The first time Umāsvāti uses the word manas in his Tattvārtha-sūtra (TAS), the standard work for matters concerning Jaina philosophy, is when he lists the means of knowledge: mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥ-paryāya and kevala (TAS 1, 9). These are the pramāṇas (TAS 1, 10). In TAS 1, 14 mati or sense perception is said to be caused by indriya and aninindriya; Pūjyapāda’s commentary says that anindriya, antaḥ-karaṇa and manas are synonyms. This obviously raises questions about the specific role and function of the manas/anindriya in mati, manaḥ-paryāya and śruta, and how these retain their exclusivity without reducing the function of any of them to another means of cognition. In the Sāṅkhya system manas is seen as both an organ of cognition (buddhīndriya) and an organ of action (karmendriya, SK 27). It is interesting for a better understanding of the role of manas in Jaina thought to compare some aspects of it with the Sāṅkhya system.

中文翻译：

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吉安娜哲学中的玛纳斯概念

Umāsvāti 在他的 Tattvārtha-sūtra (TAS) 中第一次使用 manas 这个词，这是关于耆那教哲学问题的标准著作，是他列出了知识的手段：mati、śruta、avadhi、manaḥ-paryāya 和 kevala (TAS 1, 9). 这些是 pramaṇas (TAS 1, 10)。在 TAS 1 中，据说 14 mati 或感官知觉是由 indriya 和 aninindriya 引起的；Pūjyapāda 的注释说 anindriya、antaḥ-karaṇa 和 manas 是同义词。这显然提出了关于玛那/阿宁德里亚在玛蒂、玛那-帕里亚和 śruta 中的具体作用和功能的问题，以及这些如何保持其排他性，而不会将它们中的任何一个的功能减少到另一种认知方式。在 Sāṅkhya 系统中，manas 被视为认知器官 (buddhīndriya) 和行动器官 (karmendriya, SK 27)。