We characterize optimal regulated access prices in mixed oligopoly network industries where a private, profit-maximizing firm competes against a public enterprise after purchasing an essential input (e.g., network access). Optimal access prices often are lower for the private firm than for the public enterprise, and can be particularly low for a relatively efficient private supplier. In contrast to a private, profit-maximizing input supplier, the regulator reduces the access price charged to a private supplier as it becomes more efficient. The optimal access price for a private firm is the same whether it competes against another private firm or a public enterprise.

我们描述了混合寡头垄断网络行业的最优监管接入价格，在该行业中，利润最大化的私营公司在购买基本投入（例如网络接入）后与公共企业竞争。私营企业的最佳准入价格通常低于公共企业，对于效率相对较高的私营供应商来说，最佳准入价格可能特别低。与私人的、利润最大化的投入供应商相比，随着私人供应商效率的提高，监管机构会降低向私人供应商收取的准入价格。无论私营企业是与另一家私营企业还是与公共企业竞争，其最优进入价格都是相同的。