Marine microbial primary production is influenced by the availability and uptake of essential nutrients, including iron. Although marine microbes have evolved mechanisms to scavenge sub-nanomolar concentrations of iron, recent observations suggest that viruses may co-opt these very same mechanisms to facilitate infection. The “Ferrojan Horse Hypothesis” proposes that viruses incorporate iron atoms into their tail fiber proteins to adsorb to target host receptors. Here, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach to consider the joint strategies of hosts and viruses in environments with limited nutrients (like iron). We analyze the bimatrix game and find that evolutionarily stable strategies depend on the stability and quality of nutrient conditions. For example, in highly stable iron conditions, virus pressure does not change host uptake strategies. However, when iron levels are dynamic, virus pressure can lead to fluctuations in the extent to which hosts invest in metabolic machinery that increases both iron uptake and susceptibility to viral infection. Altogether, this evolutionary game model provides further evidence that viral infection and nutrient dynamics jointly shape the fate of microbial populations.

海洋微生物的初级生产受到必需营养素（包括铁）的可用性和吸收的影响。尽管海洋微生物已经进化出清除纳摩尔浓度以下的铁的机制，但最近的观察表明，病毒可能会选择这些完全相同的机制来促进感染。“ Ferrojan Horse Hypothesis”（Ferrojan Horse假说）提出，病毒将铁原子掺入其尾巴纤维蛋白中，以吸附到目标宿主受体上。在这里，我们提出了一种进化博弈论的方法，来考虑营养有限的环境（例如铁）中宿主和病毒的联合策略。我们分析了双矩阵博弈，发现进化上稳定的策略取决于营养条件的稳定性和质量。例如，在高度稳定的铁条件下，病毒压力不会改变宿主的摄取策略。但是，当铁水平动态变化时，病毒压力可能会导致宿主投资代谢机制的程度出现波动，从而增加铁的吸收和对病毒感染的敏感性。总而言之，这种进化博弈模型提供了进一步的证据，证明病毒感染和营养动力学共同影响着微生物种群的命运。