. Calling someone an “ideologue” isn’t a compliment. But what is ideology and why exactly is it a threat? I propose that ideology is fruitfully understood in terms of three ingredients: a basic moral claim, a worldview built on top of that claim, and the attempt to politicize this worldview by injecting it into social
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What are problems? Philosophical Studies (IF 1.1) Pub Date : 2024-09-11 Hakob Barseghyan, Paul Patton, Guillaume Dechauffour, Carlin Henikoff
Building off the recent work on the semantics of problem, we suggest a more general account that encompasses problems of all agents, human or nonhuman, individual or communal. Situation X is a problem for agent A, iff situation X is at odds with the agent’s goal G and removing the discrepancy between X and G presents some difficulty for agent A. In addition, for agent A to actually have a problem,
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Gender identity: the subjective fit account Philosophical Studies (IF 1.1) Pub Date : 2024-09-11 Rach Cosker-Rowland
This paper proposes a new account of gender identity on which for A to have gender G as part of their gender identity is for A to not take G not to fit them (or to positively take G to fit them). It argues that this subjective fit account of gender identity fits well with trans people’s testimony and both trans and cis people’s experiences of their genders. The subjective fit account also avoids the
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Six Roles for Inclination Mind (IF 1.8) Pub Date : 2024-09-11 Zach Barnett
Initially, you judge that p. You then learn that most experts disagree. All things considered, you believe that the experts are probably right. Still, p continues to seem right to you, in some sense. You don’t yet see what, if anything, is wrong with your original reasoning. In such a case, we’ll say that you are ‘inclined’ toward p. This paper explores various roles that this state of inclination
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Notes on Contributors Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 227-227, October 2024.
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Charlotte Witt, Social Goodness: The Ontology of Social Norms Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Åsa Burman
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 222-226, October 2024.
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Nicholas Vrousalis, Exploitation as Domination: What Makes Capitalism Unjust Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Benjamin Ferguson
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 217-222, October 2024.
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Theron Pummer, The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Peter Murphy
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 213-217, October 2024.
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Fabienne Peter, The Grounds of Political Legitimacy Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Dorota Mokrosinska
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 206-212, October 2024.
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David Owens, Bound by Convention: Obligation and Social Rules Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Jeffrey Kaplan
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 202-206, October 2024.
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Jake Monaghan, Just Policing Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Daniel Muñoz
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 194-201, October 2024.
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Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way, Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Reasons, and Value Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Christopher Howard
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 189-194, October 2024.
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Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, The Beam and the Mote: On Blame, Standing, and Normativity Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Justin Snedegar
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 184-189, October 2024.
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Stephen Ingram, Robust Realism in Ethics: Normative Arbitrariness, Interpersonal Dialogue, and Moral Objectivity Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Olle Risberg
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 179-184, October 2024.
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Luara Ferracioli, Parenting and the Goods of Childhood Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Elizabeth Cripps
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 175-179, October 2024.
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Myisha Cherry, Failures of Forgiveness: What We Get Wrong and How to Do Better Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Céline Leboeuf
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 171-175, October 2024.
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Peter Brian Barry, George Orwell: The Ethics of Equality Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Iskra Fileva
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 166-171, October 2024.
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Impermissible Altruism: A Response to Pummer Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Iskra Fileva
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 151-165, October 2024.
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Mistakes in the Moral Mathematics of Existential Risk Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 David Thorstad
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 122-150, October 2024.
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The Particularist Challenge to Kantian Ethics Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Irina Schumski
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 88-121, October 2024.
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The Right to Be Forgotten and the Value of an Open Future Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Lowry Pressly
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 65-87, October 2024.
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Amnesia and Punishment Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Austen McDougal
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 36-64, October 2024.
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Back to Class: From Equality of Educational Opportunity to Social Equality Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Ryan Cox
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 5-35, October 2024.
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From the Editor Ethics (IF 4.6) Pub Date : 2024-09-09 Douglas W. Portmore
Ethics, Volume 135, Issue 1, Page 1-4, October 2024.