Performance-based accountability (PBA) policies are increasingly adopted in a wide range of education systems in order to reform school governance and to improve students’ results and schools’ performance. Countries around the world have been implementing national large-scale assessments to make school actors more accountable and responsible for students’ results. This policy model has been generalized in countries with different administrative traditions, including those with a short tradition in New Public Management. This is the case in Spain, where PBA has been adopted unevenly in different regions, with Madrid being one of the earliest adopters. In recent decades, Madrid has developed a model that combines administrative test-based accountability with a system of broad parental school choice, which also facilitates the activation of market forms of accountability. However, the combination and interaction between market and administrative forms of accountability is understudied. This paper adopts a policy enactment perspective to analyze, through a case study approach, the interaction of administrative and market forms of accountability and its enactment at the school level. The case study is based on a set of 41 semi-structured interviews with teachers, principals, and school inspectors in a sample of eight schools in Madrid, combined with document analysis of school educational projects and improvement plans. The evidence suggests that administrative and market forms of accountability tend to generate dynamics of interdependence, resulting in increasing external pressures which schools tend to address with superficial responses, including teaching to the test, or second-order competition between schools.

基于绩效的问责制（PBA）政策越来越广泛地应用于各种教育系统中，以改革学校的管理方式并改善学生的成绩和学校的绩效。世界各国一直在进行国家大规模评估，以使学校行为者对学生的成绩更负责任和负责。该政策模型已在具有不同行政传统的国家（包括在新公共管理中具有较短传统的国家）得到了推广。西班牙就是这种情况，PBA在不同地区的采用不均衡，马德里是最早的采用者之一。近几十年来，马德里开发了一种模型，该模型将基于行政考试的问责制与广泛的父母学校选择系统结合在一起，这也有助于激活市场形式的问责制。但是，市场和行政问责形式之间的结合和相互作用却没有得到充分的研究。本文采用政策制定的观点，通过案例研究的方法来分析行政和市场问责制之间的相互作用及其在学校一级的制定。案例研究基于马德里八所学校样本中教师，校长和学校检查员进行的41次半结构化访谈，结合对学校教育项目和改进计划的文件分析。有证据表明，行政和市场形式的问责制往往会产生相互依存的动态，从而导致外部压力越来越大，而学校往往会通过表面的回应来应对这些压力，