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God* does not exist: a novel logical problem of evil

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Abstract

I often tell my students that the only thing that is not controversial in philosophy is that everything else in it is controversial. While this might be a bit of an exaggeration, it does contain a kernel of truth, as many exaggerations do: philosophy is a highly contentious discipline. So it is remarkable the extent to which there is agreement in the philosophy of religion amongst theists, agnostics, and atheists alike that John Mackie’s argument for atheism is either invalid or unsound. As a result, the focus has entirely shifted from the logical problem of evil to the so-called evidential one. But I think that this is a mistake, not necessarily because I think Mackie’s argument is sound, but rather because I reject an assumption made by apparently all parties to the debate, which is that there is only one logical problem of evil. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to defend a deductive argument that God* does not exist. As far as I can tell, the basic idea of this argument is a novel one: while Mackie’s argument (and much of the discussion that occurs in its wake) has a more or less consequentialist framework, mine has a deontological one. The evil of which I will speak is that of our having been thrown into the world.

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Notes

  1. For an example of a theist who thinks this, see Adams (2000). For an example of an agnostic who thinks this, see Draper (1989). And for an example of an atheist who thinks this, see Rowe (1979). For Mackie’s original argument, see his (1955).

  2. The literature on the evidential argument has exploded in recent years. It has also become increasingly technical in nature. A good place to start is Howard-Snyder (1996).

  3. While I do think that Mackie’s argument has a lot more going for it than others seem to think, I will not argue this point here.

  4. As will become clear, ‘God*’ is a technical term. Below I will address the question: What is the nature of God*? In other words, if God* had existed, what would he have been like?

  5. Adams argues that the Christian theist should insist that this framework include explicitly Christian values. See her (2000).

  6. This phrase, of course, comes from Heidegger. See his (1996). It should not necessarily be assumed that I mean the same thing by it that he does, however. To be perfectly frank, I doubt I know what Heidegger means by it. I will discuss my understanding of the phrase’s meaning below.

  7. For example, Hoffman and Rosenkrant’s The Divine Attributes (2002) devotes an entire chapter each to omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence, but no chapter to the idea of God as creator.

  8. According to this definition, not necessarily all persons are creatures, and not necessarily all creatures are persons.

  9. For one discussion of these problems, see Plantinga (1980).

  10. For a discussion of these problems, see Geach (1977).

  11. I am understanding this, of course, as a technical term. What it is for God* to be strong is not necessarily the same thing as what it is for the young Arnold Schwarzenegger to be strong.

  12. For a discussion of this matter, see Craig (1990).

  13. I am also understanding this, of course, as a technical term. What it is for God* to be smart is not necessarily the same thing as what it is for Stephen Hawking to be smart.

  14. And how could he not be?

  15. Of course, there are other, more sophisticated, versions of the subjunctive condition. For example, see Parfit (2011). But even if one of these versions is true, it still would not change the dynamic of the present dialectic. For, again, I am not claiming that if one throws a person into a scenario without that person’s consent, one thereby acts in a morally impermissible manner. Rather, I claim that one’s action would be disrespectful.

  16. I say ‘perhaps’ because I can imagine a scenario in which the unconscious person had in the past made it absolutely clear to the EMT that if the EMT were ever to encounter the unconscious person unconscious, he or she did not want to be resuscitated. Of course, there remains the issue of how the EMT could know that the unconscious person had not changed his or her mind since the time they last spoke. Thankfully, nothing in my argument turns on the resolution of the issue of what we should say about such a case.

  17. I thank the anonymous referee for pressing me to respond to the previous two objections.

  18. For example, see Wolff (1970, pp. 12–18).

  19. I thank the anonymous referee for pressing me to expand on this point.

  20. For example, see “Successful and Schizophrenic,” by Elyn Saks, The New York Times, Jan. 25, 2013.

  21. It is intentional that a ‘*’ is omitted at a certain point in this sentence.

  22. And it is intentional that ‘*’ is omitted at a certain point in this sentence as well.

  23. For a discussion of this view, see Kvanvig (1993).

  24. For a defense of anti-natalism, see Benetar (2006). However, whereas Benetar’s argument relies on the contingent truth that life involves pain, my argument does not.

  25. It is intentional that a ‘*’ is omitted at a certain point in this sentence.

References

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Corey Maley, Peter Murphy, and Makayla Parriott, as well as audiences in Buffalo and Warsaw, for comments on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank the anonymous referee for comments on the penultimate version.

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Correspondence to P. X. Monaghan.

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Monaghan, P.X. God* does not exist: a novel logical problem of evil. Int J Philos Relig 88, 181–195 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-019-09738-7

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