Appeals to human nature are ubiquitous, yet historically many have proven ill-founded. Why? How might frequent errors be remedied towards building a more robust and reliable scientific study of human nature? Our aim is neither to advance specific scientific or philosophical claims about human nature, nor to proscribe or eliminate such claims. Rather, we articulate through examples the types of errors that frequently arise in this field, towards improving the rigor of the scientific and social studies. We seek to analyze such claims rhetorically, cognitively, and epistemically. Namely, how do we think about human nature? Claims about human nature, we show, are susceptible to widely exhibited deficits in cognitive tendencies such as framing, confirmation bias, satisficing, and teleological perspectives, as well as motivated reasoning. Such missteps foster methodological, empirical, and psychological mistakes and biases. Specifically, they promote the naturalizing error, whereby cultural ideology and values are projected onto an apparently objective description of nature. Concrete remedies are offered to aid scientists in conducting and reporting their research goals and findings more responsibly and effectively (relevant also to educators and other communicators who convey these findings publicly). Recommendations include acknowledging that human nature claims are often context-dependent, seeking multiple critical perspectives, and explicitly labeling uncertainties.

对人性的呼吁无处不在，但历史上许多人都没有根据。为什么？如何纠正经常发生的错误，以建立更强大，更可靠的人性科学研究？我们的目的既不是推进关于人性的特定科学或哲学主张，也不是禁止或消除此类主张。相反，我们通过示例阐明了该领域中经常出现的错误类型，以提高科学和社会研究的严格性。我们力求通过口头，认知和认识论来分析此类主张。也就是说，我们如何思考人性？我们证明，关于人性的主张容易受到认知倾向（如取景，确认偏见，满意度和目的论观点以及动机推理）广泛展现的缺陷的影响。这样的失误助长了方法，经验和心理上的错误和偏见。具体而言，它们会促进归化错误，从而将文化意识形态和价值观投射到对自然的表面客观描述上。提供了具体的补救措施，以帮助科学家更负责任和有效地进行和报告他们的研究目标和发现（也与公开传达这些发现的教育者和其他传播者有关）。建议包括承认人性主张常常是与上下文相关的，寻求多种批判性观点，