This paper deals with the relationship between regulatory compliance, bureaucratic corruption, lobbying and the industrial structure of a country. We show that lobbying and bureaucratic corruption can coexist at the macro level when we allow for heterogeneity in firm size. Countries with similar level of development are often characterized by very different industrial structures: we show the implications this has for the level of compliance, corruption and lobbying in that country. Welfare implications of our model point toward encouraging policies that support the small business sector of an economy and toward flexible regulatory policies meant to suppress regulation for small enough firms.

本文涉及法规遵从，官僚腐败，游说与一个国家的产业结构之间的关系。我们表明，当我们允许企业规模的异质性时，游说和官僚腐败可以在宏观层面并存。具有类似发展水平的国家通常以非常不同的产业结构为特征：我们证明了这对该国的合规，腐败和游说水平具有影响。我们模型的福利含义指向鼓励支持经济中小型企业的政策，以及旨在抑制足够小企业监管的灵活监管政策。