This essay provides a novel argument for impurism, the view that certain non-truth-relevant factors can make a difference to a belief's epistemic standing. I argue that purists, unlike impurists, are forced to claim that certain ‘high-stakes’ cases rationally require agents to be akratic. Akrasia is one of the paradigmatic forms of irrationality. So purists, in virtue of calling akrasia rationally mandatory in a range of cases with no obvious precedent, take on a serious theoretical cost. By focusing on akrasia, and on the nature of the normative judgments involved therein, impurists gain a powerful new way to frame a core challenge for purism. They also gain insight about the way in which impurism is true: my argument motivates the claim that there is moral encroachment in epistemology.

中文翻译：

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Akrasia 和认知不纯主义

这篇文章提供了一个新颖的论据不纯粹主义, 认为某些与真相无关的因素可以改变信仰的认知地位的观点。我认为，纯粹主义者与不纯粹主义者不同，他们被迫声称某些“高风险”案件合理地要求代理人是无知的。Akrasia 是非理性的典型形式之一。因此，纯粹主义者由于在一系列没有明显先例的情况下合理地认为 akrasia 是强制性的，因此承担了严重的理论成本。通过关注 akrasia，以及其中所涉及的规范性判断的性质，不纯粹主义者获得了一种强大的新方法来构建纯粹主义的核心挑战。他们还深入了解了不纯粹主义是真实的方式：我的论点激发了认识论存在道德侵犯的主张。