Although it seems intuitively clear that candidate quality provides a critical pillar of democratic governance, the consequences of electing low-quality politicians remain unclear. Combining census data and election results, we conduct a regression discontinuity analysis to examine the socioeconomic effects of criminal politicians in India. We find that the election of state legislators with criminal charges can exacerbate household poverty in a village as household electrification and literacy rates both decrease when criminal candidates win close elections against non-criminal ones. In contrast, the presence of criminal politicians does not have a conclusive negative effect on the supply of local infrastructures, such as paved roads and power grids. These results highlight the importance of differentiating between different types of policy outcomes. Rent-seeking politicians will engage in local infrastructural projects, but they may pay little attention to these projects’ contribution to poverty reduction.

中文翻译：

---

犯罪政治家与社会经济发展：来自印度农村的证据

尽管从直觉上看，候选人素质是民主治理的关键支柱，但选举低素质政治家的后果仍不清楚。结合人口普查数据和选举结果，我们进行了回归不连续性分析，以检查印度犯罪政治家的社会经济影响。我们发现，当犯罪候选人在与非犯罪候选人的选举中获胜时，家庭电气化率和识字率都会下降，因此带有刑事指控的州立法者的选举会加剧村庄的家庭贫困。相比之下，犯罪政客的存在不会对当地基础设施的供应产生决定性的负面影响，例如铺砌的道路和电网。这些结果强调了区分不同类型政策结果的重要性。寻租政客会参与当地的基础设施项目，但他们可能很少关注这些项目对减贫的贡献。