Abstract It has long been recognized that the presence of politicians on the boards of directors of public firms may create inefficiencies. Nevertheless, research has so far neglected the effect of political affiliation on the appointment of Members of Parliament to the boards of public firms. This article intends to fill this gap by conducting an empirical analysis on a sample of 945 deputies of the Italian Parliament elected over the period 1996–2001. Regression discontinuity estimates show that the centre-left coalition is about 25 percentage points more likely to appoint its Members of Parliament to the board of public enterprises than the centre-right coalition. Political appointments become more pronounced when the centre-left forms a governing coalition.

中文翻译：

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意大利公共企业议会后职业中的政治隶属关系

摘要长期以来，人们认识到，政治人物在上市公司董事会中的存在可能会造成效率低下。然而，迄今为止，研究忽略了政治联系对任命国会议员加入公共公司董事会的影响。本文拟通过对进行的意大利议会的945名人大代表选举在1996 - 2001年的样本进行实证分析，以填补这一空白。回归不连续性估计显示，中左翼联盟比中右翼联盟任命国会议员担任公共企业董事会的可能性高约25个百分点。当中左翼组成执政联盟时，政治任命变得更加明显。