A fundamental issue in philosophy of perception is to understand the nature of experience and the relation of the experience with objects or states of affairs that is experienced. A prominent philosophical issue here is posed by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences, which are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception for the experiencer. The philosophical views in this matter can be grouped into three major positions on the basis of the nature of the subjective experience and relation of the subjective experience with the object. These are the sense-data theories—which consider that the objects of perception are mental entities; the representative theories—according to which perception is a representation of the objects in the external world; and the naïve realist theories—which proclaim that the external objects are constitutive of the very perceptual experience and not a representation of it. Naïve realism claims it is the defence of common-sense notion regarding experience i.e. how experience seems to the experiencer upon introspective reflection on it. This position has a growing number of proponents in philosophy especially in the last two decades. But it also entails radical departure of established philosophical views regarding the nature of experience, the phenomenal character of experience, and the experiencer–object relation. In this paper, we critically examine naïve realism from two crucial aspects pertaining to it—the question of introspection being basis of naïve realist thesis, and the notion of primacy of perception over non-veridical forms of experiences. We find that there are significant problems which weaken the naïve realist thesis.

中文翻译：

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内省和感知的首要性：对朴素现实主义的批判性思考

感知哲学的一个基本问题是理解体验的本质以及体验与经历的事物或事物状态之间的关系。这里的一个突出的哲学问题是幻觉体验的可能性，对于体验者而言，这些幻觉体验在主观上与真实的感知没有区别。根据主观经验的性质以及主观经验与客体的关系，可以将这方面的哲学观点分为三个主要立场。这些是感觉数据理论，它们认为感知的对象是心理实体。代表理论-根据哪种感知来代表外部世界中的物体；以及幼稚的现实主义理论，这些理论宣称外部客体是非常感知的体验的构成，而不是对其的表示。幼稚的现实主义声称，它是关于经验的常识性概念的辩护，即经验对内省者的内省性反思后，他们如何看待。这一立场的哲学支持者越来越多，尤其是在最近的二十年中。但是，这也必然导致关于经验的本质，经验的现象特征以及经验者与客体的关系的既定哲学观点的根本性偏离。在本文中，我们从与天真现实有关的两个关键方面进行了批判性的考察：内省问题是天真现实主义论文的基础，以及对非经验形式的感知至上的观念。