Whether a person is pretending, or not, is a function of their beliefs and intentions. This poses a challenge to 4E accounts of pretense, which typically seek to exclude such cognitive states from their explanations of psychological phenomena. Resulting tensions are explored within three recent accounts of imagination and pretense offered by theorists working in the 4E tradition. A path forward is then charted, through considering ways in which explanations can invoke beliefs and intentions while remaining true to 4E precepts. To make real progress in explaining pretense, 4E theorists will need to grow comfortable with the idea that two agents whose outward behaviors and environments are, in the short term, the same, may be guided by quite different beliefs and intentions, in virtue of which only one is pretending. In this way, the scientific project of explaining pretense remains inseparable from the more general project of determining which beliefs and intentions are appropriate to ascribe to which kinds of entities, given which kinds of behaviors.

一个人是否假装，取决于他们的信仰和意图。这对4E假装帐户构成了挑战，该帐户通常试图将此类认知状态排除在对心理现象的解释之外。在4E传统理论家提供的想象力和伪装的三个最新说明中，探讨了由此产生的紧张关系。然后，通过考虑在保持4E原则不变的前提下解释可以援引信念和意图的方式，绘制出一条前进的道路。为了在解释假装方面取得真正的进步，4E理论家需要适应这样的思想：在短期内，两个外向行为和环境相同的主体可能会受到完全不同的信念和意图的指导，因此只有一个人假装。这样，