The exportation of fast reactors with a closed nuclear fuel cycle to countries that do not have nuclear weapons could commence within the next few decades, which will require strengthening the non-proliferation regime and improving the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. Both requirements can be achieved by improving the system of accounting and management of nuclear materials and the reliability of their physical protection. It is well known that the current errors of the accounting and control system do not guarantee the implementation of the non-proliferation regime. The achievable errors and the required time and labor will have to be determined so that the accounting and control system would allow a conclusion about unauthorized interference in the fuel reprocessing process and, consequently, compliance/violation of the nonproliferation regime. The system of physical protection of nuclear material is better prepared for monitoring the non-proliferation regime, but additional studies of its stability on the territory of the importing state are needed.
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Translated from Atomnaya Énergiya, Vol. 130, No. 4, pp. 48–51, April, 2021.
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Gorin, N.V., Voloshin, N.P., Churikov, Y.I. et al. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Security on Exportation of Fast Reactors with a Closed Fuel Cycle. At Energy 130, 53–56 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10512-021-00773-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10512-021-00773-0