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Constraining the Compression: Thermodynamic Depth and Composition Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Majid D Beni
This paper examines Bird's account of restricted compositionality in terms of compression of information. Additionally, this paper proposes an alternative perspective (to Bird's) that links compositionality to the Free Energy Principle and the minimisation of collective entropy. Emphasising functional integration, this criterion provides a more focused and relatively more objective (patternist) account
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The Cautionary Account of Supererogation Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-17 Seyyed Mohsen Eslami, Alfred Archer
The problem of supererogation has attracted significant attention from contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we show that this problem was outlined in different terms in the work of the 11th century Persian philosopher Abū Alī Miskawayh. As well as identifying this problem, Miskawayh also developed a unique solution cashed out in terms of virtue ethics that has not yet been considered in
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‘Just The Facts’: Thick Concepts and Hermeneutical Misfit Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-17 Rowan Bell
Oppressive ideology regularly misrepresents features of structural injustice as normal or appropriate. I argue that resisting such injustice therefore requires critical examination of the evaluative judgments encoded in shared concepts. I diagnose a mechanism of ideological misevaluation, which I call hermeneutical misfit. Hermeneutical misfit occurs when thick concepts, or concepts which both describe
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Why Perceptual Experiences cannot be Probabilistic Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-16 Matteo Colombo, Nir Fresco
Perceptual Confidence is the thesis that perceptual experiences can be probabilistic. This thesis has been defended and criticised based on a variety of phenomenological, epistemological, and explanatory arguments. One gap in these arguments is that they neglect the question of whether perceptual experiences satisfy the formal conditions that define the notion of probability to which Perceptual Confidence
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Smelling things Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Giulia Martina, Matthew Nudds
In this paper, we outline and defend a view on which in olfactory experience we can, and often do, smell ordinary things of various kinds—for instance, cookies, coffee, and cake burnings—and the olfactory properties they have. A challenge to this view are cases of smelling in the absence of the source of a smell, such as when a fishy smell lingers after the fish is gone. Such cases, many philosophers
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Pleasure, Pain, and Pluralism about Well-Being Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Eden Lin
Pluralistic theories of well-being might appear unable to accommodate just how important pleasure and pain are to well-being. Intuitively, there is a finite limit to how well your life can go for you if it goes badly enough hedonically (e.g. because you never feel any pleasure and you spend two years in unrelenting agony). But if there is some basic good distinct from pleasure, as any pluralistic theory
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Understanding Artificial Agency Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Leonard Dung
Which artificial intelligence (AI) systems are agents? To answer this question, I propose a multidimensional account of agency. According to this account, a system's agency profile is jointly determined by its level of goal-directedness and autonomy as well as is abilities for directly impacting the surrounding world, long-term planning and acting for reasons. Rooted in extant theories of agency, this
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Towards Affective-Evaluativism: the Intentional Structure of Unpleasant Pain Experience Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-01-25 Jonathan Mitchell
Evaluativism about unpleasant pains offers one way to think about unpleasant pain experience. However, extant Evaluativist views do not pay enough attention to the affective dimension of pain experience and the complex relations between the affective, evaluative and sensory dimensions. This paper clarifies these relations and provides a view which more closely reflects the phenomenology of unpleasant
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Whose Uptake Matters? Sexual Refusal and the Ethics of Uptake Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-01-22 Rebecca E Harrison, Kai Tanter
What role does audience uptake play in determining whether a speaker refuses or consents to sex? Proponents of constitution theories of uptake argue that which speech act a speaker performs is largely determined by their addressee's uptake. However, this appears to entail a troubling result: a speaker might be made to perform a speech act of consent against her will. In response, we develop a Social
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Putting Wronging First Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-01-22 Daniel Webber
I argue that an act can be wrong because it wrongs a particular person. I then show how this thesis serves as a constraint on moral theories, using Kantian ethics as a case study.
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Epistemic Arguments for a Democratic Right to Silence Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-01-19 Dan Degerman, Francesca Bellazzi
While much ink has been spilt over the political importance of speech, much less has been dedicated to the political importance of silence. This article seeks to fill that gap. We propose the need for a robust, democratic right to silence in public life and argue that there are politically salient epistemic reasons for recognising that right. We begin by defining what silence is and what a robust right
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Blameworthiness is Terminable Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-01-11 Benjamin Matheson
A theory of blameworthiness must answer two fundamental questions. First, what makes a person blameworthy when they act? Secondly, what makes a person blameworthy after the time of action? Two main answers have been given to the second question. According to interminability theorists, blameworthiness necessarily doesn't even diminish over time. Terminability theorists deny this. In this paper, I argue
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Wondering and Epistemic Desires Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-01-09 Richard Teague
This paper explores the relationship between the questioning attitude of wondering and a class of attitudes I call epistemic desires. Broadly, these are desires to improve one’s epistemic position on some question. A common example is the attitude of wanting to know the answer to some question. I argue that one can have any kind of epistemic desire towards any question, Q, without necessarily wondering
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An Alleged Tension Between non-Classical Logics and Applied Classical Mathematics Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-01-05 Sebastian Horvat, Iulian D Toader
Timothy Williamson has recently argued that the applicability of classical mathematics in the natural and social sciences raises a problem for the endorsement, in non-mathematical domains, of a wide range of non-classical logics. We first reconstruct his argument and present its restriction to the case of quantum logic (QL). Then we show that there is no problematic tension between the applicability
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Disjunctivism and the Paradox of Tragedy Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-12-28 Richard Gaskin
The paper offers a disjunctivist solution to the paradox of tragedy. The first part of the paper defends a version of disjunctivism as that doctrine is understood in the epistemology of perception, and contrasts it with its rival, conjunctivism. In the second part of the paper, it is argued that the traditional paradox of tragedy—the question why tragedy gives pleasure—can be solved by adopting a disjunctivist
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Pregnant Thinkers Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-12-22 David Mark Kovacs
Do pregnant mothers have foetuses as parts? According to the ‘parthood view’, they do, while according to the ‘containment view’, they don’t. This paper raises a novel puzzle about pregnancy: If mothers have their foetuses as parts, then wherever there is a pregnant mother, there is also a smaller thinking being that has every part of the mother except for those that overlap with the foetus. This problem
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Imagining Out of Hope Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-12-20 Steve Humbert-Droz, Juliette Vazard
Both lay people and philosophers assume that hoping for something implies imagining it. According to contemporary philosophical accounts of hope, hope involves an element of imagination as input, part, or output of hope. However, there is no systematic view of the interaction between hope and the different processes constituting imagination. In this paper we put forward a view of (i) the kind of imaginings
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Of the Perfect and the Ordinary: Indistinguishability and Hallucination Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-12-19 Shivam Patel
The claim that perfect hallucination is introspectively indistinguishable from perception has been a centrepiece of philosophical theorizing about sense experience. The most common interpretation of the indistinguishability claim is modal: that it is impossible to distinguish perfect hallucination from perception through introspection alone. I run through various models of introspection and show that
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How Imagination Informs Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-12-18 Joshua Myers
An influential objection to the epistemic power of the imagination holds that it is uninformative. You cannot get more out of the imagination than you put into it, and therefore learning from the imagination is impossible. This paper argues, against this view, that the imagination is robustly informative. Moreover, it defends a novel account of how the imagination informs, according to which the imagination
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Asking Expresses a Desire to Know Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-12-18 Peter van Elswyk
A speaker's use of a sentence does more than contribute content to a conversation. It also expresses the speaker's attitude. This essay is about which attitude or attitudes are expressed by using an interrogative sentence to ask a question. With reference to eight lines of data about how questions are circulated in conversation, it is argued that a desire to know the question's answer(s) is expressed
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Wittgenstein on Proof and Concept-Formation Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-12-11 Sorin Bangu
In his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein claims, puzzlingly, that ‘the proof creates a new concept’ (RFM III-41). This paper aims to contribute to clarifying this idea, and to showing how it marks a major break with the traditional conception of proof. Moreover, since the most natural way to understand his claim is open to criticism, a secondary goal of what follows is to offer
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Rights and the Good Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-12-11 Ariel Zylberman
What is the connection between moral rights and the good? While familiar normative theories give justificatory precedence to one notion over the other, this paper explores a neglected alternative: when properly specified, the notion of moral rights and of the good conceptually depend on each other.1
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Imagining the Past of the Present Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-12-09 Mark Windsor
Some objects we value because they afford a felt connection with people, events or places connected with their past. Visiting Canterbury cathedral, you encounter the place where, in 1170, Archbishop Thomas Becket was murdered by four knights of Henry II. Knowing that you are standing in the very place where Becket's blood was spilled gives the past event a sense of tangible reality. One feels ‘in touch
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A Phasalist Approach to Coincidence Puzzles Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-12-07 Justin Mooney
The phasalist solution to the classic puzzle of the statue and the piece of clay only works for some coincidence puzzles and not others. To address this limitation of phasalism, I develop a novel approach to coincidence puzzles that permits different kinds of coincidence puzzles to be solved in different ways, provided that each solution satisfies certain constraints inspired by the phasalist solution
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What can We Know about Unanswerable Questions? Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-11-29 Thomas Raleigh
I present two arguments that aim to establish logical limits on what we can know. More specifically, I argue for two results concerning what we can know about questions that we cannot answer. I also discuss a line of thought, found in the writings of Pierce and of Rescher, in support of the idea that we cannot identify specific scientific questions that will never be answered.
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Possible Worlds as Propositions Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-11-27 Daniel Deasy
Realists about possible worlds typically identify possible worlds with abstract objects, such as propositions or properties. However, they face a significant objection due to Lewis (1986), to the effect that there is no way to explain how possible worlds-as-abstract objects represent possibilities. In this paper, I describe a response to this objection on behalf of realists. The response is to identify
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Two Ways of Limiting Moral Demands Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-10-20 Lukas Naegeli
How should we respond to moral theories that put excessive demands on individual agents? Intramoral strategies concern the content of morality and set limits on how exacting moral demands may be. Extramoral strategies concern the normative status of morality and set limits on how significant moral demands may be. While both strategies are often discussed separately, I focus on a specific aspect of
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Self-Effacing Reasons and Epistemic Constraints: Some Lessons from the Knowability Paradox Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-10-20 Massimiliano Carrara, Davide Fassio
A minimal constraint on normative reasons seems to be that if some fact is a reason for an agent to φ (act, believe, or feel), the agent could come to know that fact. This constraint is threatened by a well-known type of counterexamples. Self-effacing reasons are facts that intuitively constitute reasons for an agent to φ, but that if they were to become known, they would cease to be reasons for that
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Transparency and the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-10-20 Victor Lange, Thor Grünbaum
Many philosophers endorse the Transparency Thesis, the claim that by introspection one cannot become aware of one's experience. Recently, some authors have suggested that the Transparency Thesis is challenged by introspective states reached under mindfulness. We label this the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis. The present paper develops the hypothesis in important new ways. First, we motivate the hypothesis
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Work Hours, Free Time, and Economic Output Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-10-11 Tom Parr
My aim in this article is to contribute to defences of working time policies by attempting to meet an objection that comes from those who condemn these measures on the alleged grounds that they reduce economic output. What is more, as I emphasize throughout, it is possible to rebut such a concern in a fashion that is consistent with the demands of liberal anti-perfectionism. In itself, this is a philosophically
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How to Explain the Importance of Persons Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-10-10 Christopher Register
We commonly explain the distinctive prudential and moral status of persons in terms of our mental capacities. I draw from recent work to argue that the common explanation is incomplete. I then develop a new explanation: We are ethically important because we are the object of a pattern of self-concern. I argue that the view solves moral problems posed by permissive ontologies, such as the recent personite
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Why Must Incompatibility Be Symmetric? Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-09-05 Ryan Simonelli
Why must incompatibility be symmetric? An odd question, but recent work in the semantics of non-classical logic, which appeals to the notion of incompatibility as a primitive and defines negation in terms of it, has brought this question to the fore. Francesco Berto proposes such a semantics for negation argues that, since incompatibility must be symmetric, double negation introduction must be a law
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Two Conceptions of Instrumental Thought Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-09-05 Rory O’Connell
According to a dominant assumption the truth of instrumental thoughts—thoughts in which one action is identified as a means to another—are not affected by agents’ normative conceptions of their ends. Agents could in principle grasp these thoughts, and thereby the correct means to their ends, without consulting any conception they may have as to the pursuit-worthiness of those ends. I argue this assumption
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Solidarity and the Work of Moral Understanding Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-08-29 Samuel Dishaw
Because moral understanding involves a distinctly first-personal grasp of moral matters, there is a temptation to think of its value primarily in terms of achievements that reflect well on its possessor: the moral worth of one's action or the virtue of one's character. These explanations, I argue, do not do full justice to the importance of moral understanding in our moral lives. Of equal importance
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Veridicalism and Scepticism Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-08-24 Yuval Avnur
According to veridicalism, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are typically true, and can constitute knowledge, even if you are in some global sceptical scenario. Even if you are a victim of Descartes’ demon, you can still know that there are tables, for example. Accordingly, even if you don’t know whether you are in some such scenario, you still know that there are tables. This refutes
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Metacontexts and Cross-Contextual Communication: Stabilizing the Content of Documents Across Contexts Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-07-26 Alex Davies
Context-sensitive expressions appear ill suited to the purpose of sharing content across contexts. Yet we regularly use them to that end (in regulations, textbooks, memos, guidelines, laws, minutes, etc.). This paper describes the utility of the concept of a metacontext for understanding cross-contextual content-sharing with context-sensitive expressions. A metacontext is the context of a group of
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Failure and Success in Agency Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-07-26 David Heering
Agency often consists in performing actions and engaging in activities that are successful. We pour glasses, catch objects, carry things, recite poems, and play instruments. It has therefore seemed tempting in recent philosophical thinking to conceptualise the relationship between our agentive abilities and our successes as follows: (Success) S is exercising their ability to ϕ only if S successfully
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What is Structural Rationality? Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-07-20 Wooram Lee
The normativity of so-called ‘coherence’ or ‘structural’ requirements of rationality has been hotly debated in recent years. However, relatively little has been said about the nature of structural rationality, or what makes a set of attitudes structurally irrational, if structural rationality is not ultimately a matter of responding correctly to reasons. This paper develops a novel account of incoherence
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A Duty not to Remain Silent: Hypocrisy and the Lack of Standing not to Blame Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-07-20 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
A notable feature of our practice of blaming is that blamees can dismiss blame for their own blameworthy actions when the blamer is censuring them hypocritically and, as it is often put, lacks standing to blame them as a result. This feature has received a good deal of philosophical attention in recent years. By contrast, no attention has been given the possibility that, likewise, refraining from blaming
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Promising by Normative Assurance Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-07-11 Luca Passi
This paper develops a new theory of the morality of promissory obligations. T. M. Scanlon notoriously argued that promising consists in assuring the promisee that we will do something. I disagree. I argue that it is true that promising consists in assuring the promisee, but what the promisor gives to the promisee is not an assurance that they will do something, but that the normative situation is in
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The Threat of Anti-Theism: What is at Stake in the Axiology of God? Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-07-10 Brian Scott Ballard
Would God's existence be a good thing for us? According to anti-theism, the answer is No. Probably, many theists will want to reject anti-theism. But it isn’t obvious why. After all, whether p is good for us is logically independent from whether p is true. So anti-theism seems entirely compatible with theism. In this essay, however, I argue this seeming compatibility is mistaken. If anti-theism is
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Strawson’s Account of Morality and its Implications for Central Themes in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-06-26 Benjamin De Mesel, Stefaan E Cuypers
We argue that P. F. Strawson's hugely influential account of moral responsibility in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (FR) is inextricably bound up with his barely known account of morality in ‘Social Morality and Individual Ideal’ (SMII). Reading FR through the lens of SMII has at least three far-reaching implications. First, the ethics–morality distinction in SMII gives content to Strawson's famous distinction
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Attribution and Explanation in Relativism Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-05-29 Gurpreet Rattan
Is relativism a coherent thesis? The paper argues for a new view of relativism that opposes both classic and contemporary views. On this view, the thesis of relativism is coherent even if the key notions in the standard apparatus of relativism—of alternative conceptual schemes, relative truth, perspectival content—are all incoherent. The view defended here highlights issues about attitude attribution
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Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-05-24 Cameron Boult
We regularly make graded normative judgements in the epistemic domain. Recent work in the literature examines degrees of justification, degrees of rationality, and degrees of assertability. This paper addresses a different dimension of the gradeability of epistemic normativity, one that has been given little attention. How should we understand degrees of epistemic criticizability? In virtue of what
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Realism and the Value of Explanation Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-05-10 Samuel John Andrews
Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient
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The Trolley Problem in the Ethics of Autonomous Vehicles Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-05-08 Norbert Paulo
In 2021, Germany passed the first law worldwide that regulates dilemma situations with autonomous cars. Against this background, this article investigates the permissibility of trade-offs between human lives in the context of self-driving cars. It does so by drawing on the debate about the traditional trolley problem. In contrast to most authors in the relevant literature, it argues that the debate
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What’s your Opinion? Negation and ‘Weak’ Attitude Verbs Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-05-02 Henry Ian Schiller
Attitude verbs like ‘believe’ and ‘want’ exhibit neg-raising: an ascription of the form a doesn’t believe that p tends to convey that a disbelieves—i.e., believes the negation of—p. In ‘Belief is Weak’, Hawthore et al. observe that neg-raising does not occur with verbs like ‘know’ or ‘need’. According to them, an ascription of the form a believes that p is true just in case a is in a belief state that
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Pain Linguistics: A Case for Pluralism Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-04-20 Sabrina Coninx, Pascale Willemsen, Kevin Reuter
The most common approach to understanding the semantics of the concept of pain is third-person thought experiments. By contrast, the most frequent and most relevant uses of the folk concept of pain are from a first-person perspective in conversational settings. In this paper, we use a set of linguistic tools to systematically explore the semantics of what people communicate when reporting pain from
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Schaffer, Sherlock and Shaddai Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-04-19 Hezki Symonds
According to Schaffer, most of the controversial entities that ontologists debate exist. Schaffer calls this view permissivism and he defends it by appealing to easy arguments for the existence of the entities in question. Schaffer presents several easy arguments, but his easy argument for fictional characters and his easy argument for God play a crucial role in his defence of permissivism. In this
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Response to LÖhr: Why We Still Need a New Normativism Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-04-19 Javier Gomez-Lavin, Matthew Rachar
Guido Löhr's recent article makes several insightful and productive suggestions about how to proceed with the empirical study of collective action. However, their critique of the conclusions drawn in Gomez-Lavin & Rachar (2022) is undermined by some issues with the interpretation of the debate and paper. This discussion article clears up those issues, presents new findings from experiments developed
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Legislating Taste Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-04-17 Kenneth Walden
My aesthetic judgements seem to make claims on you. While some popular accounts of aesthetic normativity say that the force of these claims is third-personal, I argue that it is actually second-personal. This point may sound like a bland technicality, but it points to a novel idea about what aesthetic judgements ultimately are and what they do. It suggests, in particular, that aesthetic judgements
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A Deductive Solution to the Generalisation Problem for Horwich’s Minimalism about Truth Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-04-17 Ralf Busse
Minimalism is the view that our concept of truth is constituted by our disposition to accept instances of the truth schema ‘The proposition that p is true if and only if p’. The generalisation problem is the challenge to account for universal generalisations concerning logical truths such as ‘Every proposition of the form 〈if p, then p〉 is true’. This paper argues that such generalisations can be deduced
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Cross-Domain Descriptions: The Sensory and the Psychological Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-04-14 Michelle Liu
Cross-domain descriptions are descriptions of features pertaining to one domain in terms of vocabulary primarily associated with another domain. Notably, we routinely describe psychological features in terms of the sensory domain and vice versa. Sorrow is said to be ‘bitter’ and fear ‘cold’. Music can be described as ‘happy’, ‘sad’, ‘mournful’, and so on. Such descriptions are rife in both everyday
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Sidestepping the Frege–Geach Problem Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-04-12 Graham Bex-Priestley, Will Gamester
Hybrid expressivists claim to solve the Frege–Geach problem by offloading the explanation of the logico-semantic properties of moral sentences onto the belief-components of hybrid states they express. We argue that this strategy is undermined by one of hybrid expressivism's own commitments: That the truth of the belief-component is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of the hybrid state
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Restricted Composition is Information Compression Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-04-10 Alexander Bird
This paper proposes and examines an answer to the special composition question—complex objects compress information about their parts. I start by defending fastenation for material objects and then extract from fastenation the idea that the conjoinment of parts establishes correlations among the locations and motions of those parts. I move from this to the proposal that entities are parts of some object
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Trust, Distrust, and ‘Medical Gaslighting’ Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-04-07 Elizabeth Barnes
When are we obligated to believe someone? To what extent are people authorities about their own experiences? What kind of harm might we enact when we doubt? Questions like these lie at the heart of many debates in social and feminist epistemology, and they’re the driving issue behind a key conceptual framework in these debates—gaslighting. But while the concept of gaslighting has provided fruitful
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Knowing, Telling, Trusting Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-04-05 Richard Holton
This paper falls into three parts. The first looks at wh-constructions, focussing on the so-called factual whs, ‘X knows where… ’, ‘when’, ‘who’, ‘what’ etc. I suggest, drawing on both linguistic considerations and evidence from developmental psychology, that these constructions take things as their objects, not propositions; and that this may be why they are learned before those taking sentential
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Shared Agency and Mutual Obligations: A Pluralist Account Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-04-04 Jules Salomone-Sehr
Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree
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Parity versus Ignorance Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-04-03 Moritz Schulz
Why are hard decisions hard? According to the incomparabilists, hard choices are hard because the options cannot be compared. Proponents of parity hold that hard choices are hard because the options can be compared but only in terms of a fourth value relation—parity—in addition to the three standard relations: better, worse, and equally good. Others claim that hard choices are hard because it is vague
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Diagnosing Institutionalized ‘Distrustworthiness’ Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2023-03-30 Miranda Fricker
I consider Katherine Hawley's commitment account of interpersonal trustworthiness alongside her sceptical challenge regarding the value of philosophically modelling institutional trustworthiness as distinct from reliability. I argue, pace Hawley's challenge, that there would be significant diagnostic and explanatory loss if we were to content ourselves with ideas of institutional (un)reliability alone;