The article focuses on the unifying and explanatory power of the selective realism defended by Anjan Chakravartty. Our main aim is twofold. First, we critically analyse the purported synthesis between entity realism and structural realism offered by the author. We give reasons to think that this unification is an inconvenient marriage. In the second step, we deal with certain controversial aspects of the intended unification among three metaphysical concepts: causation, laws of nature and natural kinds. After pointing out that Chakravartty’s conception of laws is a plausible view that a scientific realist might endorse, we contend, on the contrary, that the concept of natural kind is dispensable in the framework of Chakravartty’s realism.

本文着重于安安·查克拉瓦蒂（Anjan Chakravartty）辩护的选择性现实主义的统一和解释力。我们的主要目标是双重的。首先，我们批判性地分析了作者提供的实体现实主义和结构现实主义之间的所谓综合。我们有理由认为这种统一是不方便的婚姻。在第二步中，我们处理了以下三个形而上学概念中预期统一的某些有争议的方面：因果关系，自然定律和自然种类。在指出查克拉瓦尔蒂的法律概念是科学现实主义者可能赞同的合理观点之后，我们相反认为，自然种类的概念在查克拉瓦尔蒂的现实主义框架中是可有可无的。