This paper argues that political brokers pay particular attention to household size, and the age distribution of its members, when allocating scarce indivisible social benefits. Because people usually share their income with other household members, allocating a social benefit to an individual member of a household with n voters is likely to bring more political support than allocating the same benefit to an individual member of a household with n-1 voters. Based on the main Argentine household survey and on personal interviews with 120 brokers, this paper shows that brokers effectively collect information on family size and age composition and allocate scarce temporary public works programs to families with more voters, unintentionally discriminating against families with children not old enough to vote.

中文翻译：

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以家庭为基础的客户服务：经纪人对阿根廷临时公共工程项目的分配

本文认为，政治经纪人在分配稀缺的不可分割的社会福利时，特​​别关注家庭规模和成员的年龄分布。由于人们通常与其他家庭成员分享他们的收入，因此将社会福利分配给有 n 个选民的家庭的个人成员可能比将相同的福利分配给有 n-1 个选民的家庭的个人成员带来更多的政治支持。本文基于主要的阿根廷家庭调查和对 120 名经纪人的个人访谈，表明经纪人有效地收集了家庭规模和年龄构成的信息，并将稀缺的临时公共工程项目分配给选民较多的家庭，无意中歧视了有孩子的家庭。足以投票。