Although it is assumed that CEOs attempt to use corporate reputation ratings to justify increases in their annual compensation, controversy persists on the relationship between corporate reputation ratings and CEO compensation. Based on agency theory and signaling theory, we predict a positive relationship between corporate reputation ratings and CEO compensation but only during periods of economic recovery. Using a subset of Fortune’s “Most Admired” companies, this study demonstrates that corporate reputation ratings are significantly associated with CEO compensation during periods of economic recovery but not during periods of economic recession, after controlling the potential extraneous factors that may influence CEO pay.

尽管假设 CEO 试图利用企业声誉评级来证明其年度薪酬的增长是合理的，但关于企业声誉评级与 CEO 薪酬之间的关系仍存在争议。基于代理理论和信号理论，我们预测企业声誉评级与 CEO 薪酬之间存在正相关关系，但仅限于经济复苏时期。本研究使用《财富》杂志“最受赞赏”公司的子集，表明在控制了可能影响 CEO 薪酬的潜在外来因素后，企业声誉评级与经济复苏时期的 CEO 薪酬显着相关，但在经济衰退时期则不然。 .