I often tell my students that the only thing that is not controversial in philosophy is that everything else in it is controversial. While this might be a bit of an exaggeration, it does contain a kernel of truth, as many exaggerations do: philosophy is a highly contentious discipline. So it is remarkable the extent to which there is agreement in the philosophy of religion amongst theists, agnostics, and atheists alike that John Mackie’s argument for atheism is either invalid or unsound. As a result, the focus has entirely shifted from the logical problem of evil to the so-called evidential one. But I think that this is a mistake, not necessarily because I think Mackie’s argument is sound, but rather because I reject an assumption made by apparently all parties to the debate, which is that there is only one logical problem of evil. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to defend a deductive argument that God* does not exist. As far as I can tell, the basic idea of this argument is a novel one: while Mackie’s argument (and much of the discussion that occurs in its wake) has a more or less consequentialist framework, mine has a deontological one. The evil of which I will speak is that of our having been thrown into the world.

中文翻译：

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上帝*不存在：一个新的邪恶逻辑问题

我经常告诉我的学生，哲学中唯一没有争议的是它的其他一切都是有争议的。虽然这可能有点夸张，但它确实包含了一个真理的核心，正如许多夸张所做的那样：哲学是一门极具争议的学科。因此，在有神论者、不可知论者和无神论者等宗教哲学中，约翰·麦基 (John Mackie) 的无神论论点要么无效，要么不合理，这一点令人瞩目。结果，焦点完全从邪恶的逻辑问题转移到了所谓的证据问题。但我认为这是一个错误，不一定是因为我认为 Mackie 的论点是合理的，而是因为我拒绝了显然所有辩论各方做出的假设，即只有一个逻辑上的邪恶问题。因此，本文的目的是为上帝*不存在的演绎论证辩护。据我所知，这个论点的基本思想是一个新颖的论点：虽然麦基的论点（以及随之而来的大部分讨论）或多或少有一个结果论的框架，但我的论点有一个义务论的框架。我要讲的邪恶是我们被扔到世界上的邪恶。