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Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2021

JAMES FRITZ Open the ORCID record for JAMES FRITZ [Opens in a new window]
JAMES FRITZ*
Affiliation:
VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITYjamie.c.fritz@gmail.com
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Abstract

This essay provides a novel argument for impurism, the view that certain non-truth-relevant factors can make a difference to a belief's epistemic standing. I argue that purists, unlike impurists, are forced to claim that certain ‘high-stakes’ cases rationally require agents to be akratic. Akrasia is one of the paradigmatic forms of irrationality. So purists, in virtue of calling akrasia rationally mandatory in a range of cases with no obvious precedent, take on a serious theoretical cost. By focusing on akrasia, and on the nature of the normative judgments involved therein, impurists gain a powerful new way to frame a core challenge for purism. They also gain insight about the way in which impurism is true: my argument motivates the claim that there is moral encroachment in epistemology.

Keywords

akrasiaimpurismmoral encroachmentpragmatic encroachmentpractical rationality
Type
Article
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , Spring 2021 , pp. 98 - 116
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Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2021

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Footnotes

For helpful discussion, I am grateful to Mike Ashfield, Ethan Brauer, Patrick Croskery, Justin D'Arms, Jenni Ernst, Brian McLean, Julia Jorati, Matthew Shields, Keshav Singh, several anonymous referees, and audiences at meetings of the Eastern APA and the Ohio Philosophical Association. Special thanks to Tristram McPherson and Declan Smithies, who provided invaluable help at every stage of the drafting process.

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