Different deposit–refund systems are being practically applied to promote the proper treatment of end-of-life products in China. One is widely used in the industry of household appliances nationwide (DR1) while the other is applied in the industry of electric vehicle (EV) in Shenzhen of China (DR2). It is found that both the deposit–refund entity (either manufacturers or retailers pay tax and receive subsidy) and the channel leadership are different between the two industries. Given the practical conditions, this study aims to comprehensively analyze the influence of the two deposit–refund systems under different channel leaderships. In this end, a game-theoretic model consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and consumers is established and three channel leaderships including Nash game, M-leader, R-leader are considered. This study presents the collection rate, the total environmental impact and the economic benefit of the whole supply chain as multi-criteria to value the performance of the supply chain. The results indicate that different channel leaderships lead to different channel performances regardless of with DR1 or DR2. The study then explores and confirms the optimal deposit–refund system under each channel leadership. The results further demonstrate the advantages of practically applying the two different deposit–refund systems in China.