Masuda et al. (Games Econ Behav 83:73–85, 2014) showed that the minimum approval mechanism (AM) implements the efficient level of public good theoretically and experimentally in a linear public good game. We extent this result to a two-players common pool resource (CPR) game. The AM adds a second stage into the extraction game. In the first stage, each group member proposes his level of extraction. In the second stage, the proposed extractions and associated payoffs are displayed and each player is asked to approve or to disapprove both proposed extractions. If both players approve, the proposals are implemented. Otherwise, a uniform level of extraction, the disapproval benchmark (DB), is imposed onto each player. We consider three different DBs: the minimum proposal (MIN), the maximum proposal (MAX) and the Nash extraction level (NASH). We derive theoretical predictions for each DB following backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS). We first underline the strength of the AM, by showing that the MIN implements the optimum theoretically and experimentally. The sub-games predicted under the NASH are Pareto improving with respect to the Nash equilibrium. The MAX leads, either to Pareto improving outcomes with respect to the free access extractions, or to a Pareto degradation. Our experimental results show that the MAX and the NASH reduce the level of over-extraction of the CPR. The MAX leads above all to larger reductions of (proposed and realized) extractions than the NASH.

增田等。(Games Econ Behav 83:73–85, 2014) 表明最小批准机制 (AM) 在线性公共物品博弈中从理论上和实验上实现公共物品的有效水平。我们将此结果扩展到两人公共池资源 (CPR) 游戏。AM 在提取游戏中添加了第二阶段。在第一阶段，每个小组成员提出他的提取水平。在第二阶段，显示提议的提取和相关的收益，并要求每个玩家批准或不同意这两个提议的提取。如果双方都同意，提案就会被执行。否则，会对每个玩家施加统一的提取级别，即不赞成基准( DB )。我们考虑三个不同的DBs：最小提议（MIN），最大提议（MAX）和纳什提取级别（NASH）。在向后消除弱支配策略 ( BEWDS )后，我们为每个DB推导出理论预测。我们首先强调了 AM 的强度，通过证明MIN在理论上和实验上实现了最优。在NASH下预测的子博弈相对于纳什均衡是帕累托改进的。该MAX线索，无论是帕累托改进相对于免费获取提取结果，或帕累托降解。我们的实验结果表明，MAX和NASH降低了 CPR 过度提取的水平。该MAX引线首先是较大的减少（提出并实现）萃取比NASH。