I deal with the relation between phenomenology and realism while examining Ingarden’s critique towards Husserl. I exhibit the empiricist nucleus of Husserl’s phenomenology, according to which the real is what can be sensuously experienced. On this basis, I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology is not idealistic, in opposition to the realistic phenomenology, according to which reality consists in entities which cannot be sensuously experienced and are thus ideal. Finally I attempt to show that the idealistic elements of Husserl’s thinking do not originate from the transcendental turn, but from a remainder of psychologism that contradicts his empiricism.

中文翻译：

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现象学与现实主义。Die Frage nach der Wirklichkeit im Streit zwischen Husserl und Ingarden

在考察英加登对胡塞尔的批判时，我处理了现象学和现实主义之间的关系。我展示了胡塞尔现象学的经验主义核心，根据这种核心，实在是可以被感性地体验到的东西。在此基础上，我认为胡塞尔的现象学不是唯心主义的，与现实现象学相反，根据现实现象学，现实存在于不能被感性地体验的实体中，因此是理想的。最后，我试图表明胡塞尔思想的唯心主义元素并非源自先验转向，而是源自与他的经验主义相矛盾的心理学的其余部分。