I offer reasons against reading Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. I argue that Hume's scepticism is motivated differently, that his sceptical strategies are not analogous to Pyrrhonism's, and that it is profitable to read Hume as a critic of Pyrrhonism. I hold that the most informative point of comparison between Hume and Sextus Empiricus is a point of difference, namely, their stands on the connection between suspension of judgement (epochê) and tranquillity (ataraxia). For Sextus, tranquillity flows naturally from suspending judgement on all opinions. Hume, by contrast, consistently treats radical suspension of judgement as resulting in despair and social detachment. I take a firmer stance than past commentators on this issue by affirming that Hume and Sextus do not merely disagree on this issue, but that Hume's view is more plausible. Reading Hume's sceptical crisis, I propose, reveals an insightful criticism of Pyrrhonism, one that sheds light on human nature's response to radical doubt.

中文翻译：

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休谟是皮洛的敌人

我提出反对将休谟解读为皮浪怀疑论者的理由。我认为休谟的怀疑主义动机不同，他的怀疑策略与皮浪主义的不同，并且将休谟解读为皮浪主义的批评者是有益的。我认为休谟和经验主义的最丰富的比较点是一个不同点，即他们对中止判断之间联系的立场（时代) 和安宁 (共济失调）。对于塞克斯图斯来说，平静自然地源于对所有意见的判断。相比之下，休谟一贯将激进的中止判断视为导致绝望和社会疏离的结果。在这个问题上，我比过去的评论者采取更坚定的立场，肯定休谟和塞克斯图斯不仅在这个问题上存在分歧，而且休谟的观点更合理。我建议，阅读休谟的怀疑危机，揭示了对皮浪主义的深刻批评，揭示了人性对激进怀疑的反应。