The Concept of Manas in Jaina Philosophy

Abstract

The first time Umāsvāti uses the word manas in his Tattvārtha-sūtra (TAS), the standard work for matters concerning Jaina philosophy, is when he lists the means of knowledge: mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥ-paryāya and kevala (TAS 1, 9). These are the pramāṇas (TAS 1, 10). In TAS 1, 14 mati or sense perception is said to be caused by indriya and aninindriya; Pūjyapāda’s commentary says that anindriya, antaḥ-karaṇa and manas are synonyms. This obviously raises questions about the specific role and function of the manas/anindriya in mati, manaḥ-paryāya and śruta, and how these retain their exclusivity without reducing the function of any of them to another means of cognition. In the Sāṅkhya system manas is seen as both an organ of cognition (buddhīndriya) and an organ of action (karmendriya, SK 27). It is interesting for a better understanding of the role of manas in Jaina thought to compare some aspects of it with the Sāṅkhya system.

The concept of the manas in Jaina philosophy has hardly been a topic of independent study.¹ Its specific role is acknowledged in Jaina epistemology as is evident in Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra (TAS), the standard work for matters concerning Jaina philosophy. He uses the word manas quite early in his text, the first time when he lists the means of cognition or knowledge, jñāna (TAS 1, 9): mati (sense perception), śruta (scriptural or authoritative source of knowledge), avadhi (clairvoyance), manaḥ-paryaya (telepathy or communicating without the use of the senses, also written manaḥ-paryāya), and kevala (omniscience). For our purposes we can ignore two of them: avadhi-jñāna, because it is a special case occurring in celestial and infernal beings (TAS 1, 21/22),² and kevala-jñāna, because it occurs in kevalins, namely those who have overcome the influence of karmas and know things as they really are. We shall also not delve in detail into the actual function of manaḥ-paryaya itself either, because it presupposes an advanced stage of asceticism, one that is not affected by the karma that usually hinders the function of manaḥ-paryāya in ordinary individuals.³ Here I am interested in the category of the manas itself. We need to note that the first two, mati and śruta, are indirect means (parokṣa) and the rest are direct (pratyakṣa) means of cognition or knowledge (TAS 1, 11–12), a point that will soon be relevant. We shall see below that according to TAS 1, 14 mati-jñāna is caused (nimitta) by both the indriyas (sense organs) and the anindriya/manas (non-sense-organ). It is mati-jñāna that will chiefly occupy our deliberations here regarding the role of the manas, more than the other means of cognition.

That the manas is a crucial term is evident not only through the epistemological role it plays for example in mati-jñāna (see TAS 1, 13–14 below) and independently as manaḥ-paryaya, but also because of its role in human activity as such. TAS 6, 1–2 say that together with actions of the body and speech (kāya and vāk), the action of the manas as well is responsible for the association or connection (yoga) with the jīva of fine, invisible, material pudgala-particles which then operate as karma. This is the Jaina metaphysical category of influx, āsrava, in TAS 1, 4 caused by the threefold activity of the body, speech and manas mentioned in TAS 6, 1–2.⁴

Before proceeding with the role of the manas in Jaina epistemology, which is the prime reason for the concern here, it might be useful to recall some fundamental facts in Jainism about the term manas. For a basic orientation regarding the concept itself and its role, it is helpful to look at the terms pudgala, aṇu or paramāṇu and vargaṇā/vaggaṇā, to see how manas is directly related to them.

The term pudgala is usually translated as ‘matter’ or ‘material atom’ (Jaini 1979, p. 81). Jaini (1979, p. 101) gives its etymology as traditionally “derived from puṃ (joining) plus -gala (breaking)”. A few related sūtras by Umāsvāti furnish a general idea regarding matter as such, pudgala, and how the manas is a form of it, together with how aṇu or paramāṇu (atom) is directly concerned with pudgala.

TAS 5, 5/4: rūpiṇaḥ pudgalāḥ, “Things which have form constitute matter (pudgalas).⁵

TAS 5, 10: saṅkyeyāsaṅkyeyāś ca pudgalānām, “(The space-points [pradeśas]) of forms of matter are both numerable and innumerable”.⁶

5, 11: nāṇoḥ (na aṇoḥ). Not for the atom (which has space points, pradeśa).

5, 19: śarīra-vaṅ-manaḥ-prāṇāpānāḥ pudgalānām. “(The function) of pudgalas (is to form the basis) of the body, the organs of speech, the manas and respiration.”

5, 20: sukha-duḥkha-jīvita-maraṇopagrahāś ca. “(The function of pudgalas is) also to contribute to pleasure, suffering, life and death of living beings.”

5, 25: aṇavaḥ skandhāś ca. Atoms and molecules (are the two main divisions of matter).⁷

5, 26: bheda-saṅghātebhya utpadyante “They (the molecules) are formed by division (fission) and union (fusion) and division-cum-union.”⁸ Evidently quoting this TAS 5, 26 Jaini (1979, p. 101) summarises how the Jainas envision the formation and destruction of matter (pudgala), namely “through atomic aggregation (saṃghāta) and disjunction (bheda)”.

TAS 5, 28: bheda-saṅghātābhyām cākṣuṣaḥ, “(Molecules produced) by the combined action of division (fission) and union (fusion) can be perceived by the eyes”.⁹

This random selection of sūtras describes matter and its role or functions. For our immediate purposes we need to note 5, 19 above, because manas is singled out as one of the categories formed out of matter or pudgala and how the terms aṇu or paramāṇu feature there, namely as a “division” of matter (5, 25), together with molecules. In continuing with the basic understanding regarding the manas, we now need to briefly look at the technical term vargaṇā/vaggaṇā (Sanskrit/Prakrit) of which the manas forms one such group.

The term vargaṇā/vaggaṇā, is translated as a “group” (Tatia 1951, p. 65).¹⁰ The 5th part of the Ṣatkhaṇḍāgama¹¹ is about vargaṇā/vaggaṇā in which four anuyoga-dvāra sections (sparśa, karma, prakṛti and bandha) are discussed, namely topics of discussion dealt with in the text. The term therefore seems to be used in the sense of a division in separate exposition-groups of the anuyoga-dvāras.¹² In sūtras 5, 6, 98–116 (vol. 14, pp. 133–223, including the commentary), the ṢkhĀ enters into a debate over the terms saṅghāta and bheda (Pr. saṃghāda and bheda) of pudgala-atoms. In sūtras 5, 6, 728–756 of the ṢkhĀ (pp. 546–556, vol. 14) a list of five vaggaṇās/vargaṇās is briefly mentioned, in which the manas is mentioned. These are called: āhāra- teyā-, bhāsā-, maṇa- and kammaiya-davva-vagganā, namely the dravya-vargaṇās respectively called āhāra, taijasa, bhāṣā, manas (mano-) and kārmaṇa, from which 23 further types are derived.¹³

Since I am concerned only with the manas, as a ‘group’, we can look at the four kinds of the manas-substance, maṇa-davva-vaggana, given in ṢkhĀ 5, 6, 750–751 (vol. 14, pp. 551–552), so that it is clear that the manas is a form of matter and that it directly affects the nature of the sentient principle, jīva. The sūtras about the manas group of matter are:

maṇa-davva-vaggaṇā cau-vvihassa maṇassa gahaṇaṃ pavattadi || ṢkhĀ 5, 6, 750 ||

sacca-maṇassa moṣa-maṇassa sacca-moṣa-maṇassa asacca-moṣa-maṇassa jāṇi davvāṇi ghettūṇa sacca-maṇattāe moṣa-maṇattāe sacca-moṣa-maṇattāe asacca-moṣa-maṇattāe pariṇāmedūṇa pariṇamaṃti jīvā tāṇi davvāṇi maṇa-davva-vaggaṇā ṇāma || ṢkhĀ 5, 6, 751 ||

The text says that the group of pudgala-atoms that makes up the manas is “active” and becomes transformed into four types of manas: true or pure, deceptive, a combination of both and a combination of an untrue and deceptive manas. These forms of manas cause the sentient principle (jīva) to be transformed accordingly in the sense that the jīva is obstructed by the form that a particular group of the manas substance (mana-davva-vaggaṇā/mano-vargaṇā) takes on, positively in a pure way or negatively in a deceptive manner, with their respective combinations. This description of the role of manas is relevant not only in the context of its role in ethical conduct but also in the context of epistemology in which the manas plays a significant function, as we shall see below.

The conclusion we can draw from the ṢkhĀ discussion on vargaṇā/vaggaṇā is that the technical term itself, but not the idea behind it, was abandoned by Umāsvāti in his TAS, perhaps for the sake of brevity so as not to have to discuss in any detail the vast theme of the numerous groups of matter. Umāsvāti took over the idea of a group of atoms that join one another or disjoin (TAS 5, 26 above), omitting the explicit term vargaṇā/vaggaṇā, retaining only the idea of saṅghāta and bheda. The topic of vargaṇā/vaggaṇā is interesting in itself, but our concern is only with the manas as a group of matter, particularly in the epistemological role it plays in Jainism and especially with reference largely to one of the five pramāṇas in Jainism, and briefly mentioning the two other means of cognition: mati (sense perception), śruta (scriptural or authoritative source of knowledge), manaḥ-paryaya (telepathy or communicating without the use of the senses, also written manaḥ-paryāya). As already pointed out, we are omitting the remaining means mentioned in TAS 1, 9 avadhi (clairvoyance) and kevala (omniscience) for the reasons already mentioned. Up to this point we have now seen how the concept manas fits into the structure of pudgalas as a specific group. Let us now proceed to the role of the manas in our cognition.

Cognition is a speedy, split-second, complex procedure involving our entire psycho-somatic structure and the Sāṅkhya system gives a clear presentation of it, which we have learnt early in our studies in Indian philosophy. In Sāṅkhya, cognition through the senses is a process that involves the roles of buddhi, ahaṅkāra, manas and the indriyas, where the manas has the unique status of being both a buddhīndriya as well as a karmendriya (SK 26–27).¹⁴ It is generally taught that the role of the manas is indispensable in the cognition process, playing an important intermediary function between the external sense organs (the eyes, ears, etc.) and the outer world of objects observed through the indriyas or external senses, resulting in the final judgement about the object, that the object of perception is this or that thing. ‘With the split-second speed of thought’ (manovegena) manas passes on the data provided by the sense-organs to the buddhi which then makes the final judgement that the object is this or that thing. It is known that in Sāṅkhya manas is an evolute of prakṛti or matter as such.

We saw that the Jainas also see manas as matter, which they call pudgala. However, whereas Sāṅkhya has a system of 24 categories which makes up its ontology and metaphysics, Jainism has just the two ontological categories (dravya) of jīva and ajīva, with the latter being a generic term standing for pudgala, dharma, adharma, ākāśa and kāla. These two, jīva and ajīva, constitute the basis on which Jainism builds up its metaphysics, adding to these two the five well-known concepts of āsrava, bandha, saṃvara, nirjarā and mokṣa (TAS 1, 4). To compare the unique status of manas as both buddhīndriya and karmendriya in Sāṅkhya with manas in Jainism, is quite instructive because it reveals interesting insights and differences, as we shall see below when we briefly mention the point concerning an advanced state ascetic discipline. Moreover, in the epistemological context, Sāṅkhya accepts only three pramāṇas (drṣṭa, anumāna and āpta-vacana, SK 4) whereas Jainism has a different classification of two pramāṇas (parokṣa and pratyakṣa), the first comprising mati and śruta, and the latter avadhi, manaḥ-paryaya and kevala, making up five in all. It is interesting that mati, sense perception, is regarded as parokṣa, namely as being indirect, whereas in Sāṅkhya it is a direct form of cognition. Let us look at some details concerning mati-jñāna and the role of manas in it.

Mati-jñāna

In dealing with the concept of manas in Jainism we are compelled to become more precise in our concern with Jaina epistemology. Usually mati-jñāna is simply regarded as sense perception, without distinguishing not only the perception of sight from the others (touch, taste, smell and hearing), but also ignoring the four stages involved in the process of mati-jñāna (avagraha, īhā, avāya/apāya and dhāraṇā, TAS 1, 15). This is noteworthy because the avagraha stage of mati-jñāna does not apply to sight (and the manas), as we shall see immediately. Let us recall that mati, and śruta, are indirect means of cognition and in the case of sense perception, the Jainas draw a perceptive distinction between sight and the other sense-organ perceptions. The significance of this for us is that for the Jainas the functions of sight and the manas have to be treated separately.

TAS 1, 14 says that mati-jñāna (with its synonyms smṛti, saṃjñā, cintā, and abhinibodha, supplied in TAS 1, 13) is caused by the indriyas (sense organs) and the anindriya (non-sense-organ).¹⁵ A part of Pūjyapāda’s commentary on this is directly relevant here. He says that anindriya, antaḥ-karaṇa and manas are synonyms.¹⁶ He adds that the negative particle (nañ) in anindriya is used in the sense of īṣat, meaning that the anindriya is not a ‘complete’ indriya as the external senses are, but somehow like them, a sort of indriya, a crypto-sense-organ. Further, this anindriya or manas is not dependent on the indriyas: “because it is not seen externally, like the eyes, etc, and because it is independent of the indriyas in investigating thoughts of qualities and faults, and for memory, etc., the internal instrument is said to be antaḥ-karaṇa.”¹⁷ Hence, manas has some sort of independence and uniqueness.

Not only is this a clear statement about anindriya, antaḥ-karaṇa and manas being synonymous, and a key one at that, but it is obviously from the specific Jaina perspective: it hints at the independence of the category of manas, apart from alluding to the particular role it is given in its changed, functional mode as a specific instrument of knowledge or cognition, namely as manaḥ-paryaya (telepathy or communicating without the use of the external senses, the eyes, etc.). This independence of manas is not of the Vaiśeṣika type where the manas and the ātman are listed as two of the nine dravyas in VS 1, 5.¹⁸ In Jainism manas would be a part of ajīva-dravya and a type or group of pudgala, as we have seen, with jīva being the only other dravya that the Jaina tradition accepts.

The SS commentary on TAS 1, 14 reveals an interesting aspect regarding the role of manas. It is said there that the manas is a sign (liṅga) of the jīva (here referred to as indra).¹⁹ Neither the SS commentary nor Umāsvāti’s auto-commentary says exactly how the manas operates, only that its function implies the existence of a sentient principle, of which the manas is a sign. As in the case of upayoga,²⁰manas is also related to the jīva, and plays a role as a mass of pudgalas in mati-jñāna, a pramāṇa that is described as being an indirect means of cognition. Apart from this, the manas plays an independent role in its modified form as manaḥ-paryaya, as an autonomous pramāṇa, described and functioning now as a direct means of cognition.²¹

So what is the problem? It is in the details. On the one hand, mati arises through the functions of the indriyas and the anindriya (TAS 1, 14) and manaḥ-paryaya arises without the indriyas. Moreover, TAS 1, 19 says that indistinct apprehension (vyañjana/avagraha, see below) does not apply to sight (perception through the eyes) nor to the anindriya/manas (TAS 1, 19: na cakṣur-anindriyābhyām). This means that the process of perception through sight is different from the perceptions through the other senses, touch, taste, smell and hearing. One arrives at this position through inference as well (apart from the scriptures),²² because the eye ‘acts on any object without direct contact with it’ (aprāpya-kāri) and because it is not intercepted through contact (spṛṣṭānavagrahāt).²³ This statement gives the impression that in contrast to the other senses, the eyes seem to perceive directly, but is in fact not so. Even with the exclusion of one stage in the cognition process, sight being different from the other senses, is still mati-jñāna and, together with śruta, it is regarded as being indirect (parokṣa), with the others being direct (TAS 1, 11–12).

In order to better understand TAS 1, 19, just quoted above, we have to look at both TAS 1, 18 and 19 together:

TAS 1, 18 vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ

TAS 1, 19: na cakṣur-anindriyābhyām (as quoted above).

These sūtras state that that there is a vyañjana, (an apprehension/sensation of indistinct things, by all the senses), except (only) in the case of the eye and the manas (TAS 1, 19). In order to understand the terms vyañjana and avagraha here we have to look back at TAS 1, 15 which provides us with the four stages or divisions, of the process of mati-jñāna (sensory perception):

TAS 1, 15 says: avagrahehāvāya-dhāraṇāḥ (= avagraha, īhā, avāya and dhāraṇā): apprehension or mere sensation, speculation, perceptual judgement and retention (are the four divisions of mati, sense perception).

In other words mati-jñāna is not simply mati-jñāna because, generally, it involves four stages before the object is completely cognised and, in the particular case of sight and the function of manas, these two have a special status because the first avagraha stage of mati-jñāna is short-circuited. Sight and manas, are excluded because the avagraha stage in the process of perception does not take place in them: the stage of apprehension, a mere sensation or an indication that there is an object presented to a respective sense organ, but not yet fully grasped, is excluded in sight and the manas. Cognition as such would occur in fact in the third and fourth stages of avāya (also called apāya) and dhāraṇā, the final judgement about the object and its retention respectively (the stage of īhā or speculation is not yet perceptual judgement or avāya). For this technical reason, the functions of sight and the manas are treated separately from the other sense perceptions.

What would be reason for excluding the avagraha stage in the process of cognition through sight or the manas? How is sight or the manas different from the other four sense perceptions through touch, taste, smell and hearing? The text teaches us that the four, touch, taste, smell and hearing, presuppose a direct contact between the sense-organ and its respective object: wind, etc., has to be in direct contact with the skin to cause a sense of touch, the tongue has to touch something sweet or sour to register taste, a scent or odour has to enter the nose to smell it, and sound waves have to enter the ear in order for us to hear them. This does not seem to be case with the eyes and the mind, nothing has to ‘enter’ them for the ‘sight’ of the object looked at, or in investigating thoughts of qualities and faults, or for memory. Hence the stage of avagraha is short-circuited or omitted, so that the eyes and manas directly cognise their respective objects, without the stage of an unspecified object of perception. This is precisely the problem that is being confronted here: mati-jñāna (sensory perception) is defined as parokṣa-jñāna or indirect perception, so that seems to exclude the eyes (and manas) which has a special status.

The upshot of these deliberations is that we have to distinguish not only between sight and the other organs of perception, but also between it and the role of the manas. Moreover, we have to also distinguish between the manas as such, as group of material particles (vargaṇā/vaggaṇā), discussed above, and the manas in its modified form as manaḥ-paryāya which, by definition, is a direct mode of cognition (pratyakṣa). In other words, the role of the manas-vargaṇā or manas-group in mati-jñāna (sense perception) makes sense perception indirect (parokṣa-jñāna), through the role of the senses, whereas in its modified form as the manaḥ-paryāya means of cognition (telepathy) it is direct (pratyakṣa-jñāna) because, as we saw, manaḥ-paryāya is a form of communication without the use of the senses. These details are significant in order to uphold the basic Jaina distinction between pratyakṣa and parokṣa, as already hinted at above when talking about sight and manas. The difference is on account of the role of the senses in perception and their exclusion in the manaḥ-paryāya means of cognition, in terms of Jaina epistemology.

The rest of Pūjyapāda’s commentary to TAS 1, 19, § 204 in full verifies what was said above. After spṛṣṭānavagrahāt mentioned above, Pūjyapāda goes on to say there:

yadi prāpya-kāri syāt tvag-indriya-vat spṛṣṭam añjanaṃ gṛhṇīyāt, na tu gṛhṇāt yato mano-vad aprāpya-kārīty-avaseyam | tataś cakṣur-manasi varjayitvā śeṣāṇām indriyāṇāṃ vyañjanāvagrahaḥ | sarveṣām indriyānindriyāṇām arthāvagraha iti siddham |

If (the eye) were in contact (with the object) then, like the sense of touch, it would [just as well] perceive the collyrium (añjanaṃ, applied to the eye), but it does not perceive it, so it it to be understood that, like the manas, the eye is a sense without (physical) contact (with the object). Therefore, apart from the eye and manas, the other senses perceive indistinct things (TAS 1, 18 says: vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ). It is thus established that all the indriyas and the anindriya/manas perceive (their respective) objects [differently).²⁴

Umāsvāti’s auto-commentary on TAS 1, 19 says:

cakṣuṣā no-indriyeṇa ca vyañjanāvagraho na bhavati | caturbhir-indriyaiḥ śeṣair bhavatīty arthaḥ | evam etan mati-jñānaṃ dvi-vidhaṃ catur-vidhaṃ aṣṭa-viṃśati-vidham aṣṭa-ṣaṣasṭhyutara-śati-vidhaṃ ṣaṭ-triṃśa-tri-śati ca bhavati |

There is no apprehension of what is indistinct (vyañjana) through the eye and manas. This means that it (an indistinct apprehension) occurs (only) through the remaining four sense organs (touch, taste, smell and hearing). Thus, this mati-jñāna can be twofold, fourfold, twenty-eightfold, one hundred and sixty-eightfold or three hundred and thirty-sixfold.²⁵

What the above brief summary concerning the concept of manas has revealed in the case of sense perception or mati-jñāna, is the teaching that the function of sense perception through the eyes (and the manas) is to be seen in a significantly different way from the other four sense perceptions, through touch, taste, smell and hearing. The reason we saw was that according to the Jainas objects known through sight do not ‘enter’ the eyes, as is the case with the other sense perceptions where a direct contact with the respective sense organ is necessary: contact with the skin is necessary to cause a sense of touch, the tongue has to touch something sweet or sour to register taste, a scent or odour has to enter the nose to smell it, and sound waves have to enter the ear in order for us to hear them. In other words, we have to separate sight and the manas from the others for the sake of precision when talking about the Jaina theory of knowledge.

Śruta-jñāna

There has been an age-old debate in the history of Indian epistemology about the exact and independent nature of scriptural or authoritative knowledge, variously referred to as śruti, śabda, āpta-vacana, or śruta in Jainism. Those who regard it as a separate, autonomous pramāṇa, do not relegate it to either sense perception or inference. This holds true even if it is accepted that the function of the eyes and/or ears in reading or hearing serve as an aid. The senses by themselves, however, do not yield the essence of scriptural knowledge any more than the eyes alone by themselves yield the cognition of fire by seeing only the smoke. The protracted debate on this will not be reproduced here. Only the Tattvārtha-sūtra is being quoted for the Jaina position: TAS 1, 20: śrutaṃ mati-pūrvaṃ dvy-aneka-dvādaśa-bhedam “Scriptural knowledge, preceded by sensory knowledge, is of two kinds, which are of twelve and many subdivisions”. This sūtra refers to the precedence of sense perception (reading or listening) so that the points mentioned above about mati-jñāna would apply to scriptural or authoritative knowledge. The actual grasping of the authoritative teaching is an internal process, after the senses have performed their functions. The question of the occurrence of error in our cognition is a topic for a separate study (see Soni 2018, especially pp. 51–65).

Manaḥ-paryaya-jñāna

The changed mode of manas in the form of manaḥ-paryaya is direct (by definition) and we saw how manas is allied to sight which is mati-jñāna, namely indirect.

The five kinds of pramāṇa are listed in TAS 1, 9 and Pūjyapāda’s SS commentary on it mentions a point that we can now better understand. It has to do with the specific role of manas and shows an awareness of the concern with how manaḥ-paryaya is different from mati-jñāna. He says there:

parakīya-mano-gato ’rtho mana ity ucyate | sāhacaryāt tasya paryayaṇaṃ parigamanaṃ manaḥ-paryayaḥ | mati-jñāna-prasaṅga iti cet; na; apekśā-mātratvāt | kṣayopaśama-śakti-mātra-vijṛmbhitaṃ hi tat-kevalaṃ sva-para-manobhir vyapadiśyate | yathā abhre candramasaṃ paśyeti | (SS on TAS 1, 9, §164, pp. 67–68).²⁶

The object connected with the manas of another person is said to be the manas [of the other person]. Manaḥ-paryaya is ascertaining it, encompassing it on account of an association with it. Now, is it mati-jñāna? No, because it (manas) is merely relative (or related to it). That which is displayed by destruction-cum-subsidence alone is merely spoken of with reference to one’s own and another’s manas, just as we say ‘look at the moon in the sky’ (here the sky is intended merely as the background) (tr. based on Jain 1960, p. 16).

It is noteworthy that only after many sūtras subsequent to TAS 1, 9 which mentions the five pramāṇas, mati, etc.,²⁷ do we learn that three of them mati, śruta, and avadhi can or may be erroneous as well (TAS 1, 31/32: mati-śruta-avadhayo viparyayaś ca), not manaḥ-paryaya and kevala! This means that we have to re-read TAS 1, 9 in the light of TAS 1, 31/32 in order to arrive at a proper view of Jaina epistemology and the theory of error couched in it. The point is noteworthy because of the special status given to manaḥ-paryaya (and kevala). Since they are defined as not being erroneous they are a reliable source of cognition or knowledge for the Jainas. As already said manaḥ-paryaya as a means of knowledge presupposes an advanced stage of asceticism, one that is not affected by the karma that usually hinders the function of manaḥ-paryāya in ordinary individuals. It is in view of this that TAS 1, 23/24 says that the differences between the two kinds of manaḥ-paryaya (ṛju-vipulamatī manaḥ-paryayaḥ)²⁸ are due only to the degree of purity (e.g., whether the corresponding karmic veil has subsided and not completely removed) and infallibility (TAS 1, 24/25: viśuddhy-apratipātābhyāṃ tad-viśeṣaḥ).

Returning now again to Sāṅkhya, we saw that cognition through the senses is a split-second, complex process that involves the roles of buddhi, ahaṃkāra, manas and the indriyas. We saw that manas has the unique status of being both a buddhīndriya as well as a karmendriya (SK 26–27). This function of manas as a buddhīndriya in Sāṅkhya is clearly related to the role of buddhi that is explicitly stated as being determinative in SK 23, namely to finally determine what the object is and that this function operates optimally when the sattva component predominates.²⁹ To consciously train manas as a buddhīndriya for an operation with an optimum of sattva presupposes a special training involving a clear understanding of the difference between puruṣa and prakṛti (as in Yoga). Now, in view of the fact that in Jainism manaḥ-paryaya-jñāna also presupposes, as we saw, an advanced stage of asceticism, I submit that in this particular context manaḥ-paryaya can be understood in comparison with the role of manas as a buddhīndriya in Sāṅkhya that operates ideally with the predominance of sattva-guṇa. In both Jainism and Sāṅkhya an advanced stage of development obtained through ascetic discipline is presupposed, making a comparison of the case in point plausible.

Conclusion

It was seen that the term manas in Jainism can be traced back to so-called groups (vargaṇā/vaggaṇā) of matter (pudgala). The ṢkhĀ gives a list of five such groups, of which manas is one. Moreover, four kinds of manas-groups, namely manas groups of matter (maṇa-davva-vaggana) are given in ṢkhĀ 5, 6, 750–751. Furthermore, matter was seen seen as being constituted of atoms and molecules (TAS 5, 25) with their aggregation (saṃghāta) and disjunction (bjeda) mentioned in TAS 5, 26 and 28. It was also seen that while Umāsvāti does not use the term vargaṇā/vaggaṇā he nonetheless retains the idea of atoms and molecules aggregating and/or disjoining.

The role of the manas was seen in mati (sense perception), śruta (scriptural or authoritative source of knowledge), and manaḥ-paryaya (telepathy or communicating without the use of the senses (also written manaḥ-paryāya), omitting the remaining two means of cognition accepted by the Jainas, avadhi (clairvoyance) and kevala (omniscience), for the reasons already given. In the case of mati the perceptive Jaina view was briefly touched upon, namely of regarding sight (and manas) as being different from the other four sense perceptions through touch, taste, smell and hearing, because the objects of sight do not ‘enter, touch or are in direct contact with the eyes’, as is the case with the perception through touch, etc. The modified form of manas in its function as manaḥ-paryaya was also briefly discussed in order to show its difference from mati. Mati also plays a role in śruta, without the latter means of cognition being reduced to sense perception on account of the involvement of hearing or reading.

It is well-known in the Indian context that each school accepts its own number with regard to the means of cognition. It is assumed that there were logical criteria for accepting specific types of pramāṇas. It seems that there are at least four general conditions or criteria for the accepted number of the means of cognition in all the schools, which the Jainas also implicitly accepted. These criteria can be summarised in conclusion as follows:

• 1. The cognition that each means of cognition or knowledge furnishes must be new and not attainable by any other means.

• 2. One means of cognition may aid another in making cognition possible, for example perception may aid the cognition arrived at through an inference, e.g. inferring the seen smoke from the unseen fire, but the means in question should not be reducible to another. In Jainism authoritative statements (śruta) cannot be reduced to sense perception (mati), although hearing or reading plays a role, as we saw.

• 3. The cognition arrived at through a particular means should not be contradicted (abādhita) by another means.

• 4. The accepted means of cognition should appeal to reason and in the case of scriptural or trustworthy authority (śabda, śruti or śruta), for example, the truth that is revealed must appear probable and be made intelligible in terms of human experience, otherwise the revealed truth would fail in its purpose of being understandable and thereby become useless (see also Soni 1989, p. 119).