This article examines Cohen’s “transcendental method”, Windelband’s “critical method”, the neo-Kantian distinctions between natural science and the humanities (i. e., human or cultural sciences), and Weber’s account of ideal-typical explanations. The Marburg and the Southwest Schools of neo-Kantianism have in common that their respective philosophies of science focused on method, but they substantially differ in their approaches. Cohen advanced the “transcendental method”, which was taken up and transformed by Natorp and Cassirer; later, it became influential in neo-Kantian approaches to 20 th century physics. Windelband distinguished between facts and values, linking the former to the “genetic” method of history and the latter to the “critical” method of philosophy; and between the “nomothetic” and “idiographic” methods of the empirical sciences, a distinction further elaborated by Rickert. The distinction does not give rise to a sharp discrimination but is rather what Weber would later call an ideal type. All these approaches contribute in different ways to understanding the structure of scientific knowledge, focusing on different aspects of the general path of the empirical sciences between rationalism and empiricism.

中文翻译：

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方法论：科学事实与自然科学与人文科学的区别

本文考察了科恩的“先验方法”，温德尔班德的“批判方法”，自然科学与人文科学（即人文科学或文化科学）之间的新康德式区分，以及韦伯对理想典型解释的解释。马尔堡和新康德主义的西南流派的共同点是，他们各自的科学哲学关注方法，但是它们的方法却大不相同。Cohen提出了“超验方法”，该方法由Natorp和Cassirer采纳并进行了改造。后来，它在20世纪物理学的新康德式方法中产生了影响。温德尔班德区分事实和价值，将前者与历史的“遗传”方法联系起来，将后者与哲学的“批判”方法联系起来；在经验科学的“理论”和“特殊”方法之间，里克特进一步阐述了这一区别。这种区别不会引起明显的区别，而是韦伯后来称之为理想的类型。所有这些方法都以不同的方式有助于理解科学知识的结构，重点放在理性主义和经验主义之间的经验科学一般路径的不同方面。