The problem of self-consciousness has been an essential one for philosophy since the onset of modernity. Both E. Tugendhat and the Heidelberg School represented by D. Henrich have reflected critically upon the traditional theory of self-consciousness, and both have revealed the circular dilemma of the “reflection-model” adopted by the traditional theory. In order to avoid the dilemma, they both proposed substitute formulas, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. Husserl also paid particular attention to the traditional theory of self-consciousness in his phenomenology. Through the distinctions of “primal consciousness” and “reflection,” Husserl explored the core problem of the traditional theory of self-consciousness in two different dimensions. In his critique, Husserl clarified the founding relation between primal consciousness and reflection, and in contrast to Tugendhat’s semantic approach, he developed a new reflection-model of self-consciousness which effectively avoids the circular dilemma of the traditional theory and does not narrow the problem domain of that theory.

中文翻译：

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自我意识的现象学反思模型如何可能？胡塞尔对 E. Tugendhat 对自我意识的语义方法的回应

自现代性出现以来，自我意识问题一直是哲学的重要问题。E. Tugendhat和以D. Henrich为代表的海德堡学派都对传统的自我意识理论进行了批判性反思，都揭示了传统理论所采用的“反思模式”的循环困境。为了避免进退两难，他们都提出了替代公式，每个公式都有其优点和缺点。胡塞尔在他的现象学中也特别关注自我意识的传统理论。胡塞尔通过区分“原始意识”和“反思”，从两个不同的维度探讨了传统自我意识理论的核心问题。在他的批评中，