The exportation of fast reactors with a closed nuclear fuel cycle to countries that do not have nuclear weapons could commence within the next few decades, which will require strengthening the non-proliferation regime and improving the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. Both requirements can be achieved by improving the system of accounting and management of nuclear materials and the reliability of their physical protection. It is well known that the current errors of the accounting and control system do not guarantee the implementation of the non-proliferation regime. The achievable errors and the required time and labor will have to be determined so that the accounting and control system would allow a conclusion about unauthorized interference in the fuel reprocessing process and, consequently, compliance/violation of the nonproliferation regime. The system of physical protection of nuclear material is better prepared for monitoring the non-proliferation regime, but additional studies of its stability on the territory of the importing state are needed.

未来几十年内可能会开始向没有核武器的国家出口具有封闭核燃料循环的快堆，这将需要加强不扩散制度并提高原子能机构保障监督的有效性。这两个要求都可以通过改进核材料的核算和管理系统及其实物保护的可靠性来实现。众所周知，当前的核算和控制系统的错误并不能保证防扩散制度的实施。必须确定可实现的错误以及所需的时间和劳动力，以便会计和控制系统能够得出关于未经授权干预燃料后处理过程的结论，从而导致遵守/违反不扩散制度。