We analyze a transboundary pollution control problem in a heterogeneous two-country differential game setting in which regulators care for the implications of environmental policies on the competitiveness. We characterize the noncooperative and the cooperative solutions, showing that under both scenarios, in the presence of competitiveness considerations, heterogeneous countries will generally set different carbon taxes. This suggests, while implementing a mitigation policy is necessary to combat climate change, a universally homogeneous policy may not be optimal. Moreover, when countries are symmetric, except for their degree of competitiveness concerns, under noncooperation introduction of such concerns lowers the abatement policies in both countries, however, the self-effect is stronger than the cross-effect. Nevertheless, under cooperation, an increase in country j’s competitiveness concerns leads to more stringent policies in country i, while, the self-effect could be either positive or negative. The latter result emphasizes the importance of cooperation to tackle pollution in the presence of competitiveness concerns.

我们在异质的两国差分博弈环境中分析了跨界污染控制问题，在这种博弈中监管机构关注环境政策对竞争力的影响。我们描述了非合作和合作解决方案的特征，表明在两种情况下，出于竞争考虑，异质国家通常会设置不同的碳税。这表明，尽管实施缓解政策对于应对气候变化是必要的，但普遍一致的政策可能并不是最佳选择。此外，当国家处于对称状态时，除了对竞争力的关注程度外，在不合作的情况下引入这种关注会降低两国的减排政策，但是，自我效果要强于交叉效果。不过，在合作下j的竞争力问题导致i国采取更严格的政策，而自我影响可能是正面的或负面的。后一个结果强调了在存在竞争问题的情况下进行合作以解决污染的重要性。