According to Mario Gómez-Torrente in Roads to Reference, the reference of a demonstrative is fixed in an object by the speaker’s referential intentions (IRH). I argue that this is a mistake. First, I draw attention to a venerable alternative theory that Gómez-Torrente surprisingly overlooks: the reference is fixed in an object directly by a relation established in perceiving the object. Next I criticize IRH, arguing that it is implausible, redundant, and misleading. Finally, I present a theory of demonstrations that is like the alternative theory for demonstratives. For, though demonstrations do not determine the reference of demonstratives, they play an independent referential role which is important in explaining David Kaplan’s famous Carnap-Agnew example and many others including some of Gómez-Torrente’s.

根据 Mario Gómez-Torrente 在Roads to Reference 中的说法，指示词的指称通过说话者的指称意图 (IRH) 固定在对象中。我认为这是一个错误。首先，我提请注意戈麦斯-托伦特 (Gómez-Torrente) 出人意料地忽略了一个古老的替代理论：参照直接通过在感知对象时建立的关系固定在对象中。接下来我批评 IRH，认为它是不可信的、多余的和误导性的。最后，我介绍正在示威的理论离子这就像论证的替代理论。因为，虽然示范并不能确定指示词的参考，但它们起着独立的参考作用，这对于解释大卫·卡普兰著名的 Carnap-Agnew 例子以及包括戈麦斯-托伦特的一些例子在内的许多其他例子很重要。