This paper investigates the role of institutional investors in the improvement of corporate governance for the companies in which they invest (investee companies) using evidence about the attributes of boards of directors across 15 countries. Furthermore, this paper examines the extent to which the activism of institutional investors is determined by the institutional environment, to include various economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis), legal systems and ownership structures. Drawing from the agency theory and institutional theory, the results show that foreign institutional investors are the main promoters of board governance structures across the globe. This study also provides evidence that institutional investors promote the independence of a board and its audit and compensation sub-committees (but excluding its nomination committee). The study also demonstrates that institutional investors reduce board entrenchment, though it presents no evidence that institutional investors reduce board busyness. The results also suggest that institutional investors behave differently when operating within different economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis), legal systems and ownership structures. This paper contributes to the growing literature on shareholder activism and comparative corporate governance mechanisms. The findings suggest that the activism of institutional investors is contingent on the institutional settings, to include economic conditions, legal systems and ownership structures.

中文翻译：

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机构投资者在改善全球董事会属性中的作用

本文使用有关15个国家/地区董事会特征的证据，调查了机构投资者在其投资公司（投资公司）的公司治理中的作用。此外，本文考察了制度投资者决定机构投资者积极性的程度，包括各种经济条件（危机前，危机和危机后），法律制度和所有权结构。从代理理论和机构理论出发，研究结果表明，外国机构投资者是全球董事会治理结构的主要推动者。这项研究还提供了证据，表明机构投资者可以促进董事会及其审计和薪酬小组委员会（但不包括提名委员会）的独立性。该研究还表明，机构投资者减少了董事会纠缠，尽管没有证据表明机构投资者减少了董事会忙碌。结果还表明，机构投资者在不同的经济条件（危机前，危机和危机后），法律制度和所有权结构下运作时，行为会有所不同。本文为有关股东行动主义和比较公司治理机制的文献不断发展做出了贡献。研究结果表明，机构投资者的积极性取决于机构环境，包括经济条件，