Skip to main content
Log in

The Impact of Corporate Reputation Ratings on CEO Compensation Under Diverse Economic Conditions

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Corporate Reputation Review Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Although it is assumed that CEOs attempt to use corporate reputation ratings to justify increases in their annual compensation, controversy persists on the relationship between corporate reputation ratings and CEO compensation. Based on agency theory and signaling theory, we predict a positive relationship between corporate reputation ratings and CEO compensation but only during periods of economic recovery. Using a subset of Fortune’s “Most Admired” companies, this study demonstrates that corporate reputation ratings are significantly associated with CEO compensation during periods of economic recovery but not during periods of economic recession, after controlling the potential extraneous factors that may influence CEO pay.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Alin, A. 2010. Multicollinearity. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics 2 (3): 370–374.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anckar, C. 2008. On the applicability of the most similar systems design and the most different systems design in comparative research. International Journal of Social Research Methodology 11 (5): 389–401.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, R.C., and J.M. Bizjak. 2003. An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. Journal of Banking and Finance 27 (7): 1323–1348.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ang, S.H., and A. Wight. 2009. Building intangible resources: The stickiness of reputation. Corporate Reputation Review 12 (1): 21–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anginer, D., and M. Statman. 2010. Stocks of admired and spurned companies. Journal of Portfolio Management 36 (3): 71–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Balsam, S., J. Boone, H. Liu, and J. Yin. 2016. The impact of say-on-pay on executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 35 (2): 162–191.

    Google Scholar 

  • Balsam, S., and S. Miharjo. 2007. The effect of equity compensation on voluntary executive turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43 (1): 95–119.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berrone, P., and L.R. Gomez-Mejia. 2009. Environmental performance and executive compensation: An integrated agency-institutional perspective. Academy of Management Journal 52 (1): 103–126.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blackwell, D.W., D.M. Dudney, and K.A. Farrell. 2007. Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 29 (3): 315–338.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bosse, D.A., and R.A. Phillips. 2016. Agency theory and bounded self-interest. Academy of Management Review 41 (2): 276–297.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, B. 1998. Do stock market investors reward companies with reputations for social performance? Corporate Reputation Review 1 (3): 271–280.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cao, Y., L.A. Myers, and T.C. Omer. 2012. Does company reputation matter for financial reporting quality? Evidence from restatements. Contemporary Accounting Research 29 (3): 956–990.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chun, R. 2005. Corporate reputation: Meaning and measurement. International Journal of Management Reviews 7 (2): 91–109.

    Google Scholar 

  • Connelly, B.L., S.T. Certo, R.D. Ireland, and C.R. Reutzel. 2011. Signaling theory: A review and assessment. Journal of Management 37 (1): 39–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Conyon, M.J. 2014. Executive compensation and board governance in US firms. The Economic Journal 124 (574): F60–F89.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dah, M.A. 2016. Governance and firm value: The effect of a recession. Research in International Business and Finance 37: 464–476.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis, J., J.S. Batchelor, and P. Kreiser. 2018. The influence of organizational task environment and firm size on top-executive compensation contracts. Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship 31 (1): 21–42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dowling, G. 2006. How good corporate reputations create corporate value. Corporate Reputation Review 9 (2): 134–143.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eckert, C. 2017. Corporate reputation and reputation risk: Definition and measurement from a (risk) management perspective. Journal of Risk Finance 18 (2): 145–158.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eisenhardt, K.M. 1989. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review 14 (1): 57–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elsaid, E., and W.N.I.I.I. Davidson. 2009. What happens to CEO compensation following turnover and succession? Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 49 (2): 424–447.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flatt, S.J., J. Harris-Boundy, and S. Wagner. 2013. CEO succession: A help or a hindrance to corporate reputation? Corporate Reputation Review 16 (3): 206–219.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flatt, S.J., and S.J. Kowalczyk. 2008. Creating competitive advantage through intangible assets: The direct and indirect effects of corporate culture and reputation. Advances in Competitiveness Research 16 (1/2): 13–30.

    Google Scholar 

  • Focke, F., E. Maug, and A. Niessen-Ruenzi. 2017. The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 123 (2): 313–336.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fombrun, C. 1998. Indices of corporate reputation: An analysis of media rankings and social monitors’ ratings. Corporate Reputation Review 1 (4): 327–340.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fombrun, C., and C. van Riel. 1997. The reputational landscape. Corporate Reputation Review 1 (1): 5–13.

    Google Scholar 

  • Furnham, A., and H.C. Boo. 2011. A literature review of the anchoring effect. Journal of Socio-Economics 40 (1): 35–42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gao, H., J. Luo, and T. Tang. 2015. Effects of managerial labor market in executive compensation: Evidence from job-hopping. Journal of Accounting and Economics 59 (2–3): 203–220.

    Google Scholar 

  • Geiger, S., and L. Cashen. 2007. Organizational size and CEO compensation: The moderating effect of diversification in downscoping organizations. Journal of Managerial Issues 19 (2): 233–252.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haleblian, J.J., M.D. Pfarrer, and J.T. Kiley. 2017. High-reputation firms and their differential acquisition behaviors. Strategic Management Journal 38 (11): 2237–2254.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hamori, M. 2014. Executive career success in search-firm-mediated moves across employers. International Journal of Human Resource Management 25 (3): 390–411.

    Google Scholar 

  • Highhouse, S., M.E. Brooks, and G. Gregarus. 2009. An organizational impression management perspective on the formation of corporate reputations. Journal of Management 35 (6): 1481–1493.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korn Ferry. 2009. ‘Fortune world’s most admired companies. https://www.kornferry.com/institute/fortune-worlds-most-admired-companies-2019

  • Little, P., D. Coffee, R. Lirely, and B. Little. 2010. Explaining variation in market to book ratios: Do corporate reputation ratings add explanatory power over and above brand values? Journal of Finance and Accountancy 2: 1–10.

    Google Scholar 

  • Little, P.L., and B.L. Little. 2000. Do perceptions of corporate social responsibility contribute to explaining differences in corporate price-earnings ratio? A research note. Corporate Reputation Review 3 (2): 137–142.

    Google Scholar 

  • Love, E.G., and M. Kraatz. 2009. Character, conformity, or the bottom line? How and why downsizing affected corporate reputation. Academy of Management Journal 52 (2): 314–335.

    Google Scholar 

  • Love, E.G., and M. Kraatz. 2017. Failed stakeholder exchanges and corporate reputation: The case of earnings misses. Academy of Management Journal 60 (3): 880–903.

    Google Scholar 

  • Love, E.G., J. Lim, and M.K. Bednar. 2017. The face of the firm: The influence of CEOs on corporate reputation. Academy of Management Journal 60 (4): 1462–1481.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matolcsy, Z.P. 2000. Executive compensation and cash performance during different economic cycles. Contemporary Accounting Research 17 (4): 671–692.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miles, P.C., and G. Miles. 2013. Corporate social responsibility and executive compensation: Exploring the link. Social Responsibility Journal 9 (1): 76–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roberts, P.W., and G.R. Dowling. 2002. Corporate reputation and sustained superior financial performance. Strategic Management Journal 23 (12): 1077–1093.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, L.A. 2010. Why are CEOs rarely fired? Evidence from structural estimation. Journal of Finance 55 (6): 2051–2087.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tosi, H.L., S. Werner, J.P. Katz, and L.R. Gomez-Mejia. 2000. How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO pay studies. Journal of Management 26 (2): 301–339.

    Google Scholar 

  • van Essen, M., J. Otten, and E.J. Carberry. 2015. Assessing managerial power theory: A meta-analytic approach to understanding the determinants of CEO compensation. Journal of Management 41 (1): 164–202.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Joel Rudin.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Rudin, J., Lee, J. The Impact of Corporate Reputation Ratings on CEO Compensation Under Diverse Economic Conditions. Corp Reputation Rev 24, 117–127 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41299-020-00095-0

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41299-020-00095-0

Keywords

Navigation