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How is a Phenomenological Reflection-Model of Self-Consciousness Possible? A Husserlian Response to E. Tugendhat’s Semantic Approach to Self-Consciousness

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Abstract

The problem of self-consciousness has been an essential one for philosophy since the onset of modernity. Both E. Tugendhat and the Heidelberg School represented by D. Henrich have reflected critically upon the traditional theory of self-consciousness, and both have revealed the circular dilemma of the “reflection-model” adopted by the traditional theory. In order to avoid the dilemma, they both proposed substitute formulas, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. Husserl also paid particular attention to the traditional theory of self-consciousness in his phenomenology. Through the distinctions of “primal consciousness” and “reflection,” Husserl explored the core problem of the traditional theory of self-consciousness in two different dimensions. In his critique, Husserl clarified the founding relation between primal consciousness and reflection, and in contrast to Tugendhat’s semantic approach, he developed a new reflection-model of self-consciousness which effectively avoids the circular dilemma of the traditional theory and does not narrow the problem domain of that theory.

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Notes

  1. For a detailed discussion of the dispute, see Zhang (2013, pp. 160–183).

  2. „Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht“ (Henrich 1966, pp. 188–232). The article was a modified and substantially expanded version of Henrich’s lecture, “Fichtes „Ich“”, which was held at the Institute of France in the spring of 1966. The lecture draft was published in French in 1967, and was translated into German and published in Henrich (1982, pp. 57–82).

  3. Henrich (1966, pp. 191f/1982, pp. 61f).

  4. Kant (2002, p. 362). See also Frank (1986, p. 29). In the following discussion I translate the personal pronoun “ich” as “I”, “(das) Ich” after nominalization as “ego”, and the accusative “mich” as “object I” (me).

  5. In addition to the two difficulties summarized by Henrich here, Fichte in fact identified an infinite regress: in order to have self-consciousness I must turn myself into an object, and so I cannot actually reach self-consciousness at all. The subject-I needs a further subject in order to cognize itself, and this will continue without end. See Frank (1986, p. 35) and (1991, p. 25). Contemporary discussions of self-consciousness often refer to this problem of infinite regress. See Zahavi (2005, pp. 17–29).

  6. Due to the thematic limits of this article, I cannot discuss the merits and problems found in Fichte’s theory of self-consciousness any further. For monographic discussions, see D. Henrich (2003, pp. 246–262), K. Gloy (1990, pp. 54–71), and L. K. Ni (2002, chs. 12, 13).

  7. See Melle (2005); Ni (2010, pp. 163–178); Zhang (2009, pp. 130–142).

  8. Hua XIX/1, A 332/B1 354; Hua XXIV, p. 247; Hua X, p. 118ff.,124ff. See also Ni (1998, pp. 77–99).

  9. The so-called “dative I” here means the self-givenness of the stream of conscious experience to itself, the polarizing of consciousness toward ego that constitutes its first-person character. Ego means no more than an identification of the stream of consciousness, and the identification initially lies in the way of self-givenness of consciousness in the first person. It should be noted that the identification of the stream of consciousness here is different from the oneness (Einheit) of it. In Husserl, the latter is grounded in the double intentionality of the stream of consciousness (See Hua X, Sect. 38, 39).

  10. See Hua I, p. 28, where Husserl also stressed that this three-sided structure forms the “inborn a priori” of the “concrete and transcendental Ego.” The disclosure of the “inborn a priori” fundamentally relies on a “self-examination” (Selbstbesinnung) that “is the most important methodological insight of phenomenology,” next to the phenomenological reduction.

  11. Of course, this does not mean that the reflection-model of self-consciousness in Husserl’s phenomenology is merely pre-linguistic. It means, rather, that it is primarily concerned with the pre-linguistic dimension and only later with the dimension of language. This is the fundamental starting point of the philosophy of consciousness. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.

  12. See Hua XXV, S. 80f. English translation in McCormick and Elliston 1982, p. 17.

  13. Tugendhat claimed that all intentional consciousness is propositional, a point aimed at Brentano and Husserl. Brentano held that the second item in the intentional relation need not exist; for example, someone can fear, love, and desire N although N may not exist. But as Tugendhat suggested, “I can fear the devil even if he does not exist, but I cannot do so without believing that he exists. Hence, the point to which Brentano called attention—namely, that the object of an intentional mode of consciousness does not have to exist—is primarily a consequence of the fact that one can relate consciously to an object only insofar as one believes that it exists. Of course, the claim that an object exists is a proposition; and believing that it exists is a propositional consciousness” (Tugendhat 1979, p. 20/1989, p. 11). He went on to say that “If all intentional consciousness is either directly propositional or implies propositional consciousness, we can lay down the following universal principle: All intentional consciousness is propositional.” The formulation here reminds us of the description of the “psychic phenomenon” by Brentano (the psychic phenomenon is either the presentation itself, or is based on a presentation) and Husserl’s description of “intentional experience” (every intentional experience is either itself an objectified act, or is based on an objectified experience). See for example Hua XIX/1, A 458/B1 494. Here it is impossible to fully develop the discussion of Tugendhat's inference and its relation to Brentano and Husserl. For a related discussion, see Tugendhat (1976, pp. 98–103) and Rapic (2009).

  14. See Frank (1986, pp. 79f.) and Frank (1991, pp. 423f.).

  15. Husserl began to take free variation by fantasy as the key step of eidetic reduction in the 1920s. See Hua XXVII, pp. 10ff. Hua IX, pp. 72–87; and Husserl (1985, pp. 410–420).

  16. The difficulty of the traditional theory of self-consciousness is designated the “circular” dilemma by two other representatives of the Heidelberg School, U. Pothast and K. Cramer. See Pothast (1971, pp. 18–23) and Cramer (1974, pp. 537–603). For a more systematic analysis, see Mauersberg (2000, pp. 167–80).

  17. See Düsing (2002, pp. 111–140). Originally published in Italian in 1992.

  18. Other than the essays mentioned in the previous note, see also Düsing (1992, pp. 89–122), Düsing (1993, pp. 107–122), Düsing (1997), Düsing (2005, pp. 134–138), and Düsing (2009, pp. 259–274).

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Acknowledgments

This article is funded by the Youth Project of the National Social Science Fund of China (NSSFC) (Project No.: 12CZX047) and the Project supported by the Foundation for the Author of National Excellent Doctoral Dissertation of PR China (FANEDD) 2013 (Grant No. 201403).

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  1. Institute of Phenomenology, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, No. 135, Xingang Xi Road, Guangzhou, 510275, China

    Wei Zhang

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Zhang, W. How is a Phenomenological Reflection-Model of Self-Consciousness Possible? A Husserlian Response to E. Tugendhat’s Semantic Approach to Self-Consciousness. Husserl Stud 32, 47–66 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-015-9185-1

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